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INTRODUCTICN 
The present thesis entitled, "Pricing System 
In The Public Enterprises of India With Special 
Reference to Iron and Steel Industry", is the fruit 
of seven years of persistent work on the problem. 
Enormity of the work can be judged from heterogeneous 
nature and size of public enterprises whose working 
and problems I have analysed, besides presenting a 
case study of Iron and Steel Industry, 
The purpose of this study is to examine the 
pricing policies of our public enterprises which are 
expected to generate resources through the sale of goods 
o-
and services. The State has made massive investment 
in the public sector to provide social and economic 
overheads and public utilitieso To accelerate the 
growth rate further, it is essential that the capital 
is accumulated at every convenient point of activity. 
The public enterprises should *^ ot lag .behind the rest 
of the economy in capital formation. In fact, * surplus' 
from public enterprises would constitute savings for 
productive investment on the one hand and contribution 
to the national social welfare programmes on the other, 
•Surplus* is also necessary for public enterprises to 
-Cii)-
self-finance their expansion and raodernicationo This 
"being the policy goal, a pricing system to secure an 
adequate return on the capital invested in public 
enterprises is not only unobjectionable but Is, indeed, 
desirable. Thus the main purpose of this study is to 
analyse the pricing system of public enterprises and 
make suggestions compatible v/ith improvement in 
marketing and technological position, efficiency in 
management and reduction in costs to a minimum level. 
It must be only through the device of an appropriate 
pricing policy that a successful public enterprise, by 
its efficiency and drive, finds the earnings for its 
own grov/th and the growth of the economy as a whole^ 
Critical evaluation of working results of public , 
enterprises, cost pattern, organisation and management 
imderline the following facts: 
(i) Trading results of public enterprises are 
by far and large highly unsatisfactory, 
(ii) Costs in their cases are excessive due to 
a variety of reasons, including idle capacity, lack of 
harmony between social and economic interests, etc, 
(ill) There is lack of initiative to reduce cost 
of production and take prompt decisions due to inefficient 
-(iii)-
organisation and management which is over-centralised 
in the hands of bureaucrats, 
i±v) There is arbitrariness in the formulation 
of pricing policies. 
In a bid to resolve the above problems, I have 
made the following recommendations of far-reaching 
consequences: 
(a) Non-commercial activities of public enter-
prises must be separated from the economic ones to avoid 
confusion in the mind of management who, at present, in 
most cases do not incur statutorj'- financial obligations 
fo fulfilp 
(b)a"When prices are determined, there must obtain 
a 'minimum level of-cost* viz-a-viz prices for the 
products of our public enterprises. Prices determined 
on the basis of 'cost plus* formula are not conducive 
to reduction of costs. These arbitrary methods must be 
replaced by the 'marg;^al cost pricing' system, 
(c) To reduce costs.to a minimum level, public 
enterprises must be run on sound principles of management 
so that prompt decisions are taken, 
(d) Efficle;icy must be measured in relation to 
-(irr)-
certain objectives, instead of money-profits alone, viz., 
economical use of capital resources and other inputs, 
savings on overheads and inventories, higher productivity 
of labour and capital, changes in unit cost of produc-
tion of a given standard* 
(e) 'Surplus' targets must be determined for indi-
vidual concerns in close consultation v/ith the manage-
ment who alone can say that is feasible and what is 
linfeasible vinder existing demand and supply conditions^ 
(f) A competent body must be constituted to take 
into consideration the impact of changes in pricing 
policies on the private sector vi«-a-vi» the national 
econcnjy as a whole» 
<h 
NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE ENQUIHI 
The enquiry deals with the pricing problem of 
public enterprises In relation to the following questions: 
(i) have the objectives been specified to harmo-
nize economic and social interests which the public 
enterprises are called upon to fulfil and the norms to 
mieasure efficiency; 
(11> is there a consistent pricing policy; 
-(V)-
(iii) does there obtain 'tninimum cost level' vis-a-
vis-pricing; and 
(iv) does there exist a system of sufficient consul-
tation with the management to fix prices including 
profit margin or »surplus* targets? 
To resolve the above problems, an attempt is made 
to recommend the methods most suited to our public 
enterprises under existing socio-economic conditicnSe 
RESEARCH I^ iETHODOLOGY 
The research methodology is based on the technique 
of thesis-writing to present the problem in its true 
perspective. The study has been made v;ith theoretical 
justifications and practical applicability, with a 
view to reach conclusions vjith the help of sound 
economic reasoning, experiences gained in the public 
enterprises and the lessons learnt from the economic 
history of their development, 
o 
The statistical analysis Is based on personal 
interviews and the collection of primary data. The 
reports of the Bureau of public Enterprises and public 
documents are the secondary sources. The case study 
gives independent estimates of individual components of 
-iv±)-
works costo Studies by the Research Bureau of the 
Reserve Eunk of India and reports carried by a number 
of dailies on public enterprises have been used to 
illiOKiinate the problem. 
For the purpose of scientific investigation, the 
period 1965-7^ of the working of our- public enterprises, 
including iron and steel industry, has beerr selected. 
The long period has been studied to analyse the conti-
nuous impact of pricing policies on the working and 
profitability of these undertrikings, 
LAI-OUT OF TIIE WORK 
The study is divided into seven chapters: Chapter I, 
"Development of Public Enterprises in India i>-jai Analy-
tical Study", examines the development of public enter-
prises with an emphasis on their role in mobilising 
resources. It shows that public enterprises have been 
established to attain the goal of "Socialistic Pattern 
of Society" and to provide infrastructure for further 
socio-economic development of the country. In pursuance 
of this objective, the Government has to perform func-
tions ranging from the provision of public utilities to 
industrialisation of the economy. These multifarious 
activities call for huge investments. 
-(vii)" 
To explore the exteiit and size of potetilii;.lities 
of resource-mobilisation by the public enterprises for 
their own future expansion, modernization and for the 
plan outlays, financial performance of the public 
enterprises during the period 1965-7^ has been analysed 
in the Chapter II, "Financial Per^ -formance of the Public 
Enterprises", The contention that performance of our 
public enterprises is not satisfactory is tenable on 
the basis of the study conducted in this chapter* 
TheT"e are various factors which depressed profit-
ability of these enterprises, vizo, large idle capacity, 
conflicting 'economic' and 'social' obligations, etc-
Chapter III, "Cost Behaviour and Influences on Cost 
Composition", has critically analysed those factors 
which inflate the costs in public enterprises. 
In addition to these. Chapter IV, "Cost Pattern 
In Relation to Organisation and I-fenagement", is devoted 
to the problem of excessive costs which continues to 
ha\int our public enterprises due to lack of sound 
principles^of management. 
Cliapter V, "Pricing System In Public Enterprises", 
deals with the following questions which have arisen 
out of the discussions presented in the foregoing 
chapters, viz: 
-(viii)-
(a) to harmonize 'the 'ecoijomic' and 'social' 
inte<rests and specify the norms to measure the efficiency 
of public enterprises; 
(b) to recoimend a consistent pricing policy; 
(c) to specify methods of reducing costs to a 
minimum level vis-a-vis pricing; and 
(d) to recommend a system of consultation with 
the management to fix 'surplus' targets for individual 
concerns. 
Chapter VI, "Pricing System In Iron and Steel 
Industry", \^ hich is a case study, substantiates the 
vieu of the research scholar that our public enter-
prises need a forward-looking pricing policy rather 
than a system of price controls which has tarnished 
the image of public enterprises in India. Indeed, the 
reforms recommended in the Chapter VTI, "Conclusions", 
are essential for the fulfilment of the social res-
ponsibilities of the public enterprises and their 
tinisteeship towards the citizens of the country. 
CHAPTER - I 
DEVELOPMEI^ 'T OF PUBLIC ENTEPJ^RISES IN I^ iDlA 
AN ANALYTICAL STUDY 
(WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO IRON & STEEL INDUSTRY) 
"Public ownership" which denotes all government 
agencies engaged in providing goods and ser^ rices is 
a fairly old concept. Its actual development can be 
traced to the Industrial Revolution ^ d the doctrine 
of laissez-faire. In laissez-faire, only a few 
capitalists controlled the whole econony. They used 
to exploit the v/orking class by paying them the wage 
barely sufficient to sustain the life, and appropriate 
whole of the surplus value of the product in the form 
of profits. It resulted in unequal distribution of 
the wealth and brought, in its train great hardships 
to labourers, besides creating instability in the 
economy. It was not surprising, therefore, that this 
unsatisfactory state of affairs was the cause of 
emei*gence of "public ownership" of production, distri-
bution and consumption. The "Socialism" was the answer 
to the attitude of capitalist class since the public 
-(2)-
enterprise was viewed as the people's property* The idea 
of "socialism" emerged slowly; and notable contribution 
to its development was made by the Fabian Essayists^ 
They emphasised that public ownership; of economic 
institutions was necessary, because, if it was left to 
the private enterprise, the economy would deteriorate 
since profit was the main motive of private investment. 
Private enterpreneurs normally abstained from entering 
the area of low profit, though strategic to economic 
development of a country. Economic planning which has 
been adopted by many countries, including India, for 
rapid and balanced economic development was difficult to 
implement without State participation and public control 
of certain key industries* 
AS far as the Indian Econcsny is concerned, the 
charter of public sector was embodied in the Industrial. 
Policy Resolution of April, 19U3* The role assigned to 
the State in the Resolution was significant for bringing 
about a rapid economic development by expanding its 
activities. The rationale of public enterprises in India 
was identified with the rationale of economic planning* 
Basically, aim of all the economic planning is to bring 
about ordered economic development in different sectors of 
the national economy. The State can make a deliberate and 
conscious effort towards economic development by entering 
the field of economic activities and can bring about the 
needed development in critical areas. Also, the public 
industries are used as the source of finance for the plan 
-(3)-
outlay. Further, public institutions are the mediuin 
through which the concept of welfare economy is realised 
practicsJ-lyo They help in providing job opportunities 
for the vinemployed mass of the, country. For a thorough 
review of the development of public sector it is, 
therefore,^essential to trace the State's policy during 
the pre-and-post Independence era» An attempt has been 
made in the present chapter to examine the growth of the 
public sector and that of the iron and steel industry. 
Finally, an analysis has been made to determine the role 
of the public enterprises in mobilizing resources for 
plan outlays and tor the expansion of their own© 
At the outset, it may be expressed that the public 
sector In India embraces enterprises of the Central, the 
State Governments, some local governments and other 
organisations, especially set up for this purpose. The 
most important component of the public sector in India 
is the Central Government enterprises. Analysis is 
therefore confined to Central Government enterprises cmly, 
STATE POLICY TOWARDS PUBLIC SECTOR 
(a) PBE-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD: Evolution of the public 
sedtor in the economy 
of India is linked with the planning. During the 19th 
centuiy, laissez-faire was the policy of the British 
India, Its main objective was to keep India confined to 
agriculture and extractive industries in the interest of 
British industry and trade» This policy crippled the 
growth of the Indian ventures. 
By the turn of the century, Government's policy 
changed. For instance, Imperial Department of Commerce 
and Industry was established in 1905j and Indian Indus-
trial CozniDission was appointed. World War I also 
influenced approach of the Government to Indian industries. 
Provinces were given autonomy, constitutional reforms were 
introduced, Tariff Board was set up in 1923, and "discri-
minatory protection" was granted to certain industries. 
It helped industrial development to a certain extent; 
industries like textiles, paper, cement, jute, iron and 
•J 
steel were established. This process of industrialisation 
was, however, halted by the Great Depression, Euin of the 
economy lent support to the demand for some type of control 
over production and effective utilisation of man-power. 
Also, the Indian National Congress had, at its Karachi 
session in 1931» passed far-reaching resolution with 
regard to economic planning. The Congress expressed 
Itself in favour of "nationalisation" of key and basic 
industries. Towards the end of 1938, the National 
Planning Committee was constituted. However, the Committee 
had a chequered career owing to the war and the arrest of 
its members. 
1, The first successfia integrated iron aind steel plant was 
established by the Tata Iron and Steel Canpany (TISCO) 
at what is now Jamshedpur in 1908, 
-tp;-
its members. 
The idea of economic p3.anning seems to have received 
the greatest attention of the people as well as that of 
the Govemaient during the World War II. Main concern of 
the Government was to keep up production of the indigenous 
industries after Japan's entry into the war. The Government 
provided protection to Indisui industries against foreign 
competition, established a nizmber of committees in 
connection with "reconstruction" after J\me, 19^ -1, In 
19Mf, a new post of Member for "Planning and Reconstruction" 
was created. Meanwhile, a number of non-official plans 
were published in the country. The "Bombay Plan", sponsored 
by industrial magnates was before the country early in 
19Mf6 In April, 19Mf, the "People's Plan" was published 
at the instance of Indian Federation of Labour, Also 
in 19^» came out the "Gandhian Plan" of economic develop-
ment. This plan emphasised the development of cottage 
industries and agriculture* "Decentralisation" and "Village ^ 
Self-sufficiency" were its basic tenets. 
However, none of those plans was taken up for 
implementation because the country then was under foreign 
rule. In 19^, the Government of India annoimced their 
industrial policy involving Central control over certain 
industries. The industrial policy of ^^k•^ marked the 
first ever definite step suggesting the attitude of the 
State towards industry in India. This policy was not 
implemented owing to the impending political changes. 
-<6)-
In October, 19^, the Advisory Planning Board was 
appointed© Report of the Board was published on 
February 1, 19lf7» In its report, the Board opined 
in regard to State ownership that, at least, some of 
the basic industries should he bro\»*ght under the 
control and management of the State *^  
POST-INDEPE^JDEJCE PERIOD: After independence, 
economic situation, 
instead of showing signs of improvement, steadily 
deteriorated. Industrial production declined, prices 
registered further increases, labour unrest became 
severer than ever before, and political turmoil 
following partition- of the coxmtry led to a host of 
other problems. All these factors culminated in the 
delayed fonnulation of industrial policy. In December, 
19U-7, ^ e Industrial Conference representing labour, 
industry and commerce was convened to chalk out a 
definite industrial policy and to put an end to the 
vincertainties and unrest. 
The Conference recommended to the Government (a) the 
need for equitable *distribution of the country's wealth 
and production leading to rapid improveaent of the 
standard of living and comfort of the masses of the 
liidian people, based on social Justice, (b) the need for 
the fullest utilisation of the country's resources 
without allowing wealth to accumulate in the hands of 
-(7)-
a section of the people, and (c) the need for Central 
planning, co-ordination and direction so as to obtain 
maxinauD efficiency and output, a fair and reasonable 
distk»ibution of the industries throughout the country 
in relation to potentialities of each area, and also to 
determine a fair basis of wages and profits*^ 
The Conference divided industries into three broad 
categories, viz*, (1) industries which should be under 
state ownership and management, (2) industries managed 
and owned by private enterprises, and (3) industries to 
be jointly owned and managed both by the State and the 
private enterprises. 
Meanwhile, the All-India Congress Conmittee, at its 
"Session held in New Delhi In November, 19^7, urged the 
planning of co\mtry»s economic resources on the basis of 
Justice, equality and democracy* The economic Programme 
a-
Committee was constituted at this session. It 
recommended the fixation of a ceiling for incomes, widest 
diffusion of opportunities through an economy based on 
decentralisation and national and regional self-
sufficiency* 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY RESOLUTION OF A$k8i 
The National Government placed their first formal 
statement of industrial policy on the table of the 
Dominion Parliament on April 6, ^9kQo The policy was 
-(8)-
fonmilated largely in the light of discussions held at 
the Industries Conference, The Resolution on IndustrisuL 
Policy was that "the nation has now set itself to 
establish a social order where justice and equality of 
opportunity shauLl be secured to all the people In 
the present state of the nation's economy fhe mass of 
the people are below subsistence level; the emphasis 
should be on the expansion of productiono .«oA mere 
redistribution of existing wealth would make no essential 
difference to the people and would merely mean the 
distribution of poverty." The Resolution on Industrial 
Policy underlines the limitations to the active rdle of 
the State in the development of industries in terms 
of mechanism and resources which "may not permit it to 
participate in industry as widely as may be de'sirable." 
Accordingly, the Government divided industries into three 
categories: (1) those which would be more or less 
Government's monopoly, (2) those which would normally be 
open to private enterprise; but the State would not 
hesitate to intervene whenever the progress of an 
industry under private enterprise was unsatisfactory, and 
(3) those which would be subject to Central regiilation 
o 
and control. 
The category of industries under Central GovemmenJ+«s 
monopoly comprised the manufacture of arms and ammunition, 
the producticoi and control of atomic energy and the 
ownership and management of railway ti^ ansport* However, 
-(9)-
in the case of the following six industries the State, 
including Provincial and State Governments and other 
public authorities like municipal corporations, would 
be exclusively responsible for the establishment of 
new undertakings, except where in the national interest 
the State itself found it necessary to secure the 
co-operation of private enterprise subject to such 
control and regulation as the Central Government might 
prescribe: 
(1) Coal; (2) Iron and Steel; (3) Aircraft 
Mantifacture; (h) Ship-building; (5) Manu-
facture of telephone, telegraph and wireless 
apparatus, including radio receiving sets, and 
(6) Mineral Oils. 
The existing undertakings in those fields would be allowed 
to develop for a period of ten years during which they 
were to be allowed all the facilities for efficient 
working and reasonable expansion^ At the^end of this 
period, the whole matter was to be reviewed and a 
decision taken in the light of circumstances obtaining^ 
at that time. If it was decided that the State should 
acquire any unit, the fundamental rights guaranteed by 
the Constitution were to be observed and compensation » 
awarded on a fair and equitable basis. 
It was only after the Constitution laying down the 
"Directive Principles" was framed that the matter assumed 
Importance, For the first time, it was laid down In 
-(10)-
clear and unequivocal language that the State shall so 
direct its policy that (a) ownership and control of the 
material resources of the community are distributed to 
subserve the common good, and (b) the operation of the 
economic system shall not result in the concentration of 
wealth and means of production to the common detriment. 
The policy was given a concrete form by the Planning 
Commission in its Report of December 7, 1952, in which 
it laid down the objectives, techniques and priorities 
in planning* Speaking of the backwardness of the Indian 
economy, the Planning Commission said in 1952, "the 
problem is not merely one of making the existing economic 
Institutions work more efficiently or making small 
adjustments in them. What is required is a transformation 
of that system so as to ensure greater efficiency as well 
as equality and Justice© There are risks in going too 
far or too fast in these matters, but the risks of not 
moving fast enough are no less serious." In addition, 
the Commission observed, "it is clear that, in the 
transformation of the economy that is called for, the 
State will have to play the crucial role« Whether one 
Jhinks of the problem of capital formation or of intro-
duction of new techniques or of expansion of social 
services or of the overall re-suLlignment of the productive 
forces and class relationships within society, one comes 
Inevitably to the conclusion that a rapid expansion of the 
economic and social responsibilities of the State will 
- ( 1 1 ) -
alone be capable of satisfying the Igltimate expectations 
of the people," 
The Comniission also referred specifically to the 
relative share of the public and private sectors in the 
ownership of productive capacity and reiterated the 
division of the sphere of responsibility laid down in 
the Industrial Policy Statement of 19^ -8, 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY RESOLUTION OF 1956: 
The issue received a further seal of approval in the 
Economic Policy Resolution passed by the Avadl Session 
of the Indian National Congress held In January, 1955o 
Soon after this, Government reviewed the 19^^ Industrial 
Policy and announced a new one in a resolution dated 
April 30, 1956, which stated that, In order to realize 
the objective of socialist pattern of society (which 
is different in its connotation from socialism), it was 
essential to expand the public sector* "This would 
provide the economic foundation for increasing opportuni-
ties for gainftil employment and improving living stsundards 
and working conditions for the mass of the peddle. It' 
would also reduce disparities in income and wealth, prevent 
prigate monopoly and the concentration of economic power 
in the hands of small number of individuals. Accordingly, 
the State must progressively assume a predominant and 
direct responsibility for setting up new industrial 
-(12)-
undertakings and for developing transport facilities," 
However, the Government, conscious of the limiting 
• factors, defined the area of the State's sole responsi-
bility for industrial development and made a selection 
of industries to play a secondary role. Industries 
were accordingly reclassiiied into three categories, 
namely, (1) industries for whose development the State 
is exclusively responsible, (2) industries left to the 
initiative and enterprise of the private sector, and 
(3) Industries which would be progressively state-
owned, but in which private enterprise could continue 
to operate. 
There have been some more recent statements on 
Industrial Policy by the Government of India, While 
there have been some changes in policy emphasis, there 
has been no major cliange of direction. The Government 
of India has continued to endorse the view that the 
State would play a positive role and provide leadership 
in the more critical, more difficult and capital 
intensive sectors of the economy and, at the same time^ , 
provide assistance and guidance to the private sector 
which will develop and operate under a system of State 
regulation, 
. GBOWTH OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR The public sector 
now constitutes 
-(13)-
the core of industrialisation and covers a very large 
field including transport and conmmnication, minerals, 
and other basic industries* Railways are the biggest 
industry of the country both from the pblnt of view of 
employment and capital. There are other big establish-
ments which are necessary for the economic development 
TABLE 1,1 - SHARE OF PUBLIC SECTOR IN PLAN OUTLATS 
(RS. CHORES) 
I PLAN II PLAN III PLAN IV PLAN V PLAN 
Overall 
Outlays 3,760 
Public 
Sector 
Outlay 1,960 
Private 
Sector 
(Invest-
ment) 1,800 
7,772 12,677 
-^,672 8,577 
3,100 i f, 100 
25,181 ^^,k6h 
16,201 39,303 
8,980 16,161 
Total 
Invest-
ments 3,360 
Public 
Sector 1,560 
(AS % 
of Total) k6% 
Private 
Sector 1,800 
(AS % o f 
Total) ^h% 
6,831 
3,731 
55% 
3,100 
^5% 
11,280 
7,180 
6h% 
Sioo 
36^ 
22,635 
13,655 
6 1 ^ 
8.980 
39^ 
55ik6k-
39,303 
71Jf 
16,161 
29% 
NOTE: Percentage share has been calculated by the Research 
Scholar, 
SOURCE: Government of India, Planning Commission, Five Year 
Plans, New Delhi, 
- ( 1 1 + ) -
of the coTintry, The proportion of investment in the 
public sector out of total investment in the^national 
economy has been steadily rising since 1951* The ratio 
of public investment, though lower than the private 
sector inifcially, increased in the later plan periods. 
The above table 1«1 shows that investment in the public 
sector increased from k6 per cent in the First Five Year 
Plan to 71 per cent in the Fifth Plan, mainly due to the 
fact that India has accepted the "Socialistic Pattern of 
Society," State had to invest in some projects vrhich were 
not only essential for the economy but also for social 
welfare of the masses. 
The following table 1,2 shows the distribution of 
plan outlays in the public sector during the five year 
plans. The distribution of investment in different heads 
reflects the priorities. In the first Five Year Plan 
period, agricultural developmeut was given a place of 
prominence. Share of agriciilture, irrigation and other 
sullied projects was 31 per cent. Generation of electric 
power which was linked in most cases with the major 
projects aJLso received priority. Priority to agriculture 
was necessary because without a substantial increase in 
the production of food and raw-materials, it would have 
been impossible to sustain and promote a higher tempo 
of industrial development. Due to this reason the high 
priority given in investment programmes of public sector 
-(15^)-
TABLE 1o2 - DISTRIBUTION OF PLAN OUTLAWS IN PUBLIC SECTOR 
(RS.CROEES) 
Head of the 
Development I PLAN I I PLAN I I I PLAN IV PLAN V PLAN 
1, Development 
Out lays 
Agr ic i i l tu re 
& A l l i e d 
Sec tors 
I r r i g a t i o n 
& Flood 
Control 
Power 
Vi l l age & 
Small 
Industry-
Indus t ry & 
Minerals 
1,501 (TO) 
291 
(15^) 
310 
(16^) 
260 
(13^) 
^3 (2^) 
(^1) 
Transpor t & 523 
CcMmnunicationC 27^) 
2» Soc ia l Ser -
v i c e s & 
o t h e r 
Programmes k^S 
(23^) 
3 . Mtsce l l a -
neous 
3,768 6 ,008 
(82J?) (70%) 
529 
(11^) 
^20 
(10^) 
176 
ih%) 
900 
(20^) 
1,300 
(28^) 
830 
(17^) 
- 7 ^ 
(1^) 
1,068 
650 
(9%) 
1,020 
(13^) 
26J+ 
W) 
1,520 
(20^) 
1,^86 
(20Jg) 
1,300 
(17^) 
1,27lf 
(13^) 
OVERALL OUTLAY 
IN THE PUBLIC 
SECTOR 1,960 l+,672 8,577 
(100^) (100^) (lOOJg) 
b%) 
2,932 
(19^) 
2^3 (2%) 
2,861+ 
(19^) 
3,080 
(20^) 
2,986 
(20^) 
1,269 (n%) 
^ 2,793 3 1 , ^ 2 
(78^) (,r^ 
2,320 
(15^) 
6,898 
(18^) 
2,200 
(6%) 
5,502 
825 
(.2%) 
7,860 
(20^) 
(20^) 
6,981 
(17^) 
880 
(3%) 
16,201 39,303 
(100^) (lOOJg) 
NOTE: Percentage share given in pa ran these s has been ca l cu l a -
ted by the Research Schola r . 
SOURCE: Govt, of I n d i a , Planning Commission, 5 Yr. P l a n s . 
-Uo;-
"to the investment of agriculture limits inevitably the 
investment which the State can itself undertake in the 
Industries, especially large scale industrieSo" 
The priority to agriculture did not mean neglect of 
industries. The plan provided for completion of various 
industrial pro;3ects already in progress. The Central ^ 
Government made allocation of funds for the establishment 
of certain defence industries, Sindri Fertilizer Factory, 
Chlttranjan Locomotive Factory, etc. The production of 
telephone equipments, dry core cables and news-print 
envisaged in the plan also strengthened the industrial 
structure and some of the important industries were also 
commissioned in this plan. These included Hindustan 
Steel Ltdji^ , which was incorporated in 19!?^ for the 
management of Rourkela Steel Plajit; Hindustan Machine 
Tools Ltdo, was incorporated in 1953; National Industrial 
Development Corporation Ltd, was set up in 195^ and 
Indian Airlines was set up as statutory corporation 
In 1953. 
The Second Five Year Plan, in a sense, was a conti-
nuation of the development efforts commenced in the 
First Plan, but there was a shift in the priorities with 
a large accent on industrialisation especially the develop-
ment of heavy industries and the necessary ancllliaries, 
like transport. The responsibility for some industries 
1» Government of India, Planning Commission, First Five 
Year Plan, New Delhi, 19^3j P^^-*^. 
-(17)-
like oil exploration, coal, and atomic energy was given 
to the Central Government* 
Allocation under major heads of development shown 
in the preceding Table 1»2 indicates the relative shift 
in priorities between the First and the Second Plans, 
Industries and Mining claimed about 20 per cent of the 
total public sector outlay as compared to h per cent in 
the First Five lear Plan. Transport and Coimnunication 
accounted for 28 per cent of the total outlay in the 
Plan, 19 per cent of the total outlay of the Central 
and the State Governments was devoted to irrigation and 
power and 17 per cenl^  of the outlay to Social Services as 
compared to 23 per cent in the First Five Year Plan, 
In the Third Five Year Plan, the development of 
basic industries such as steel, fuel and power, machine-
builfling and chemcial industries was fundamentally for 
rapid economic growth. These industries largely 
determine the pace at which the economy can become self-
reliant and self-generating. Programmes for industrial 
development were drawn up from the point of view of the 
needs and priorities of the economy as a whole. Moreover, 
the Third Five Year Plan recognised the need to build up 
small industries as a vital segment in the industrial 
structure by promoting greater integration between large 
n?'-: scale and small scale industries, spreading the 
benefits of industrialisation to small towns and rural areas, 
-(18)-
The percentage share of individual heads of deve-
lopment did not -undergo any material change except 
Transport and commxmication whose share got reduced to 
20 per cent in the Third Five Year Plan, The major 
industrial projects in the public sector included were 
in the fields of metallurgical, industrial machinery, 
machine tools, petroleim refinery and steel. 
The Fourth Five Year Plan followed the same overall 
pattern of growth in industrial, investments in the 
public sector as in the Third Five Year Plan, The major 
proportion of the outlay in the public sector of the 
Fourth Plan was devoted to the completion of projects 
under construction and the projects, on which a decision 
was already taken. New projects were envisaged in 
high priority fields like fertilizers, pesticides, petro-
chemcials, non-ferrous metals, development of iron ore, 
pyrites and rock phosphates resources, ^ 
During the Fifth Five Year Plan, the same level 
of allocation to industry was maintained as in the 
Fourth Five Year Plan, There has been shift in emphasis 
in favour of agricxilture, irrigation and village eind 
small industry. Share of Social Services got reduced 
from 20 per cent in the Fourth Five Year Plan to 17 per 
cent in the Fifth Five Year Plan, 
Taken as a whole, the public sector investment would 
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strengthen the control of government over the 
commanding heights of the economy. Its hold in areas 
like electricity, mining and banking and insurance 
is almost absolute, as revealed by the Table 1,3» 
Table 1«3 shows that share of the public sector 
is increasing rapidly in manufacturing and secondary 
sectors of the economy. Contribution of the 
public sector to Net Domestic Product increased 
from 11 per cent in 196O-6I to 19 19 per cent in 
1975-76. Its share in Net Domestic capital formation 
also increased from 22 per cent In I96I to 31 per 
cent in 1976, as revealed by the Table 1.ifo 
TABLE n»+ - SHAKE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN NET 
DOMESTIC CAPITAL FORI^ T^ION: I96O-6I TO 1976-77. 
(AT CURRENT PRICES) 
(RS.CHORES) 
Year/Period 
1961 
1970 
1975 
1976 
Net Domestic 
Capital 
Formation 
(RSoCrores) 
1,8»4-7 
^,561 
10,809 
11,7^3 
Share of the 
Pulallc Sector 
Rs^Crores /^ of the 
Total 
If 12 
708 
2,^9 
3,687 
22.3^ 
15.5^ 
22.8^ 
31A^ 
SOURCE: National Accounts Statistics, C.S.O. 
Table 1«5 shows that the number of imits increased 
from 7^ in 1965 to IV5 in 1976-77, 
As regards .the area of public investment, 
-(dl)' 
TABLE 1.5 - PATTEHN OF GBOWTH OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES 
(CENTRAL NON-DEPARTMENTAL): FROM 1965 TO I976 
Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
197^ 
1975 
1976 
1965 
To 
1976 
' 0 
No. 
of 
Units 
7k-
77 
83 
P5 
91 
97 
101 
113 
122 
129 
129 
m-5 
Emp-
loy -
ment 
(noo 
Lakhs) 
^•71 
5.21 
5*5^ 
5»98 
6»13 
6,60 
7*01 
9.32 
13*1V 
lif.08 
15.05 
l5o75 
2«3^ 
CAPITAL 
At 
Current 
P r i c e s 
2,V15 
2,81+1 
3,333 
3,902 
^,301 
If, 680 
5.052 
5,571 
6,237 
7,261 
8,973 
11,097 
(RS.CHORES 
At 
1961-62 
Prjices 
1,917 
2,255 
2,658 
3,056 
3,350 
3,607 
3,836 
if,1if8 
^,509 
3,577 
if, 261 
5,515 
OUTPUT ( 
At 
Current 
P r i c e s 
1,000 
1,lf08 
1,85V 
2,393 
2,996 
3 , 3 0 9 ' 
3,97 V 
5,299 
6,777 
10,217 
11,688 
1lf,5lf2 
COMPOUND GROWTH RATES 
3.60 1,88 
:RS,CHORES) 
At 
1961-62 
P r i c e s 
79V 
1,117 
1,V16 
1,803 
2,203 
2,3V8 
2,565 
3,171 
3,296 
^,757 
5,^57 
6,515 
7.20 
NOTE: Ccmpound Growth Bates have been calculated by the 
Research Scholar 
SOURCE: CSoO,, Annual Survey of Industries (Various 
Issues)* 
-(22)-
Table 1o6 reveals that the industries in the public sector 
are the heavy industries where trained manpov/er, technical 
know-hov.' and private capital were generally not available, 
namely, iron and steel, chemicals and phanBaceuticals, 
Minerals and Metals, Heavy Engineering, etc. In the, 
allocation of public investments, primacy was given 
to manufacturing and selling enterprises which got 83 
per cent of the total investment as compared to 17 per cent 
for Service enterprises in 1976-77o Of the total invest-
ments in Manufacturing enterprises, 50 per cent was in the 
Iron and Steel, Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals, Minerals and 
Metals, Heavy Engineering, and Petroleum industries. Steel 
got 26 per cent of the total investment. Chemicals and 
Pharmaceuticals 19 per cent. Minerals and Metails 18 per 
cent. Heavy Engineering 7 per cent, Petroleiim 6 per cent, 
Transportation Equipment 3 per cent, Medium and Light 
Engineering 2 per cent, Consumer goods 2 per cent anfl 
Agro-based industry less than 1 per cent. Of the Service 
enterprises, the Transportation, Marketing and Financial 
enterprises were given precedence over others for the 
provision of well-developed services. 
It is significant to note that there has been a 
o 
regional bias in public investments. The regional bias' 
was imparted to reduce economic disparity throiogh dispersal 
of public enterprises among the most economically backward 
states. Of all the States, the most backward states got 
the lion's share. 
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Regional pattern of public investment has been 
presented In Table 1o7« It reveals that backward States 
like Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa together got -^5 per 
cent of the total public investments» 
TABLE 1,^7 - STATEWISE INVESTMEIJT AS ON 31 •3.197^ BY 
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
STATE 
Andhra Pradesh 
Assam 
Bihar 
Gujarat 
Haryana 
Himachal Pradesh 
Kerala 
Madhya Pradesh 
Maharashtra 
Kamataka 
Or i s sa 
Punjab 
Rajasthan 
Tamil Nadu 
Union T e r r i t o r i e s 
U t t a r Pradesh 
West Bengal 
Janmu & Kashmir 
Investment 
(Rs»Crores) 
203 cC 
157.2 
.1,lf68,3 
2if9o8 
10.9 
0.6 
178.2 
729o5 
203o9 
160.2 
530«6 
»f2.5 
i i5o5 
365.2 
9^7 
217.5 
650.9 
6 ,2 
Investment 
as % of t h e 
T o t a l 
3 ^ 
3% 
2h% 
h% 
0 , 2 ^ 
OoCI^ 
3% 
^2% 
1% 
3% 
9% 
0^7% 
2.0% 
6^ 
^6% 
Z% 
^^% 
0.09JS 
NOTE: Percentage share of each State in the total invest-
ment has been calculated by the Research Scholar. 
SOURCE: Government of India, Bureau of Public Enterprises, 
Bureau Report, 197^75, Po360« 
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The value of capital at current prices also increased 
frorn Rs,2,^l5 crores in 1965-66 to Rs#11,097 crores in 
1976-77. Table 1*5 reveals that, at constant prices 
(base 1961-62), it increased from Rs«1,917 crores to 
Rs*5»5''5 crores. 
Table 1o5 makes it clear that public enterprises 
have also generated employmento Employment has increased 
from 5 lakhs to I6 lakhs during the period under review. 
Nevertheless, the output has increased from Rs«,1,000 
crores to RSo1^ ,5**-2 crores during this period, as revealed 
by Table 1,5* The real output Increased, that is, the 
value of output at constant prices, from Rs«79if crores 
to RSo6,5l5 crores during the period under considerationo 
GROWTH OP IRON & STEEL INDUSTRY 
Discussion of the growth of public sector with parti-
cular reference to the Iron and Steel Industry would not be 
complete without an exclusive analysis of the development 
of Iron and Steel Industry in the public sector to which 
the present work bears a special reference, 
» 
Importance of expanding Iron and Steel Industry was 
stressed in the First Five Year Plan, Provision was made 
in the Plan for the construction of a new public steel 
mill possessing a capacity of 8,00,000 tons of pig iron 
and a minimum capacity of 3,^0,000 tons of finished steel 
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per year. Although this project had not been formalised 
at the time the First Plan was laimched, it was believed 
that the mill would be able to produce pig iron by 19^6. 
In addition, the plan envisaged a 59 per cent increase 
in the combined capacities of TISCO and IISCO during this 
period. 
During the First Plan, however, the only increase 
in the iron and steel industry's capacity resulted from 
the expansion programmes undertaken by the existing private 
mills. Although the Government had begun initial prepara-
tions for the construction of three new public steel 
plants by 1956, no new mill was actually erected during 
the plan period, TISCO, on the other hand, undertook a 
relatively ^modest modernisation and expansion progrsimme 
in 1951» designed to increase its saleable steel capacity 
from 780,000 to 931,000 tons by 1957. The primary 
jnirpose of this plan was to rehabilitate TISCO's plant, 
which had deteriorated badly during and after the War* 
In addition, the other major producer, IISCO, initiated 
a programme in 1950 designed to allow a fuller use of its 
capacity to increase its finished production to 350,000 
tons, a programme which was largelj'^  completed by 1953. 
A second expansion scheme designed to increase IISCO»s 
finished steel capcity to M)0,000 tons was initiated in 
1953, but this project was not completed until 1958, 
-(28)-
The Increase In finished steel production during 
this period was both too small and too late to enable 
domestic supply fulfil the demand* Only IISCC was able 
to affect any increase in finished steel production. 
Thus, in order to supplement domestic production, the 
Government was forced to Increase substantieilly the 
imports of finished steel towards the end of the plan 
period, as revealed by Table 1,8o 
TABLE 1,8 - EXPORTS^ IMPORTS OF 
FINISHED STEEL IN INDIA - »U6-70 
Year/ 
Per iod 
1 9 ^ - 7 
1950-1 
1955-6 
196O-V 
1965-6 
1969-70 
B h i l -
a i 
^^  
mm 
-
2lf 
735 
1121 
Durg-
apur 
^ 
-
-
2 
531 
Mf2 
( ,000 
Rour-
ke la Others*Tota l 
- 905 
- 1070 
- 1308 
30 2281 
780 255! 
801 2621 
905 
1070 
1308 
2337 
1+60^ 
^985 
Tons) 
Imp Exp-
- o r t o r t s 
38 7^ 
182 8 
30^ 5 
1238 2 
73^ 1 ^ 
367 687 
NOTES: * Includes TISCO, IISCO, MISW. 
SOURCES: Tata Iron and Steel Company (TISCO), ANNUAL 
REPORTS OF VARIOUS YEARS; IISCO, ANNUAL 
REPORTS OF VARIOUS YEARS. 
Hindustan"Steel Limited (HSL), STATISTICS FOR 
IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY IN INDIA of various 
years• 
Government of India, Department of Commercial 
Inteliagence and Statistics, ANNUAL STATEMENT 
OF THE FOREIGN TRADE OF INDIA, various years 
(For export and import data prior to 1956-57), 
and MONTHLY STATISTICS OF THE FOREIGN TRADE OF 
INDIA, various months (For export and import 
data after 1956-57)• 
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Indeed, domestic production, which accounted for over 
90% of consumption immediately after the war, accounted for 
only 52 per cent of finished steel consiamption by 1956 
(Table n 8 ) . 
If a new steel mill had been started in the late 19M3s 
or early 1950s, the plant would have produced ste.el by 1956. 
A portion of the substantial increase in steel import that 
occurred after 195^ could have been avoided. Moreover, it 
has been estimated that the cost of the mill would have 
been 60 per cent less than the average cost of the three 
new mills eventually established. The apparent costs of 
delay were thus quite substantial. 
The reasons for this lag in investment and expansion of 
capacity were closely linked with the Government»s policies 
towards the iron and steel industry. Almost every activity 
of the industry was either regulated or actually assiamed by 
the Government, For example, the distribution of most types 
of steel within the country, the amounts of steel to be 
imported, and the types of steel to be rolled by the inte-
grated mills were determined by the Office of the Iron and 
Steel Controller, a sub-division of the Ministry of Steel 
and Heavy Industries, \<ages were determined or at least 
influenced by the Central Government and dismissals were 
circumscribed the laws of the States, In-addition, all new 
investments by either existing or proposed mills had to be 
licensed by the Governmento Finally, the prices of the 
1e Lok Sabha, Estimates Committee, Ministry of Steel, Mines 
and Fuel, 33rd Report, Second Lok Sabha, 1958-9, P»xi« 
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raajority of the iron and steel products were established 
by the Ministry responsible for the industry. Of the last 
two areas of Government control, price control was the most 
responsible for the lag in investment during this period. 
The growth of the iron and steel industry, after 1956, 
was rapid. The Second Plan, initiated^Jji that year, 
assigned the highest priority to the expansion of this 
industry. During this period, three new mills, each with 
an initial capacity of one million ingot tons, were to be 
erected in the public sector. The construction of these 
three mills was largely completedt during the Second Plan 
period. The first blast furnaces of Rourkela and Bhilai 
were commissioned in 1959» while that of Durgapur was 
commissioned in December, 1959» In subsequent months, the 
other units were inaugurated with the last units "completed 
in 1962, 
^ Although most of the programmes for the expansion of 
iron and steel industry were completed by the end of the 
Second Plan ^ period, the production of finished steel fell 
far short of the plan's output target of ^,3 million tons 
(Table 1,8), This shortfall could be traced to delays in 
the construction of the plants and to the normal gestation 
period that follows the installation of new opacity. The 
Second Plan prograaime for the Iron and Steel Industry were 
thus by and large successful, 
AS a result of these inevitable delays, however, 
domestic production had to continue to be supplemented with 
:-.30~: 
large quantities of steel Imports. Finished steel imports 
reached a peak of 2.3 million tonnes in 1960-61« 
The Third Five Year Plaji continued to assign a high 
priority to the iron and steel industry. By means of direct 
invo.stmer.t in the .-'.nduetry of RSo550 crores, a slightly over 
6 per cent of the total plan outlay, finished steel capacity 
was to he increased from ^.5 million tons to 7»5 million 
tons hy 19660 However, finished steel production in I966 
did not exceed even the capacity target established for 196I 
and was 2,2 million tons below the Third Plan's finished 
steel output target of 6,8 million tons. This shortfall was 
traceable not only to construction delays, but also to 
delays in implementing the planned projects. 
The production of finished steel actually declined during 
1966-68, due primarily to the recession that occurred in the 
country during this period. With the reduction in the 
domestic demand for steel, exports of finishedE^steel 
increased rapidly. Indeed, by I969-7O, 687 thousands tons 
of finished steel was exported. In 1976-77, India exported 
2,^5. thousands tons, a slightly over h$ per cent of its 
finished steel production capacity, 
o 
The finished steel production targets established in 
the Fourth Plan, the introduction of which was delayed for 
three years because of economic difficulties, were somewhat 
less ambitious than those contained in the previous plans. 
By 1973-7^, finished steel capacity, for example, was to 
1, R.3.I,, Report on Currency & Finance, Vol,I, p.32 
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increase to 9.0 million tons, while the finished steel 
output was expected to reach 8,1 million tons. The targets 
were to be met by an expansion of the Bokaro and Bhilai 
steel plants in the public sector. Due to operational 
difficulties at scane of the existing plants and delayed 
completion of the Bokaro mill, however, production of the 
integrated mills was 5,9 million tons in 1976-77.^ 
ROLE OF PUBLIC ENTEHPRISES IN RESOURCE MOBILISATION 
AS the State has made huge investments in public enter-
prises, the Government anticipate to earn surplus from these 
investments. The Administrative Reforms Commission on Public 
Undertakings, in its 1967 Report, observed, ",.,(as) the 
State has made large investments in public enterprises, their 
surplus should be expanded to finance further development." 
The First Five Year Plan also stated that fimds should 
be raised by the State to the extent possible through taxa-
tion, through loans and through surpluses earned by the 
public enterprises. The 19^8 Industrial Policy Resolution 
had ^ Iso emphasised that the public enterprises should 
augment the revenue of the State and provide resources for 
further development in fresh fields. 
1. Reserve Bank of India (R.B.I,), REPORT ON CURRENCY & 
FINANCE, Vol,I, p.32 
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Mobilisation of resources for securing an adequate rate 
of growth is the crux of the problem of economic development 
in an underdeveloped country. The problem involves the need 
and availability of financial resources adequate to cover 
the cost of various development programmes. Economic groirth 
in underdeveloped countries depends upon the following macro-
variables: (a) Proportion of national income devoted to 
savings and capital formation; (b) capital output; (c) the 
rate of growth of popxilation vis-a-vis the rate of growth 
of output. These macro-variables are changed through a 
comprehensive programmes, comprising fiscal, and monetary 
policies according to the desired ends. Mobilisation of 
financial resources is related to the first variable and 
success in this direction depends upon the extent to which 
the additional national income generated through the process 
of economic development is available for capital formation. 
The question arises for what purposes-are the financial 
resources -'' required? A precise answer to this question 
depends upon the level of production and the degree of, well-
being of the people required which, in turn, depends upon 
the stock of capital at the disposal of the country. The 
larger the stock of capital, the higher is the productivity 
of labour, and, therefore, greater' the volume of eommodities 
and services. "Continuous and lasting improvements in the 
levels of living can be secured only through the progressive 
expansion of productive capacity, which depends to a larger 
•J 
extent on the pace of capital formation," 
t, Paul Alpert, Economic Development, The Free Press of Gleneo, 
London, I963, p<>132 
-(33)-
In developed countries financial resources needed for 
economic developeaent are easily available as the private 
sector is strong enough to plough-back a larger part of 
additional income for investment purposes* On the 
contrary, in underdeveloped coiohtries, the growth is not 
spontaneous and through suitable policies, diversion of 
resources from private to public sector, from consumption 
to production and from less productive investment to more 
productive investment is needed. In order to maximise the 
rate of growth and to ensure that it takes place on the 
desired lines, the Government has to make a major part of 
its investment. The main problem of economic development 
in underdeveloped countries is to develop infrastructure 
of the economy for which a 'big push' in the form of large 
scale investment in public and private sectors is needed. 
In underdeveloped coimtries the inducement to invest is 
very low due to low income, lack of entrepreneurship and 
small size of the market. For breaking this vicious circle 
what is needed is to "raise the marginal productivity of 
private investment. Any investment that creates "external 
economies" will help to achieve the objective," These 
external economies are available from the public sector 
investment and result in reducing cost of production and 
the enlargement of market. A large-scale investment 
in the economic overheads like means of transportation euid 
communication, power project and irrigation projects, 
social welfare, etc., is needed. These categories of 
investment increase the productivity of labour, reduce 
1o Chaliah, R.J., Fiscal Policy In Underdeveloped Countries, 
George Allen & Unwin, London, 19^6, p,M+ 
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cost of production and widen the market, Once these faci-
lities are established there comes an automatic expansion 
of the economy. In imdeixi eve loped countries these lines 
of investment are not attractive for private capitalists 
as the margin of profit is very low and it is spread over 
a long period. It is,, therefore, necessary for the Govern-
ment to bear the major part of the financial burden of 
these investirents. 
Further, if economic development is our main concern, 
it is necessary to look into the composition of investments. 
The optimum pattern of investment is achieved by equalisation 
of social max'ginal productivity in different lines of invest-
ment. In linderdeveloped countries, most of the investment 
in private sector is of xanproductive nature. Entrepreneurs 
in these countries are attracted towards these lines of 
investment which give a quick return. Consequently, 
productive types of investm^t are starved of capital* The 
Government with the help of appropriate fiscal^ policy, 
changes the flow of investment in such a.- manner that 
socially essential and productive investment is given 
preference to the unproductive and less-essential investments. 
Thus, for achieving a rapid economic gro^ rth in an under-
developed country, a large amount of financial resources 
is needed for accelerating the volume of investment in 
public sector, for increasing productivity in private 
sector and for meeting the increasing development expenditure. 
For financing the large scale public sector investmaiti 
Government has to mobilise financial and other resources. 
Many of the eminent economists tried to develop growth 
models suitable for the conditions prevailing in under-
developed coimtries. Consensus of the opinion on this 
point is that capital occupies the central and strategic 
position in tlie process of economic development. The 
relationship between capital formation and the economic 
development is indicated with the help of the following 
equation: 
D Sp - r 
Where D is the rate of econcraic development, S is the 
rate of net savings, p standa for productivity of new 
investments and r indicates the rate of annual increase 
of population. 
Hence, for increasing the rate of capital formation 
what is needed is that an increasing portion of additional 
income, generated through the process of economic develop-
ment, should be diverted from consumption to investment. 
Now the question arises: what proportion of the national 
income should be diverted to investment for productive 
function. It depends upon various factors and varies 
from coiintry to country and the level of economic growth. 
In the early stages of economic development in different 
1» Singer, H.W., The Mechanics of Economic Development, 
in The Indian Economic Review, August, 1952, ppol5-l6. 
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coiontries, the rate of investment has been high in order 
to achieve a 'big push' in the process of economic growth. 
In the U.S.S.R., the First Five Year Plan had a target of 
net investment amoiinting to between a quarter and a third 
of the naticJnal income, the actual achievement was perhaps-
slightly lower. Rate of net investment in U.S.S.R. in the 
decade 1928-38 was of the order of 20 per cent of the 
national income. In Japan, new capital formation in the 
decade 19OO-O9 was estimated to have averaged about 12 
per cent of the national income which increased to 17 
per cent in the following decade. 
Estimates have been made about the magnitude of 
capital formation in some underdeveloped countries. Though 
the requirements for capital vary from country to country 
and from time to time, it has been estimated that with 
the rise of one per cent in population, a community should 
save h- per cent of its national income annually to maintain 
its per capita income on the same level. According to these 
estimates if population of a community is rising at the 
rate of 2o5 per cent annually, the co\mtry should save at 
least 10 per cent of its naticftial income for maintaining 
the level of per capita Income, 
However, in India, due to political and economic 
constraints, an ambitious target like that of U.S.S.R. was 
I0 Government of India, planning Commission, First Five 
Year Plan, New Delhi, p,13<, 
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not possible in the early stages of planning. It was 
estimated that "for a population growing at the rate of 
1o25 per cent per annum, the rate of investment needed for 
maintaining per capita income constant was k and 5 Per 
cent of the national income. In the First Five Year Plan 
the proportion of investment of national income was assumed 
to rise from 5 per cent or so in 1950-51 to about 20 per 
cent hy •?968-69 and to remain at that level^ therefore, 
During the Plan, the actual rate of investment averaged to 
be 6 per cent of national income against the target of 12 
to 15 per cent. During the Second Plaji it was realised that 
a too ambitious -target of the First Plan was not feasible. 
Therefore, the long-term targets of investment were revised. 
It was assumed that investment would go up from 17 per cent 
of nationaJ. "Income in 1955-56 to about 11 per cent in 
1960-61, 1^ per cent by I965-66 and 16 per cent by 1970-71. 
Thereafter it woixld remain practically stable rising to 
17 per cent by 1975-76. In the Third Five Year Plan, again, 
these estimates were revised upward and the target for 
the Third, Fourth and Fifth Plans were kept at 1U- to 15, 
17-18 and 19-20 per cents per annxim respectively. The 
aim of the Fifth plan was to accelerate the tempo of 
economic development with stability and less uncertainties. 
The size of the investment was to be determined by the 
resources which could be mobilised domestically without 
creating inflationary pressures. Keeping all these 
factors in view, the investment projections were revised. 
I0 Government of India, Planning Commission, Op.cit., p.13. 
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Investtnent was to increase from 11,2 per cent of national 
income in 1968-69 to 1^ .5 per cent in 1973-7^. 
Further, a part of the resources mobilised is used 
for meeting non-developiDent expenditure of the Govemmento 
The marginal propensity to consume of the Government 
sector has to he effectively restrained in order to 
release more resources for development activities. In 
India, there has been marked increase in non-development 
expenditure during Five Year Plans, It increased from 
RSa38l.U0 crores in 1951-52 to Rs,2069.9 crores in 1965-66, 
During the Fourth Plan, a part of the additional resources 
mobilisation xmdertaken by the Centre and States was 
absorbed by increases in non-plan expenditure, partic\ilarly, 
on the revision of emoluments for Government employees, 
increase in expenditure on defence, relief from natural 
calamities and food subsidy, etc. 
SOURCES OF FINANCE 
Broadly speaking, following are the three sources of 
finance of the Government: 
o 
(a) Domestic Budgetary Resources; 
(b) External Assistance; and 
(c) Deficit Financing, 
Throughout the whole plan period, domestic resources 
have played a significant role and the major share of 
investment is dravm through this source. The investment 
through domestic resources formed 69 per cent of the total 
finance in the First Plan and about 75 per cent of the total 
in the Fourth Plan and the Fifth Plan, It does not mean 
that resources tapped through other means such as external 
assistance and the deficit finance are of no importance 
as rest of the total plan outlay was financed through 
these sources^ In fact these resources are comj)leraentary 
to each other and the farious schemes of the Government, 
cannot be financed exclusively through one source. An 
excess amount of one source can create innumerable 
inconveniences to the people and can affect the economy 
adversely. Raising of resources is a caref\il Job which ceinnot 
be done haphazardly because there are merits and demerits 
of each source. There has to be a baJLance among all resources 
in financing the Government plans, so that the achievements 
for economic development could be maximised and sacriflg^ es 
of the people are minimised. 
On the basis of the discussion above, it becomes 
abundantly clear that domestic resources constitute the 
major part of Plan outlay. However, if the resources are 
not sufficient to meet the requirements, the resources 
may be mobilised through the expansion of monetary system 
by borrowing from the Reserve Bank of India, Financing the 
Plain throtigh this means is preferred in circiomstances when 
the Government has to face political pressure while 
iDobilizing resources through other sources. Government 
is driven to inflation when they think that political 
difficulties in raising resources in this way are less 
than the political difficulties in the way of raising the 
same resources through taxes. Inflationary finance may 
serve for capital formation but at the same time it has 
an adverse effect on the price level of consximption of 
masses which come in the way of economic developmento It 
will increase the prices. Such a rise in price woxold depre-
ciate the real value of purchasing power. That would increase 
their cons\imption expenditure and would discourage further 
savings. Hence, on the one hand Inflationary gap depre-
ciates the purchasing power of the masses and reduces 
the propensity to save which is a source of capital forma-
tion and, on the other hand, wipes out the benefits of all 
the resources of Government igollected through different 
mecins. Consequently, Government needs resources more 
and more to finance the plans. Due to this limitation 
the proportion of deficit in the succeeding plan outlays 
was reduced to minimum from 2^^h per cent in the First 
Plan to 10 per cent in the three annual plains. The 
main objective of the Fourth and the Fifth Plans was to 
mobilize moJ-e domestic resources without heavily depending 
upon deficit financing. 
From the above analysis we reach the conclusion that 
inflationary finance is not desirable for healthy growth. 
Inflation, certainly leads, in the first instance, to 
accelerated capital formation but the accompanying social 
and economic costs are higho The problem of mobilisation 
of resources must be viewed not only in the terms of 
financial resourcec but also in terms of real resources. 
Though the State tries its best to finance the Plan 
outlays through internal resources, the external finance 
becomes necessary in an underdeveloped economy like 
India to cover the deficit in the balance of payments. 
Inflow of foreign savings also provides additional 
resources for investment, because in underdeveloped 
countries internal savings are not sufficient for the 
purpose. 
TABLE 1«9 - SAVINGS, II^ VESTMENT RATIOS 
Year/ 
Period 
1950-51 
1955-56 
1960-61 
1965-66 
1971-72 
1972-73 
1973-7^ 
Savings 
Income 
Percentage 
5.0 
6,6 
8.5 
10,5 
l l o ^ f 
11.0 
9.9 
Investment-
Income 
Percen^ge 
5.5 
7«3 
11.0 
1^.7 
13o0 
11,8 
10.8 
NOTE; Savings-Income and Investment-Income percentages 
have been calculated by the Research Scholar. 
SOURCE: Rreserve Bank of India, REPORTS ON CURRENCY & 
FINANCE of various years, Bombay. 
Investrnent is more than the total savings of the economy. 
It shows clearly that the gap is filled up by external 
resources. In this way, we find that finances mobilised 
through external resources are indispensable and it is due 
to thiS' fact that domestic savings are short of needs. 
But the external resources^ -for financing economic 
development must have their own implications. Foreign 
loans involve the payment of interest in foreign currencies 
which shift the burden from the present to the future 
generation. If loans are easily available, the money may 
be spent wastefully. On the other hand, foreign aid is 
dependent on the extent to which we can increase and 
mobilise our own resources. Even if foreign aid is avail-
able, our capacity to use it depends upon our ability to 
raise complementary internal resources. Moreover, most of 
the foreign assistance carry along with it some political 
strings. Consequently, the aid is not distributed in 
accordance with the need and use of the country. For 
instance, Turkey which has absorbed the large supply of 
dollars, is not the most needy of the Middle Eastern 
countries. The aid is given to that country because she 
is anti-communist. Political considerations in foreign 
o 
aid introduce xincertainties. Therefore, most of the 
countries do not want to depend on foreign assistance. 
The efforts are on to be self-reliant as early as may be. 
1, Hansen, A,H., Public Enterprises And Economic Development, 
London, 1959, P.30, 
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In India, resources drawn through foreign assistance in the 
Fourth Plan was 12,8 per cent of the plam outlay as compared 
to 26,2 per cent in the Third Plan and 35o9 per cent in the 
three annual plans. The proportion of the foreign assistance 
is further reduced in the Kifth Plan. 
Domestic resources which are the major part of the 
country's investment, are drawn under sereral heads. They 
are divided Into four broad categories: (a) Surplus from 
current revenues, (b) Small Savings, (c) Borrowings, and 
(d) Surplus from public enterprises. 
The surplus from current revenues depends upon the 
level of existing taxation and the capacity of raising 
additional taxes and the magnitude of non-developmental 
expenditure. For rapid economic development an increasing 
proportion of national income should be devoted to capital 
formation. Due to low income of the people, mobilisation 
of resources through voluntary savings Is inadequate to 
meet the heavy expenditure of the country. Therefore, Govern-
ment has no other option but to collect finances' through 
forced savings, i.e., taxation. 
Taxation has a position of central importance for 
o 
capital formation. Due to the elements of compulsion, It 
may serve this purpose in the desired way. But, other 
things remaining the same, it depends upon the absolute 
level of per capita income and also on the monetary transac-
tions in the economy. In poor countries taxable capacity 
is very low. The element of tax corcpels the people to cut 
their consvunption which imposes a great sacrifice on them. 
Hence, taxation can be levied to a certain extent. Further, 
if the resources are mobilised through forced savings, it 
affects adversely voluntary savings by reducing the income 
of the people. Therefore, voluntary savings and forced 
savings are not complementary to each other. Moreover, 
if the requirements of the Government are met through taxes ^  
burden on the community would be too much to bear. It 
would affect adversely Incentives for work and, thus, 
retard the process of development. In India the rates of 
taxation are very high. And in order to avoid their 
adverse affects, the Finance Minister, while presenting 
the Annual Budget for the fiscal year 1976-77 had made 
certain concession to the tax-payers. 
As regards surplus from current revenues, it also 
depends on non-developmental expenditure. In the process 
of economic development.there is expansion in the social 
services like education, health and family welfare, etc. 
For Implementation of development programmes, the administra-
tive machinery is also expanded and all these require a 
lar'ge amount of expenditure which is of non-development 
nature. In India, a very large part of additional tax 
revenue is used to finance non-development expenditure of tiie 
Government, As we cannot expect more from surplus of 
current revenues for the finance of Government expenditure, 
other resources to finance investment projections will have 
to be traced. 
Govemment mobilises a part of the resources throiigh 
small savings of different classes of the society. There 
are tvo main sources of savings: (a) Savings of private 
individuals, sjnd (b) Savings of corporations. Corporate 
savings come from the profits of the ccHiip^ nies that may be 
encouraged through differential taxation of distributed and 
undistributed profits. But corporate savings may lead to 
concentration of econoiric power in a few hands. 
In India, household sector accounts for about three-
fourths of the aggregate domestic savings. Household 
savings depend upon two variables, viz,, level of income 
and level of consiimption. In under-developed covintries, 
where per capita income is low, personal savings may not 
be mobilised easily. If they are mobilised through comp\al-
sion, i.e., taxation, personal income will decline and in 
the same proportion will the savings decrease. On the other 
hand, if resources are mobilised through monetary measures, 
the inflationary forces will be generated. If the 
inflationary effects are not neutralis,ed fully, it will not 
leave any savings for Investment, That is why household 
savings are not significant In our country. Consequently, 
other sources of finance will have to be found nut to fill 
o 
up the gap between revenue and expenditure of the Government, 
Market borrowing is one of the sources of domestic 
finance. It constitutes a considerable amount of the plan 
outlay, namely, 25.6 per cent in the Second Plan, 16,2 per 
-(U6)-
cent in the Third Plan. But public borrov/ing is a 
voluntary technique for mobilising resources. It may fail 
to mobilise adequate volume of resources if the money 
conditions are not opportune for public borrowings» 
Response to the Government bonds depends upon a nvunber of 
factors Mke relative yield of various kinds of investment, 
distribution of income in the country and propensity to 
save and consume, etc. All the factors cannot be controlledo 
Thus the Government can raise the financial resources 
throtigh various ways. But extreijje care has to be taken 
in selecting the methods of financing plan outlays. Excessive 
borrowings create instability in the econoraj'. Taxes cannot 
be levied to an lanlimited extent as they are inflationary. 
Therefore, in order_to reduce dependence on these sources, 
State itself jumps into the industrial activities and 
invests the capital in profitable commercial and industrial 
tmdertaklngs. 
In the early period of establishment of public sector 
undertakings, the idea of surplus earnings from public 
enterprises was not clear and the consensus was in favour 
of »no-profit-no-loss* policy. Besides, there were many 
problems such as the long gestation period, improper 
planning. Investment mainly in public utilities and infra-
structures, etc. As such public enterprises* capability to 
mobilise resources was limited. But now the scope of 
activities of public enterprises bas vastly expanded In the 
manufacturing and selling goods industries. Therefore, they 
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a significant role to play in contributing surplus earnings 
to the national exchequer. As most of the public enterprises 
are mature, they can earn profit* Underlying the role of 
public enterprises in the mobilisation of resources, the 
then Prime Minister of India said, "The national ladustries 
must generate sufficient resources both Internal and ^ 
external to provide for further development of the economyo 
we have at the initial stage depended largely on the 
assistance in various forms from friendly countrieso This 
was perhaps inevitable but no economy can continue to 
depend indefinitely for its own development on external 
assistance. It is in this context that the question of 
profit is important even in the public sector," 
CONCLUSION 
The main conolusions of this chapter are as follows: 
Development of public enterprises in India has been 
analysed in this chapter. It ,is in pursuit of the ideal of 
"Socialism" that the Industrial Policy Resolutions of ^^US 
and 1956 declared that State must play positive role and 
provide leadership In the more criti(eal, more difficult and 
capital intensive sectors of the economy. Both the 
resolutions rightly discarded laissez-faire policy and 
emphasised that, in the growth of public enterprises lies 
equitable distribution of the country's wealth and output 
1, Raj K. Nigam, Changing'Horizon of Public Sector, published 
by the Fertilizers and Chemicals, Travancore Ltd., 1970, 
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whlch will lead to rapid improvement In the standard of 
living of the masses who will be assured also social justice, 
The full utilisation of the co\intry's resources can be 
possible through central planning, coordination and 
direction of these enterprises towards the attainment of 
national goals. Then it is no wonder that the share of the 
public sector in plein outlays continuously increased as 
compared to private sector investrr.ent. 
It is significant to note that expansion of iron and 
steel industry in the postwar period took place mainly 
through the erection and expansion of public steel plantSo 
However, in spite of the several expansion schemes, the 
targets could not be achieved due to inadequate planning, 
constructional delays, long gestation, etc« 
Finally, the chapter dealt v;ith the role of public 
enterprises in fulfilling the need for additonal resources 
through their surplus earnings. Though the Government 
collects revenue from various sources such as taxation, 
borrowings and the external assistance, the economy is 
adversely affected if they are indiscriminately used. 
The Government utlimately relies on the surpluses of 
public enterprises in which huge investments have been 
made. It is in this perspective that the public enter-
prises are called upon to yield reasonable return on the 
capital invested. To examine it in detail, the working 
results of public enterprises form the subject-matter of 
the next chapter. 
CHAPTER - II 
FniAi^ CIAL PERFORMANCE OF THE PUBLIC ENTEBJ>RISES 
In the previous chapter, development of public 
enterprises was examined with an emphasis on their role 
in mobilising resources. The main observation in this 
respect was that public enterprises were established 
to attain the 'Socialistic Pattern of Society' and to 
provide infrastructure for further development. In 
pursuance of this objective, activities of the Government 
have vastly expanded, and with them have increased the 
social and economic responsibilities. The Government has 
to perform functions ranging from the provision of public 
utilities to industrialisation of the economy. These 
multifarious activities call for huge investments. As 
o 
stated in the last chapter,'the conventional sources of 
revenue like savings, taxes, borrowings and external 
assistance are exploited to the extent possible. Though 
taxation is the single-most important source of revenue, 
its use requires extreme care to avoid adverse effects on 
the tax-payer's willingness to work and save. Similarly, 
excessive borrowings are potential source of economic 
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instability. Foreign assistance, though necessary and 
useful, cannot be taken for granted. It Is in this pers-
pective that the Planning Comnission has begun to fix 
surplus targets for the public enterprises as plan-
resource. It, therefore, becomes necessary to explore the 
extent and size of potentialities of resource-mobilisation 
by the public enterprises for their own modernisation, 
future expansion and for the plan outlays. 
This chapter is devoted to the analysis of working 
results of the public enterprises with a view to examine 
the extent to which they have succeeded,in mobilising 
resourceSo 
FACTS OF FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 
As a first step in the evaluation of finEinciaf 
performance, the relevant facts of financial performance 
have been critically examined. It is followed by the 
application of various norms to measure the efficiency 
of these enterprises. 
Performance of the Central Government enterprises 
which are the main components of the public sector has 
not been satisfactory during 1965-66 and 1973-7^ as 
revealed by Table 2*1, 
-(51)-
TABLE 2,1 - ANNUAL RETURNS FROM INVESTMENTS IN CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT EI.^TERPRISES 
Year 
1965-66 
1967-68 
1969-70 
1971-72 
1973-7^ +-
No, of 
enter-
prises 
38 
52 
6h 
76 
96 
(Rs.Crores) 
Total capi-
tal employed 
1627»22 
2553.06 
2806.38 
3886,60 
Mf78,l8 
Net return 
(RSoCrores) 
- 2,90 
- 2*29 
-36063 
- O0I6 
75,36 
% of Net 
Return on 
Capital 
employed 
Loss 
Loss 
Loss 
Loss 
t,68 
NOTE; Percent of net return/loss has been calc\ilated by the 
Research Scholar, ^ 
SOURCE: Appendices I - X, 
The public enterprises have shown return of•RSa75,36 crore, or 
1,68 per cent only in 1973-7^* On the other hand, these 
enterprises have incurred hizge losses during 1965-72, 
Thus Table ^ ,1 presents the facts which support the 
view that public enterprises did not fare well in trading 
operations; even after working for a decade their teething 
period was not over and, hence, much improvement was desired 
in their working. 
-(52)~ 
Again to pin point as to which type of public enterprises 
earned profit during the period 1965-66 and 1973-7^, function-
wise classification of return is presented in Table 2«2o 
TABLE 2o2 - SECTORiL RETURNS IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT PUBLIC 
ENTERPRISES (1965-7^) 
(RS.CRORES) 
Capital employed 
SECTORS 1965-66 1967-68 1969-70 1971-72 1973-7^ 
Steel 
Engineering 
Shipbuilding 
Chemicals 
Mining 
Petroleum 
Trading & 
^fel^keting 
Transpor ta -
t i o n 
Contract & 
Construct ion (0»^-3) 
881.05 
( -10 .^7) 
1580I5 
( - I0I5) 
1^.^9 
( 0 .3^) 
510^6 
( 0.92) 
179.^9 (-O0IO) 
I IO0 IO 
(1 . ^9 ) 
3 I 0 I 5 (2 .62) 
190o21 
(3o12) 
11,07 
Technical 
Consultancy 
O0O5 
(-0.11) 
Total capi- 1627.22 
tal employed 
Net profit/ -2,90 
loss(Trading) 
853a92 
^73.81 
( -23.07) 
21.55 
( 0«65) 
181,19 ( -0 ,87) 
308.87 ( -7 .58) 
335.10 
(2^,92) 
195<.39 (2 .81) 
169.10 
(6 .36) 
11.92 
( -0 .30) 
0,21 
(0 .19) 
82^,93 ( -Mf .83) 
681,85 
( -26 ,12) 
26.15 
( 1.06) 
2if8,if9 
( -11 .23) 
( - ^ . 7 0 ) 
^35.18 
(33 .^1 ) 
371o77 
(6 ,95) 
220 . ^ •2 
(8 ,75) 
11.06 
( - U 0 3 ) 
8.if3 
(1 .11) 
78if,62 
( -27 .79) 
809.28 
( - 6. i f7) 
If6,if6 
( 2. i f9) 
357,28 
( -8 .51) 
385.11 ( -21 .92) 
»+l5.07 
(^9«97) 
732.Mf 
(11.13) 
337.81+ 
( -O.51) 
10.78 
(0 .52) 
7.72 
(0 .93) 
765.97 
(^ .71) 
1080,75 (36,1+0) 
63*83 
( 0.82) 
351.21 
( -6 ,39) 
572.91 
( -38 .51) 
^71.83 ( i f2.08) 
688,Mf 
(19.51) 
Mf8,28 
(12.81) 
22.95 
(1 .11) 
11.91 (1 .82) 
2551.06 2806,38 3886,60 Mf7a.08 
-2 ,29 -36 .63 -0 ,16 +75.36 
% Return on 
capital empd< Loss Loss Loss Loss 1,68^ 
NOTE: Figures in parentheses are returns on capital employed, 
SOURCE: Appendices I - X. 
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This analysis is all the more necessary as the enter-
prises were heterogeneous in nature and it facilitates 
comparison. The rates of return are classified under the 
heads of industries: Steel, Engineering, Shipbuilding, 
Trading & Marketing, Transportation Services, Contract and 
Construction, Industrial Development and Technical Consul-
tancy. 
The analysis reveals that only petroleum and trading 
& marketing xmits have made steady profits. Petroleum 
Industry earned a profit of Rs<»1,lf9 crores in 1965-66, 
Hs.2lf,92 crores in I967-68, Rs«33o^1 crores in 1970, Rs,if9o97 
crores in 1971-72 and Rs« ^ 2o08 crores in 1973-7^* The 
same held good in the case of Trading and Mafketing, Its 
profits range between 2,62 crores in 1965-66 and Rso19o5l 
crore in 1973-7^. This may be due to the fact that petroleum 
Is an essential material for many industries, and its prices 
are monopolistic prices^ The heavily losing industries were 
Steel, Engineering, Mining and Minerals« The total losses 
of those industries far outweighed the profits of all the 
others put together. It is significant to note that in 1973-7^ 
almogt '"all the public enterprises made profit. And during 
3 
1965-72 a l l the public en terpr i ses , except a few, incurred 
losses . 
These figures support the view tha t the most cap i t a l 
intensive Indust r ies incurred most of the losses , eogo. Steel , 
Engineering, Mining and Minerals, etc« 
To check the conclusion reached above, the table 2,5 
TABLE 2o5 - CLASSIFICATION OF SURPLUS OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
ENTERPRISES 
Rate 
of 
£e twrp..,, 
Below 0 
0 - 3 
3 - 6 
6 - 8 
8 - 1 0 
10 and 
above 
fJumber of e n t e r - D j i s e s 
6 5 - 6 
15 
16 
h 
2 
0 
0 
6 7 - 8 
33 
8 
6 
3 
0 
0 
69-70 
ifl 
U-
13 
5 
0 
1 
7 1 - 2 
kh 
16 
8 
0 
0 
0 
7 3 - ^ 
26 
52 
5 
0 
12 
o 
% of C a D i t a l emcloyed 
6 5 - 6 
^5 
23 
1 
31 
0 
0 
6 7 - 8 
58 
12 
10 
19 
0 
0 
6 9 -
7Q 
55 
16 
10 
19 
0 
0 ,1 
7 1 - 2 7 3 - ^ 
52 2h^h 
32 6 2 , 0 
2 0^6 
0 0 . 0 
0 1 3 . 0 
0 OaO 
SOURCE: Compiled by the Research Scholar from the Bureau 
Reports, Bureau of Public Enterprises, New Delhi, 
Despite the increase in the number of enterprises 
earning 8 per cent or above, the basic fact remains 
xinchanged, however, that about 86 per cent of the total 
capital employed yields less than 3 per cent; in fact the 
mod^l rate of return slid down from 3 per cent and above 
(3-6) to 0-3 per cent during 1971-72 and 1973-7^. Only 
about 13 per cent of the capital outlay was marked by 8 
per cent and above in 1973-7^« A quarter of the total 
capital outlay approximately was characterised by the 
negative return* 
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Further we may examine whether there exists any 
correlation between the size of an enterprise and the net 
returns. The size may he represented by the total capital 
TABLE 2.1f - GROSS CLASS IF I CAT ION OF CAPITAL 
EMPLOYED AND RETUBN DURING 1973-7^. 
Capital 
Employed •' • 
(RS.CROES) Below 0 
Below 25 0 
25 - 300 0 
300 - 500 13 
500 -1000 13 
1000 and above 0 
TOTAL 26 
Per 
0-3 
0 
If 
0 
0 -. 
27 
3* 
cent rate 
3-6 
. 5 
0 
8 . 
13 
0 
26 
of re 
6-8 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
iturn 
8-10 
5 
0 
7 
0 
0 
12 
10 and 
above 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
SOURCE: Canpiled by the Research Scholar from Bureau 
Reports of various Industries as given in Table 2^2 
employed (or the number of persons employed in the enterprise), 
The following conclusion is drawn on the basis of the 
analysis given in the Table 2,^: 
Strangely, higher rates of return seem to mark the 
smaller and medium sized enterprises; and the biggest ones 
have lower returns. Nearly 58 per cent of the "8-1OJ?" 
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retums are those of enterprises below RSo500 crores and 
k2 per cent of those below RSo25 crores, whereas no 
enterprise below 300 crores has the "below 0" per cent 
rate of return. 
True, it is the nature of the industry, the degree 
of utilisation, etc., that determines the returns signi-
ficantly; yet the statistical evidence is not without 
value in the light of the doubts generally expressed that 
some of our large enterprises are too large as managerial 
units, if not as factories under Indian conditions of 
labour and managerial efficien^o 
At this stage, some direct evidence on the extent 
of mobilisation of internal resources by public enter-
prises may be added. Table 2,5 helow shows internal 
resources mobilised by the public enterprises. 
TABLE 2*5 - NON-COST RESERVES AND CAPITAL E^ 'PLOYED 
(1971-71+) 
Reserves as % 
of 
Capital employed 
Below 0 
Upto 5 
5-10 
10 - 15 
15-20 
20 - 30 
30 and a bove 
TOTAL 
No, of public 
prises 
enter-
1971-72 1973-7^ 
» 
9 
12 
20 
11 
16 
7 
75 
•• 0 
13 
13 
^5 
If 
13 
7 
95 
% of capital 
employed 
1971-72 1973-7^ 
3 
12 
16 
27 
15 
21 
9 
100 
. 
12 
12 
^3 
1+ 
20 
9 
100 
SOURCE: Op,cit, 
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Column 1 of the t a b l e 2 ,5 shows t h e p ropo r t i on of 
non-cos t r e se rves as percentage of t o t a l c a p i t a l ou t l ay , 
colu-icns 2 and 3 r e s p e c t i v e l y show the nu-mber of 
e n t e r p r i s e s and the ou t lays concerned a t d i f f e r e n t 
p ropo r t i ons of such resources during 1971-7^, and columns 
k- and 5 i n d i c a t e the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the aggrega te c a p i t a l 
employed over the d i f f e r e n t ranges of r e se rve p r o p o r t i o n s . 
Of the 95 running concerns (manufacturing and deve-
lopmental ) in 1973-7^, 12 concerns have upto 5 p e r cent 
r e s e r v e s of the c a p i t a l employed. Nearly h a l f of the 
t o t a l number of e n t e r p r i s e s (U-5 e n t e r p r i s e s ) a r e marked 
by "10-15" pe r cent r e se rve p r o p o r t i o n , which have ^3 per 
cen t of the t o t a l outlay« 
Table 2«6 r evea l s number of pub l i c e n t e r p r i s e s t h a t 
pay d iv idend on the equi ty c a p i t a l . Out of t he 95 running 
TABLE 2o6 - DIVIDEND RATES AND EQUITY CAPITAL 
(1973.71+) 
Equity Col,3 as % 
Number of capital of total of 
Rate of Dividend Enterprises (Rs,Crores) Col«3 
1 
N i l 
0 - 1 
1 - 2 
TOTAL -
2 
8 
62 
25 
• 95 
3 
98,96 
1,6580^8 
355.1^ 
2,112o58 
k 
77% 
lOOjg 
SOURCES: Appendices, OpoCit, 
• ( 5 8 ) -
c o n e m e , 8 e n t e r p r i s e s did not pay any d iv idend . I n c l u s i v e 
of 62 e n t e r p r i s e s marked by "0 - 1" per cent r a t e of d i v i -
dend, 81 per cent of the equi ty c a p i t a l c a r r i e d the lowest 
r a t e of r e t u r n . The h ighes t r a t e of r e t u r n i s ' 1 - 2 ' per 
cent which i s paid by 25 e n t e r p r i s e s with I9 pe r cent of 
the t o t a l equi ty c a p i t a l o 
Table 2.7 i n d i c a t e s t h a t the number of e n t e r p r i s e s 
t h a t made p r o f i t s in 1973-7^ was 69 as a g a i n s t 26 t h a t 
TABLE 2,7 *• RETAINED PROFITS AS A PROPORTION OF NET PROFITS 
Retained p r o f i t Number of e n t e r p r i s e s 
^%rof i t^ '^^ 1971-72 1973-7'+ 
N i l 51 26 
5 0 - 8 0 If If 
80 - 90 20 "^7 ^-
90 -100 - 8 
TOTAL - 1"^ 95 
SOURCE: Compiled by the Research Scholar from the Bureau 
Reports as per Appendices, Op.citv 
suffered losses. The profits totaJLled Rs, 118,70 crores 
and the losses Rs«^ 5^ o3^  crore. ^kny of the enterprises 
which made profits have ploughed back substantial proportions 
into the business, keeping the dividend rates extremely low 
~(59)-
or n i l , as the following da ta in Table 2o6 i n d i c a t e , 
TABLE 2o8 - RETAII\'ED PROFITS AS PROPORTION OF CAPITAL 
EMPLOYED 
Retained 
P r o f i t as 
% of c a p i -
t a l 
0 - 3 
3 - ^ 
ij. - 5 
5 and above 
TOTAL 
Niimber 
1971-72 
60 
\ 
If 
* 7 
75 
of E n t e r p r i s e s 
1973-7^ ^ 
61 
5 
0 
29 
95 
SOURCE: Compiled and calculated by the 
Research Scholar from the Bureau 
Reports, Op©Git, 
In all of these cases processed in tables 2,6, 2#7 and 
2*8, it has to be noted, by way of qualification, dividends 
were declared at low rates. For instance, table 2,6 reveals 
that 0 - 1 and 1 - 2 per cents of the equity capital earned 
dividends while 8 did not declare any dividend, 
o 
An interesting development In this context has been 
utilisation of currently unspent depreciation reserves for 
expansion purposes* From the ways-and-means angle, this 
procedure simply implies that cash is available for any 
kind of disposal* The data processed in Table 2o9 
-i60)-
TABLE 2o9 - HELATIVE SHARES OF FREE RESERVES AM) 
DEPRECIATION FUNDS (i973-.7lf) 
Quantum of total 
internal resour-
ces (1973-7^) 
^RS.CHORES) 
50% or 75% or above Total number 
above as as free of enterprises 
free reserves in the range 
reserves 
NUMBER OF ENTERPRISES 
Below 25 
25 - 100 
•100 - 250 
250 - V50 
If50 and above 
TOTAL 
13 
h 
13 
21 
27 
-
l i f 
13 
21 
ho 
7 
18 65 95 
SOURCE: Compiled and calculated by the Research Scholar 
from Bureau Reports, Op.cit* 
indicate that in I8 cases the figure exceeded 50 per cent 
as against 65 exceeding 75 per cent. It mainly consists 
of depreciation funds. All the enterprises marked by 
"250-^50" quantum of total internal resources are those 
having above 50 per cent and 75 per cent, whereas those 
marked by "^50 and above" have less than 50 per cent of 
the quantum. It indicates that there is diversion of cost 
reserves for a permanent capital expenditure purpose. 
The break-up of capitalisation between equity and 
loans is purposeful in assessing the performance of public 
- ( 6 1 ) -
e n t e r p r l s e s i n I n d i a , The e q u i t y - l o a n r a t i o v a r i e s from 
e n t e r p r i s e to e n t e r p r i s e , though the Government's policy-
i s in favour of 1 : 1. Tahle 2,10 p r e s e n t s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
of the e n t e r p r i s e s in terms of the equity^-loan r a t i o« 
TABLE 2,10 - SQUITY-LOM COMPOSITION OF CAPITAL 
(I973-7I4.) 
Equity as % No« of Total Equity Col«3 as % 
of loans Enterprises (RS,CHORES) of total 
Below 25 
25 - 50 
50 - 80 
80 - 95 
95 and above 
TOTAL 
8 
5 
5 
17 
60 
95 
98096 
1«13 
6,69 
1^ 8,31 
1,857.^9 
2,l12o58 
5 
0,05 
0a30 
6,00 
88.65 
lOO.OO 
SOURCE: Compiled and _^ calculated by the Research Scholar 
from the Bureau Report, Op,cit« 
The break-up of capitalisation between equity and 
loans brings to fore the problem of repayment of loan and 
payment of interest in the cases of those enterprises marked 
by heavy equity-loan ratio, f^ost of the enterprises have 
been paying loans out of "Depreciation Fund", a practice 
which is objectionable both in principle and dangerous in 
application. Liquidation of "Depreciation Fund" for the 
-(62)-
sake of loan payments, will lead to dissipation of fixed 
assets. Therefore, the norm has to be clearly laid do\vn 
for strict adherence thereto. 
Table 2o11 presents the production and trading perfor-
fficince of public enterprises. It is illustrated by a 
comparison between sales and cost of sales, 
TABLE 2o11 - SALES/COST OF SALES RATIO DI 
CENTRAL GOVERNI^ iENT ENTERPRISES 
Year 
1965-66 
1967-68 
1969-70 
1971-72 
1973-7^ 
Noo of 
Units 
^38 . 
52 
6»+ 
76 
96 
Sales 
(Rs.Crores) 
85^ .03 
1,826.17 
2,959.50 
3,905.91 
5,525.35 
Cost of 
sales 
(Rs.Crores) 
802,9^ 
1771.17 
2823.60 
37^1.82 
5253.^2 
Cost of sales 
as % of 
sales 
9^ .1 
97.0 
95.^ 
95.8 
95.1 
SOURCE: Compiled sind calciLLated by the Research Scholar 
from the Bureau Reports of various years as per 
Appendices, OpoCit. 
The data summarised in table 2.11 indicate heavy ratio* 
The heavy ratios seem to be the result of overhead cost of 
large capacities. It tilted the cost of sales ratio 
unfavourably in most cases as evidenced by the cross-
classification of sales and cost of sales ratios in table 2.12. 
-(63)-
TABLE 2.12 - SALES AND COST OF SALES (1973-7^) 
Cost of Sales as Number of 
% of Sales Enterprises 
Below 90 . h2 
90-95 9 
95 -100 31 
100 and above 13 
TOTAL - 95 
SOURCE: Computed from table 2.11 by the Research Scholar 
and break u-p of units in each range of sales and 
cost of sales from Bureau Reports, Op#cit, 
Table 2o12 reveals that 31 enterprises are placed in the 
range "95-100" per cent and 13 ar« in the range "100 and 
above per cent". It supports the contention that public 
enterprises largely suffer from overheads of large 
capacities, 
OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCI 
It seems pertinent to assess operational efficiency of 
public enterprises b;^  the application of a set of norms in 
a relatively easy framework. The first norm of this kind 
is the additional quantities of capital and labour used by 
the public enterprises to produce additional quantities of 
output. If the incremental capital-output and labour-output 
ratios had both been falling, it can be concluded that the 
-(6if)-
publlc enterprises had been improving their technological 
efficiency; in the contrary case, the conclusion would be 
the other wayo However, if the t wo ratios had been moving 
in opposite direction, no conclusion woiald be possible. 
Further, because of the highly aggregative nature of the 
data analysed, even if it is seen that the two ratios had 
been falling (rising) together, we would not be able to 
conclude whether the improvement (deterioration) in 
technological performance had been due to scale economies 
(dis-economies) or technological progress (regression), 
nor, of course, their relative extent. 
Table 2»13 presents the figures of "capital invested", 
"Sales", and "Employment" of the enterprises of the Central 
Government for the period 1965-7^» 
TABLE 2«13 - CENTRAL GOVERNMENT UNDERTAKINGS 
(RS.CEORES) 
Capital Invested Sales Employment 
Year (RSoCrores) (Rs.Crores) (»000) 
1965-66 2,^5 
1967-68 3,333 
1969-70 if, 301 
1971-72 5,052 
1973-7^ 6,257 
SOURCE: computed by the Research Scholar from (a) A Handbook 
of Information on Public Enterprises (I969 and 1970), 
(b) Bureau Reports of various years. 
These are the basic data available for purposes of the 
present analysis in terms of the framework outlined above. 
1,000 
1,85^ 
2,996 
3,97^ 
6,777 
if71 
55^ 
613 
701 
1,31^ 
-(65)-
The first difficulty faced by the Scholar was that no 
figures of output were available; but that of sales were 
given. It should not be too difficxolt for the Government 
to provide figures of output, that is, "value added". But 
since this is not available, it is assumed that the ratio 
of sales to output did not change over the period so that 
the figures of sales can serve as a proir/ for output. 
Since the period under consideration is not very long, our 
assimption woxad not probably give us qualitatively wrong 
results either because of possible changes in the composition 
of output or because of possible changes in the input-output 
ratios of individual, outputs* 
The figures of 'Capital Invested' and 'Sales* are in 
current prices. Obviously, they have to be comrerted into 
constant priceso But, in case of 'Capital Invested', no 
simple deflation by a price-index would do because it is 
usually a running total of increments at current prices. 
In other words, 'Capital Invested' being a total of yearly 
parts valued at different prices, each increment has to 
be deflated separately« But the base figure for 1965-66 
is Itself a similar composite. Thus figures of 'Capital 
Invested' cannot be derived at constant prices. Increments 
of 'Capital. Invested' can only be expressed in terms of 
constant prices. This is the main reason why the above 
framework is conceived in terms of incremental ratios than 
in terms of total ratios. 
-(66)-
Table 2o1^ gives the figures of yearly increments, aB 
derived from the foregoing table 2,13« The increments of 
"Capital Investment" have been deflated by the price index 
for "machinery and equipmento" 
TABLE 2.1^ - CENTEAL GOVT, ENTERPRISES' 
YEARLY INCREMENTS 
CAPITAL SALES 
Employ- (RS.CRORES) 
vo:,r^  onr? ^ Current At I96I-62 Current At 196I-62 
lear ^ uoo ; Prices Prices Prices prices 
1967-68 83 918 811 85^ 568 
1969-70 59 968 721 11^2 666 
1971-72 88 951 ^90 978 299 
1973-7^ 593 1205 671 2803 613 
SOURCE: Derived by the Research Scholar from Table 2o13o 
The figures of "Sales" have first been deflated by 
the price index for "manufactures" and then the yearly-
increments have been derived. The indices are taken from 
the Economic Survey (Government of India) for I969-70, and 
the Report on Currency and Finance (Reserve Bank of In^ia) 
for 1975-76, Statement 16„ 
Now incremental ratios can be derived at 1961-62 prices, 
The capital-output incremental ratios and the incremental 
labour-output ratios,are derived in the following way. 
-(67)' 
Since the output is denominator, use of »'Sales" as a proxy 
for output will introduce only a scalar change in these 
-ratios, assuming of course, that the sales, output ratios, 
themselves, did not change materially over the period under 
consideration. '^' 
TABLE 2.15 - CENTHAL ENTERPRISES' INCBEMEIsTAL RATIOS 
Year 
1967-68 
1969-70 
1971-72 
1973-7^ 
SOURCE: Derived by the Research Scholar from the Table 2,1l+. 
The Scholar can now hazard the fol lowing o b s e r v a t i o n s : 
F i r s t , the above t a b l e does give the impression of an o v e r a l l 
f a l l i n g t rend in the incrementa l c a p i t a l / o u t p u t r a t i o s ; the 
inc rementa l l abour /ou tpu t r a t i o a l s o shows a s i m i l a r t r e n d 
over the f i r s t h a l f of the pe r iod but l a t e r i t s t r end appears 
o 
t o be i*ising.f 
Second, a reference to the foregoing table reveals that 
the ratios for 197(t-.72 are due to an unbelievably low figure 
C a p i t a l / 
Output 
1.^3 
1,08 
1.61+ 
no9 
Labour/ 
Output 
Opi i f 
O0O8 
0.29 
0,96 
-(68)-
of additional sales for that year, completely out of step 
with the corresponding figures for other years, A conceiv-
ahle cause for such low amoiont of additional sa-les could be 
a disproportionately large amount of investment in that year 
(or in a preceding year, if there were output lags) being 
channelled into projects of longer gestation periodSo This 
STirmise is strengthened by the finding of an output burst 
in the year 1973-7*+. 
Thjrd, 'a further reference to the table shows that the 
figures of additional employment for the last two years 
are much too high for being smoothened sufficiently to 
cause a similar falling trend in the incremental labour-
output ratioo If we find no other explanation, all we can 
say is, that the ratios for the last two years (after the 
basis figures are smoothened) w<^ijild not enable us to make 
any definite conclusion in regard to technological perfor-
mance; they could be the result of typical economic trade of 
more labour for less capital. However, it is well known that 
these were the years when the coal industiy was nationalised 
(an industry which was highly labour-intensive), adding 
o 
considerably to the number of employees of the non-
departmental central enterprises. One has the feeling that 
if the figures for the coaJL industry were taken out and the 
resulting figures were smoothened, the incremental labour-
output ratios would also show a slowly falling trend. 
Fourth, the above pointer regarding the movement of the 
incremental ratios over the period 1965-7^ niay have to be 
-(69)-
moderated because of the liiritations of the data used by 
us. It vill be remembered that we derived the values of 
the increments of capital invested and sales, by applying 
the price-index for machinery and equipment to the current 
values of capital increments and by applying the price 
index for manufactures to the current values of the sales, 
which were then different. Now, the price index for machi-
nery and equipment is perhaps the nearest that one can 
think for deflating investment^ "But the composition of the 
price-index depends on the composition of the basket of 
"manufactures" which differs considerably from the composi-
tion of output of the non-departmental central rmdertakingSo 
Whereas, in 1973-7^ the sales of undertakings classed under 
"Trading and Marketing" and "Petroleum" accounted for nearly 
two-thirds of the total sales, the group of 'manufactures' 
as used in the price-index does not include the prices of 
such goods and services. The following tables 2*16 gives 
some idea of the extent of distortions introduced by the 
use of the price index for 'manufactures' for deflating the 
values of sales, 
TABLE 2.16 - PRICES INDICES OF DIFFERENT GROUPS OF 
COMMODITIES (196I-62 = 100) 
Year 
1969-70 
1970-71 
1971-72 
1972-73 
I973-7V 
Manufac-
t u r e s 
lMf 
155 im 167 {Q%0 
^77 W) 
206 {^5%) 
P e t r o -
leums 
160 
17"^  (10^) 
205 (17^) 
213 i\%) 
3 1 ^ {^7%) 
All 
Commodities 
172 
I0I (6^) 
188 {h%) 
207 (10^) 
25^ (23^) 
NOTE: Figures in parantheses give percentage increases. 
SOURCE: Report on Currency & Finance, 1975-76 
-(70)-
Since there is no price index available for "Trading and 
Marketing", the price index for "All Ccamnodities" is 
examined as a possible substitute. It will be seen that 
during the last years of our period, the price index for 
petroleum (the sales of which accounted for nearly 20 per 
cent of the total)started rising out of step in the later 
years, while the increases in the price index for all 
commodities and those for manufactures were of smilar order. 
This Implies that the figures of'real' output(sales) Increases 
at 1961-62 prices should perhaps be depressed a bit more 
in the later years than what they appear in the table 2,2, 
Accoi-dingly, the capital-output and labour-output ratios 
of tho later years would be adjusted upwards a bit« 
One would also wish to have a closer look at the 
category of 'Capital Investment', The category for frame-
work would be capital employed rather than invested. Our 
implicit assumption is that the ratio of capital employed 
to capital Invested had been stable over the period; otherwise, 
the incremental capital-output ratios (though not the 
incremental labour-output ratios) mi^ht require further 
adjustment. We could not, however, go into this question 
for lack of rapid readily available data. 
All in all, it would be safer to conclude that the 
technological performance of the non-departmental 
central uhdertakings during the years 1965-7^^ was on the 
whole non-deteriorating, if not,, improving. 
-(71)-
We shall end the present discussion by indicating cer-
tain lines of extension. Earlier, we refered to the 
difficulty of estimating from the given data, the 
extent of departure, if any, of the observed technologic^, 
performance from the morm. Lately, however, some figures 
of "capacity" utilisation in the major manufacturing 
enterprises of the ^-Central Government, have been made 
available, A look at these figures may give some idea 
regarding the possibility of further lowering of the 
capital-output ratios, though not perhaps of the labour-
output ratio, in the existing undertakings. 
Table 2,1? below shows a selection of units with 
TABLE 2o17 - CAPACITY UTILISATION BJ MAJOR MANUFACTURING 
ENTERPRISES OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
Unit 
Durgapur 
Rourkela 
B.K.E.L.(Hard-
war) BHPV 
EEC (Eanchi) 
MAMC 
JESSOP 
Hindustan 
Cables 
PRODUCT 
V 
Steel Ingot Pig Iron 
Steel Ingot 
Heat Exchanges & Pr, 
Vessels 
Equipment 
Structurals 
Castings o 
Machine Tools 
Fabrication 
Cranes 
"Wagons 
Dry Core 
Plastic 
, 
1969-70 
59% 
61% 
100^ 
15^ 
15^ 
18^ 
17^ 
67% 
33% 
«. 
197^75 
51% 
59% 
53% 
35% 
k6% 
17% 
2h% 
22$ 
"^2% 
2B% 
^% 
h1% 
63^ 
60^ 
Contd. 
- ( 7 2 ) -
t 2 3 V 
HMT I & I I 6^% 52% 
I I I (T rac to r s ) ^8^ 62% 
IV h2>% 50% 
Garden .Reach Shipbuilding 53^ 
cv Road Roller h^% 
Bharat Ophthalmic 26% 
Tannery Corpn, Footwear 33^ 
SOURCE: Computed by the Scholar from Year Books of Public 
Sector, 1972, 1976, commerce, Bombay. 
considerable underutilised capacity, from a much bigger 
unit-wise presentation given in the sourcCo To save 
space, we have left out the Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 
where similar underutilisation of capacity existed in the 
years of reference. But, according to the source, there 
was not much evidence of significant underutilisation of 
capacity in the later years in the major sectors of 
petroleum and Rinerals and Metals, or even in a large 
part of Steel, Further, the source gives capacity utilisa-
tion figures of manufacturing enterprises only, but not of 
service enterprises. The implications of all these for 
the possibility of further lowering of the overall capital/ 
output ratio in the public sector cannot be traced without 
reference to disaggregated data^ which is presented by the 
Table2o17» A perusal of this table gives rise to the 
following thoughts: The movement of the figures of 
investment and sales over the period 1969-70 to 1973-7^ 
did not seem to promise much further scope of lowering the 
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TABLE 2.18 INDUSTHYWISE BREAK-UP OF INVEtiTMENT & SALES 
(RS.CHORES) 
GOODS 
S t e e l 
Minerals & Metals 
Petroleum 
Chemicals & Pharm« 
Heavy Engineer ing 
Mediiini & Light Engg, 
Transpo]5*tation Equip. 
Consumer Goods 
Agro-t»ased 
TOTAL 
INVESTMENT 
1969-70 
11+18.85 
if68.11 
399 .3^ 
If 2^ . 10 
611,25 
85.07 
, 263.07 
32.53 
7.00 
3716.32 
1973-7V 
2028007 
892.59 
360.02 
818.11 
67^.81 
1I+6.29 
227. M 
67.^2 
9.23 
522^,85 
SALES 
1969-70 
380 .33 , . 
118.51 
7Mf,'+1 
107.6^ 
80.76 
78.»+7 
100.if9 
11.29 
^o30 
1626,20 
1973-7'+ 
721.93 
369.58 
1562.81 
2»+9.95 
263.33 
200,35 
181.91 
30.53 
10.1+6 
3590.85 
SERVICES: 
Trading & Marketing 335.^ 
Transportation 187,22 
Constructicm etc. 19,50 
Small Indust. DeYelopt,20.85 
Tourist 2.78 
Financial ^ 3.93 
Sick Industries 9*32 
309.0^ 
528.10 
20.50 
3"+ -.12 
17.67 
89.09 
33.77 
1167.28 
169.5^ 
37.65 
6.98 
1.0^+ 
O.IV 
1.03 
2711.27 
336.32 
87.66 
22.0^ 
- 12.09 
9.18 
7.19 
TOTAL 579.00 
GRAND TOTALl+255.32 
1032.29 1383.66 3185.75 
6257.1^ 3009.86 6776.60 
SOURCE: Compiled and computed by the Scholar from Bureau 
Reports of 1969-70 and 1973-7'-^ . 
capital/output raio3, except perhaps that in Transportation; 
in all other Service Industries, capital/output ratios had 
already fallen substantially. 
For the industries producing goods, the capacity 
utilisation figures of Table 2,17 provide more definite 
lead. A liberal estimate would be that the sales of such 
industries, except Petroleum, Minerals & Metals and certain 
units of steel, were capable of being nearly doubled. But 
both in 1969-70 and in 1973-7^, the sales of such industries 
plus tremsportation, constituted about one-fourth of the 
total sales by the public sector. Thus, with a bit of 
guess work and on a very liberal estimate, one could place 
the full capacity sales by the public sector at about 25 
per cent more than the actual sales. 
Could we secure output Increase of this order without 
any increase in investment? We cannot say unless we know 
the reasons of under-utilisation of capacity, which are ^ 
examined in subsequent chapters. Such reasons include 
teething troubles, lack of spares, shortage of power, even 
shortage of raw material, apart from lack of demand. In 
certain cases, the capacity has been called into question, 
as having been unrealistically determined, regardless of 
adequate balancing equipment, etc. Leaving out the case 
of lack of demand, removal of the other difficulties appears 
to call for some increase in investment somewhere. Never-
theless, the feeling persists that capital/output ratio 
of the public sector as a whole was yet capable of being 
lowered appreciably. 
<15)-
DEFICITS 
Operational efficiency, as analysed in the previous 
paragraphs, which is low, leads to the discussion of one 
of the serious problems of cumulative deficits of public 
enterprises in India. Cumulative deficits are very large 
in many cases as revealed by the Table 2,19© 
TABLE 2,19 - DEFICIT AS PER CENT OF CAPITAL EMPLOYED 
(1973.71+) 
(RS.GRDRES) 
Sector Uni ts 
*" Engineering 
Shipbui ld ing 
Chemicals ^ 
Mining 
Petroleum 
Trading & 0 
Marketing 
T ranspo r t a t i on 
Cont rac t & 
Const ruc t ion 
27 
if 
13 
13 
7 
13 ^ 
8 
5 
I n d u s t , Developt . 
& Tech, Consul t , 5 
TOTAL 95 
C a p i t a l 
Employed 
1080.75 
63«83 
351*21 
572.91 
^71,03 
68805^ 
ifif8<,28 
22.95 
11o91 
3712.21 
D e f i c i t 
231.21 
11.30 
88.Mf 
137^92 
-
1.32 
36.97 
»f.77 
0.05 
511•98 
D e f i c i t as % 
of c a p i t a l em] 
z-\% 
1% 
25% 
2^% 
-
0^% 
Q% 
21% 
O.lf^ 
lk-% 
SOUBCE: Carpiled and computed by the Scholar from Bixreau 
aeports, Op.cit. 
- ( 7 6 ) -
Expressed in r e l a t i o n t o the c a p i t a l employed they s tand 
as follows (Table 2 , 2 0 ) . 
TABLE 2,20 - SECTOiUL CLASialFICATION OF DEFICIT AND 
CAPITAL EMPLOYED (l965-7>+) 
Sectors & 
units 
(Ro.CRORES) 
Capital Employed and Deficits 
196^-66 1969-70 1971-72 1973-7^ 
Engineering 
a) Capital 
b) Deficit 
c) Ratio 
Shipbui ld ing 
" a) Cap i t a l 
b) D e f i c i t 
c) Ra t io 
Chemicals 
(10) 
158.15 
25.&9 
(3) 
1^,69 
0,02 
a) C a p i t a l 
b) D e f i c i t 
c) Ra t io 
(7) 
5loif6 
1o19 
2% 
Mining & Minerals (^) 
a) Capital 179o^9 
b) Deficit 8„56 
c) Ratio 0.5;^  
Petroleum 
a) Capital 
b) Deficit 
(1) 
110,10 
Trading & f^erketg. (2) 
a) Capital 31.15 
b) Deficit 
c) Ratio 
Transportation (5) 
a) C a p i t a l 190o21 
b) D e f i c i t 0.13 
c) Ra t io Op7/^  
(15) 
M-73.81 
212.12 
(^) 
260I5 
1-31 
0 . 5 ^ 
(11) 
181.19 
60O2 
3^ 
(7) 
3^8.87 
37o^7 
1 1 ^ 
(5) 
^35.10 
3.67 
(if) 
371.77 
(6) 
220, If 2 
7.81 
(18) 
681,85 
210.31 
26% 
(M 
i f6. i f6 
(12) 
2if8.29 
55.89 
21% 
(7 ) 
385.11 
73.^9 
19^ 
(7) 
^15*07 
(9) 
732.Mf 
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This phenomenon represents an erosion of capital unless 
the future operations turn out to be ccmpensatorily 
profitable. Several major public enterprises have 
accumulated sizeable deficits. At the end of 1965-66 
thirty-five central government enterprises - all running 
concerns - had the deficits cited in Table 2,20. The 
total comes to Rs,37o12 crores and works out at 3 per 
cent <^ the total capital employed in these enterprises. 
Similarly, at the end of 1969-70, sixty-four central 
government enterprises had the deficits of Rs,295*57 crores 
and works at 13 per cent of the total capital employed in 
these enterprises. At the end of 1971-72, sixty-five 
central government enterprises accumtilated d<^ ficits of 
Rs,378»6l+ crores which works out" "Sit-4'3 ,.p<^r cent. In 
-p^t)35 
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1973-7'+, 89 rvinning concerns of the central government 
acciiiiiulated deficits of Rs,5l1o^8 crores and works out at 
^k• per cent. 
It Is significant to note that deficit accumulation 
has not been confined to any particular industrial sector. 
Engineering, chemcials, mining, trading and marketing and 
service enterpra,ses occur in this category. Many of the 
industries have continuously made losses since inception« 
The relative size of the deficits varies from enterprise 
to enterprise, the highest figures among the large sized 
enterprises relating to Engineering industry (Table 2»19)o 
The others, with 15 per cent and above of accumulated 
deficits in relation to capital outlay, Include Engineering, 
Chemicals, Mining, Contract and Construction Services, etc. 
The problem is of unpostponable urgency, both for probing 
into and streamlining the operational efficiency of the 
public enterprises and for giving a boost to majiagerial 
motivation. 
As a matter of fact, it will be purposeless to build 
up the problem of deficits and deficit accumulation as a 
single issue in cause or remedy. Sharp analysis is needed 
o 
of the varying situations of deficits, 
THE CAUSES OF DEFICITS • First, an enterprise may 
have accumulated deficits 
on account of heavy under-utilisation of capacity<, That 
this is widespread phenomenon in our public sector is 
clear from the representative facts cited in table 2«17* 
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The position corrects Itself in course of tinse, if the 
under-utilisation is just initial and gestational in 
nature. Unfortunately several of our public enterprises 
represent the case of near idle capacity, in so far as the 
foreseeable demands in the next five years or so are 
concerned. The point to note about this situation is that 
there is nothing managerially wrong about the enterprise 
and that the accumulated deficit is the direct consequence 
of a past error in investment decision. 
However, public enterprises may also have accumulated 
deficits due to high costs, traceable to managerial or 
operational inefficiencies, (Expensive production functions, 
low labour productivity, and high inventories, are some 
examples of inefficiencies. These are examined in the 
subsequent chapters). 
The next is a situation in which the enterprise has 
little to be blamed about but public policy favours 
subsidized prices, (The National Small Industries Corpora-
tion Ltd., and Electricity Boards illustrate the phenomenon, 
£Uid some banks may join this tribe as time passes.) 
3 
A special case of losses relevant to some units like 
the Surgical Instruments Plant at Madras may be described 
in the following terms. 
There is a demand for the product in the country, but 
not for the exact quality produced by the enterprise. At 
this stage the enterprise must try to improve the quality 
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of its products, so as to make it saleable in' the market. 
This entails additional investments of one kind or another, 
accompanied by a certain degree of scarping of certain 
outlayo 
The solution to the problem of deficits depends on the 
cause of deficits, the size of the deficits, and the surplus 
prospects of the enterprise in the immediate future. Before 
alternative courses of policy in this field are examined, 
two important qualifications may be outlined, 
(a) If provisions of depreciation have been higher 
than necessary, the deficits shown in the books are 
inflated figures. This is illustrated by the factual 
figures given in the table 2,21, 
TABLE 2„21 - DEPRECIATION PROVISION 
(RS.CRORES) 
-v 
Depreciation as 
Year Gross Block Depreciationof Gross Block 
1965-66 1A58.25 362.86^ 25% 
1967-68 2,376o08 63n66 27^ 
1969-70 3,022o00 931088 31^ 
1971-72 3,627.77 1,231.16 33^ 
1973-7^ ^,Mf3.89 1,806.92* n-'i% 
TOTAL 1^,927.99 ^,963.88 3h-% 
SOURCE: Compiled and computed by the Scholar from Bureau 
Reports of various years, Op.cit, 
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Depreciation provision appears to be quite large in the 
year ^973-7^•, mainly because the provision is made to 
obtain free flow of cash for unassigned purposes. Public 
enterprises have built up depreciation funds at 3^^ of 
gross block in general. Perhaps, there is nothing 
intrinsically wrong in this step, considering that the 
actual wear and tear could not have been higher in its 
situation of terrible under-utilisationo 
(b) The amounts of deficits cited in the tab:i,es 2.19 
and 2.20 represent the figures shovm in tjae Bureau Reports; 
they do not necessarily represent the real quantum of the 
deficits so far sustained by the enterprises, whose burdens 
have been shifted to other segments of the economy. The 
main reason is that the cost of equity capital has not 
entered the accounts and escape inclusion in the figures 
of deficits. 
Discussion on the remedial solutions may proceed in 
three stages (a) where the surplus prospects of an enter-
prise with accumulated deficits are high, (b) where the 
surplus prospects are just moderate; and (c) where the 
surplus prospects are poor, 
(a) Where an enterprise is likely to make high profits 
in the near future, the situation is one of deficits during 
gestation, and no other solution will be necessary than to 
treat the deficits as deferred, for being written off in 
the future years when such profits will be realised as not 
only pay off all current costs, but compensate for the past 
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under-utilisation cf costs, i.e,, the deficit. Assuming 
that the accumulated deficit can be written off in five 
years from now, out of the future high profits, the 
financial process will run on ond of the following lines, 
(i) The revenues may rise through price enhancements, the 
output (sales) and the cost levels remaining the same; 
(ii) the costs may be reduced, the output (sales) and 
the prices remaining the same; and (lii) all magnitudes 
may change; output increases, price increases, stays 
constant or decreases, and costs fall, stay constant or 
increase. The net result will be an excess of current 
earnings over current costs to an extent that lea'^ es 
enough for wrltjng off the accumulated deficits within a 
quinquennial period, 
(b) A more normal version of the above description 
consists of an enterprise with accumrulated deficits 
continuing to incur deficits during the immediate future, 
say five years, but at a progressively declining rate, so-
much so that at the end of five years from now, it will 
still have an accunrulated deficit, higher in aggregate 
magnitude than today. If we assiame that its surplus 
prospects will then be bright, the above sequence of 
remedy holds good in principle, though the magnitudes and 
the time-phasing of the solution and the writing-off of 
the deficits will change, 
(c) Where the immediate future prospects of an 
enterprise with deficits are just moderate in the sense 
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that no more than current full costs will be recovered froi 
current reycnues, there is only the problem of dealing 
with the accumulated deficits up to date, without worrj^ ing 
about their aggravation in the future* It is here that a 
solution such as cash grant fron: the government, to wipe 
out the accumulated deficits may be suggested. 
The cash grant will help in eliiDinatlng the debit 
balance on the profit and loss account. If certain assets 
have been eroded as a result of the deficits, they can be 
reinstated; and if loans were received from the government 
to meet the cash losses, they can be liquidated. One 
obvious danger of the cash grant method is its proneness to 
repetition from time to time, 
(d) Where the future prospects of an enterprise with 
accumulated deficits are poor, the remedial steps may have 
to go beyond the mere cash grants A capital reduction 
may be undertaken implying corresponding reductions in 
asset values, such that they truthfully represent the 
earning capacity of the enterprise. This helps the 
enterprise to show a record of surplus in the future 
years, on the reduced capital base. This method is parti-
cularly appropriate in the case of enterprises where capi-
talisation is excessive and where prospects of demand and 
profits are bleak. Excessive and idle capacities, 
calling for appropriate contractions, will also imply 
partial application of this method. 
In spite of capital reductions, the public exchequer 
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continues to bear the service charges on the capital 
written off. In other words, the tax payer pays for it; 
but the consumers of the enterprises are relieved. 
Finally, two methods of solution may be referred to. 
Firstly, the capital structure may be given the shape of 
exclusive equity, so that finance costs will totally 
exclude themselves as a change on the enterprise; and so 
that to that extent the deficit-causing conditions of 
the enterprise may be concealed by accoiunting conventions, 
Secondly, depreciation provisions may be manipulated so 
as to lower the cost burden of the enterprise and lighten 
the deficit-causing circumstanceSo 
EVALUATION OF WORKING RESULTS 
By and large, public enterprises in India have not 
yet been a significant means of resource mobilisation, 
which may be expressed in terms of low dividends and 
large deficits. Sixty-two enterprises declared dividend 
as low as "0-1" per cent of the equity capital of 
Rs,1,658.lf8 crores (Table 2,6). The aggregate capital 
of these enterprises amounted to 77 per cent of the total 
equity capital invested at the end of 1973-7^. And eight 
enterprises did not declare any dividend in 1973-7^, The 
aggregate capital invested in these enterprises works out 
at h- per cent of the total. The other 19 enterprises 
which declared dividend "1-2" per cent did not contribute 
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significantly to the national exchequer in the year 1973-7^o 
Assuming that even if high dividends were not declared, 
high profit-ploughbacks would amount to resource-Eobilisa-
tion from the stand-point of the cons-umers concerned. We 
find that ninety-Six enterprises earned profits 1o6a per 
cent in 1973-7^ on average; of them 12 enterprises earned 
profit at the rate of "8-10" per cent, which is less than 
the 'opportunity cost" of the capital invested© We, 
therefore, reach the conclusion that they have not been 
an effective means of resource mobilisation for general 
capital formation or self expansion and modernisation. 
Contrary is true to say that they have acted as a 
drain on the national exchequer due to heavy deficits 
accumulated by them over the years of their operation. 
It is clear from the analysis of deficits that accumulated 
deficits worked out at l^f per cent during the period ^ 
1965-7*+. This, in the ultimate analysis, has to be made 
good by the Government unless future operations of these 
enterprises become compensatorily profitable. The most 
difficxilt case of acciimulated deficits is the Engineering 
industry whose deficits amounted to Rs.231,21 crores at 
the end of 1973-7'+, which worked out at 21 per cent of 
the total capital invested. 
Loss of income to the Government is implicit in 
equity^evice of capitalisation to the extent of cost of 
capital whenever an enterprise does not earn profits 
enough to pay a dividend on equity capital. It was noticed 
in Table 6 that 8 running concerns of the Central GcremEent 
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did not declare dividend. Their aggregate capital was 
RSo98o95 crores. It entailed national cost of capital 
of RSo5»9 crores (if this computed at 6 per cent rate 
of interest). The cost of capital or 'opportunity cost' 
may be regarded as an unnoticed recurrent loss of income 
because this does not enter the books <of accountso It 
may be said that the explicit and implicit costs amount 
to a very high proportion of the capital over the period 
of their operations. Remedial steps are suggested to 
tackle the problem of accumulated defi(gits according 
to the situation and deficit-causing circumstanceso 
Where an enterprise is likely to make high profits in 
the near future, no other solution will be necessary 
than to treat the deficits as deferred; future profits 
will compensate for the past deficits. Where tffe rate 
of deficits is declining, so much so that at the end of 
p.. a given period of time it will wipe out the accumulated 
deficits, no special solution is called for. Where the 
enterprise is unable to show surplus but covers current 
full cost, solution such as cash grant from the Government 
is recommended. Finally, where the future prospects of 
an enterprise with accumulated deficits are poor, the 
o 
remedial steps include capital reductions, exclusively 
equity capital structure so that finance costs will totally 
exclude themselves as a charge on the enterprise, and 
also lowering the depreciation provisions. 
Analytical study of financial performance of public 
enterprises supports the view that their peroformance has 
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not been satisfactoryo It is therefore proposed to 
examine the cost of production of our public enterprises 
in the next chapter. 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter a close examination of select public 
enterprises has been made for the decade 1965-7'+o In 
the course of financial appraisal it has been noticed 
that their working results need much improvement for 
providing infrastructural facilitie;s for development of 
other industries and for their own expansion and modemi-
satlon„ AS revealed by the study, profits have been 
negligible during the period under review. In the case 
of several public enterprises like Engineer^g, ship-
building, chemicals, mining and minerals, etc., the 
rate of return was much below the bank rate. It caiinot ^  
be said of all the enterprises that rentum was Ibw on 
account teething period which entailed enormous expenses 
on their establishment» Only Petroleum industry's workiiig 
appears to be better from the point of view of surpluses» 
But this cannot be a true yardstick for measuring opera-
tional efficiency of an enterprise which enjoys monopoly 
in production and distribution of a material so basic to 
the modern economy, PetrolexMi Industry earned the largest 
profits through monopolistic prices. Two-thirds of the 
total sales by all the public enterprises, as revealed 
~(88)~ 
by the sinalysis, was accounted for by 'Petrolexiixi' and 
'Trading and Iferkoting', because increase in petroleum 
prices was higher than the increase in the prices of all 
the 'manufactures'. This conciusion is, therefore, tenable 
that the working results of public enterprises are by far 
and large highly unsatisfactory. In spite of several 
difficulties, analysis of technological performance or 
'operational efficiency' was undertaken by the Scholar* 
This analysis also confirms the view that public enter-
prises are not doing their best to improve their 
operational efficiency. As a consequence, they have largely 
accumulated deficits. There are a number of factors 
leading to deficits. These factors are being examined 
in the next two chapters entitled, "Cost Behaviour and 
Influences on Cost Composition" and the "Cost Pattern in 
Relation to Organisation And I^nagement," 
CHAPTER III 
COST BEHAVIOUR Ai^ INFLUENCES 
ON COST COMPOSITION 
The foregoing chapter x-rayed financial performance 
of public enterprises during the decade 1965-7^. The 
critical appraisal, based on analytical study, reveals 
that performance of these enterprises in mobilising 
resources is highly xmsatisfactory, though some of them 
have come out of the teething stage and are working on 
sound business principles, 'Petroleunj' and 'Trading & 
Marketing' sectors are the sole outstanding examples of 
industries generating surpluses, not so much because of 
improved operational efficiency as due to monopolies in 
their respective fields of-business activity. In general, 
profits are negligible with the resiat that they are 
short of funds to repay loans and make permanent invest-
ments for modernization and rationalisationo Paucity of 
; fund has led many public enterprises to utilise "depre-
ciation funds" for repayment of loans. This practice 
is, indeed, fraught with the danger of ultiinate 'dissipa-
tion of fixed assets'. Besides, there is continuous 
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erosion of equity as a resui.t of deficits accumulated 
which have already assumed an alarming proportion. It 
is, therefore, necessary to examine the factors infla-
ting the cost of production axid lowering the rate of 
return. The presents chapter especially deals with 
influences on cost behaviour and cost composition under 
two heads: (1) Cost Behaviour, and (2) Influences on Cost 
Composition, Let me deal them in tum« 
I - COST BEHAVIOUR 
Cost behaviour is related to the size of rated 
capacity and its utilisation. A public enterprise is 
generally free from the motive of allowing under-
utilisation of its installed capacity. Its production 
plan is likelyto be one of producing up to full capacity. 
Existence of under-utilised capacity in public sector 
enterprises, as revealed by the accompanying table S-l, 
is due to, in the first instance, creation of larger 
initial capacities, as against the graduated additions 
to capital expenditure. The table 3«1 shows that in 
1972-73, out of 35 units analysed, it was found that in 
^h enterprises utilisation of capacity was above 75 
per cent; in the case of 12 it was above 50 per cent; 
in the case of 6 it was less than 50 per cent, and 
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TABLE 3J- PEH C2NT SHORTFALL IN CAPACITY UTILISATION 
% Shortfall In 
Capacity 
Utilisation 
Less than 25% 
More than 25% but 
Less than 50 % 
More than 50% but 
Less than 75 % 
More than 75% but 
Less than 100^ 
TOTAL 
Number of 
1972-73 
lif 
12 
6 
3 
- 35 
Enterprises 
1973-7^ 
13 
11 
6 
2 
32 
.in the years 
197W-75 
12 
8 
6 
2 
28 
SOURCE: Compiled and computed by the Research Scholar 
from Bureau Reports of various various, OpeCit. 
three could utilise even less than 25 per cent. Though 
there was some improvement in subsequent years, as 
shown by the slowly declining number of enterprises 
in different ranges of under-utilisation of capacity, 
the fact remained unchanged that the problem of under-
utilisation of capacity in our public enterprises had 
been a phenomenon for a number of years. 
There are a number of factors which have led to 
idle capacity in the public enterprises. In the first 
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instance, long period of gestation is responsible for 
under-utilisation of capacity in capital-intensive 
projects. Heavy Electricals (India) Ltd., furnishes 
an example, which was incorporated on 29 August, 1955» 
for the manufacture of heavy electrical equipments like 
hydraulic turbines, switch gears, transformers, etc. 
The project report, as accepted by the Government, 
ajiticipated eight years to achieve full production in 
the factory. The period mentioned above was to be 
reckoned from the complete placement in position of 
factory facilities and staff. The eight years were a 
period of abnormally high under-utilisation of capacityo 
Teething problems, including technological diffi-
cxiltles and initial bottlenecks, also acted as cons-
traints which militated against full utilisation of capa-
city in the case of a number of public units. For 
instance, fertilizer plsmts and B and G Scheme of 
Neyveli Lignite Corporation were commissioned in 19^5* 
which had to work to low capacity until 19^9 clue to 
technological difficulties and initial bottlenecks. 
Low demand also aggravated the problem of under-
utilisation of capacity. There are evidences to suggest 
that, on balance, investment planning at the veiy begin-
ning did not take into account demand for the product. 
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This investment was partly premised on the ground of 
economy in subsequent stages of output expansion and 
partly on the ease of securing funds, as illustrated by 
the 'unbusiness-like' purchases of machinery by the *. 
Bharat Electronics Ltd., in the early years, involving 
heavy under-utilisation. There are, of course, favour-
able results that follow rapid expansion of output under 
conditions of declining cost till production approximates 
rated capacity. Economy of comprehensive planning of 
the envisaged capacity in its totality is, in fact, 
lost to the Enterprises which are unable to utilise full 
capacity, like Durgapur steel plant utilising (in 197^7^) 
51 per cent of its capacity, Rourkela 59 per cent, Haixiwar 
Plant of Bharat Heavy Electricals 35 per cent. Tannery 
and Footwear Corporation 33 per cent and so on(Table 2,17). 
Similarly, Government entered into an agreement with the 
Government of USSR on 29 May, 1959, with a view to 
establish in the public sector plants for the manufacture 
of antibiotics, synthetic drugs, surgical instruments, 
phyto-chen/c'~als and glandular products though demand for 
those products did not justify establishment of those 
imits, AS a consequence, the level of production, in 
the first two years, in Surgical Instruments Plant 
was about 19 per cent of its capacity. In 1972'-73, it 
was 2^ per cent, and in subsequent years also the level 
of production did not rise much. As the demand lor 
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surgical instruments manufactured in this plant was low, 
the production had had to be restricted tb saleable 
products» In Antibiotics Plant, Rishikesh, the produc-
tion of commissioned products was about 10 per cent in 
1967-68 and ^U• per cent in 1972-73. In 1975-76, it was 
k& per cent, This Plant was commissioned in 1967-68. 
Even after ten years, level of production was less than 
50 per cent of the rated capacity, though the project 
report had envisaged a period of two years for the plant 
to reach the full capacity, Under-utilisation of 
capacity in this case also is due to low demand for 
the product. These instances support the contention 
that demand wsi^s not adequately assessed for the products 
of many public enterprises at the time of initial capital 
investment. 
In certain cases, Government opted for larger 
capacity knowingly. For instance, in the case of Heavy-
Machine Building (fianchi), eind Mining Machinery Plant 
(Durgapur), experts had recommended to the Government 
to go in for smaller capacity projects, as suggested by 
the Colombo Plan, But the Government selected higher 
capacity plants of Russian design owing to tie-up with 
Durgapur Steel Plant, 
Likewise, lack of coordinated market research and 
development programmes is yet another factor having 
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contributed to idle capacity. Only a few enterprises 
have made efforts to Increase sales. It acted as a 
constraint on full utilisation of capacityo A singular 
example was the experience of H.M.T. which started 
diversifying its products. The Air India had entered 
the chartering lines through its subsidiary company, 
'•The Air India Charters Limited". Air India is also 
setting up 5-star hotels to be fully operated by them, 
Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., like its foreign compe-
titors, is contemplating a plan to manufacture, besides 
turbines and generators, a wide range of products from 
electric bulbs to nuclear power turbines, from very 
small fractional horse power motors to rolling mill 
drives. The Fertilizer Corporation of India can also 
similarly diversify its products. Diversification 
offers a nujnber of profitable lines to the Corporation, 
viz,, synthesis gas to which urea and ammonia are basic 
materials. The Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd., 
can also increase demand for its products by producing 
consumer-end products. The International companies like 
Haechaet, Bayer, Park^Davis, Sandoz, Glaxo, Roche, ICI, 
etc., manufacture products extending from cosmetics to 
electronics, veterinary products, pharmaceuticals, 
dye-stuffs, laboratory chemicals, industrial raw-materials 
and intermediate, textile chemicals, agro-chemcials. 
They also have a large share of consumer products, like 
baby-food, tooth pastes, shaving creams, shampoos, 
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chicklets, etc. The Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals 
Ltdo is producing the basic drugs for which sufficient 
demand does not exist. Lately, it has made a beginning 
to a limited extent with consujner-end products like 
general tonics, cough syrups, etco 
Public enterprises do not have a coordinated 
marketing management programme„ They have adopted 
different approaches for sales and marketirig of their 
products. For instance, Hyderabad Plant of Bharat 
Heavy Electricals Ltd., Hindustan Cables, Hindustan 
Teleprinters, Lubricant India Ltd,, Indiain Telephone 
Industries Ltd., etc, did not have elaborate network 
for distribution of their produetSo The Heavy Engineaing 
Corporation of India manufactures items for which no 
distribution machinery is necessary. The Mining and ^  
Allied >fe.chinery Corporation had appointed one sole agent 
for sale of hydraulic props, Hindustan Photo Films 
Mfg., Co., have a sole distributor for cine films positive. 
For medical X-ray films, distributors are appointed 
statewise. For photographic papers, statewise distri-
butors handle their sales. 
The IDPL have four divisional sales managers for 
the country. The IDC handles all bulk customers 
directly, Automative fuels are distributed to the 
public through retail pump outlets operated by dealers 
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appointed by the Corporation, Where cases of complaints 
from customers in regaijd to adulteration of products by 
dealers are received, punitive action is taken, including 
termination of dealership. 
The Central Sales Organisation handles sales and 
after-sales service of all products manufactured by the 
public steel plants• Customers can buy steel from the 
Central Sales Organisation (CSO) directly in wagon loads 
or in smaller quantities from the stockyards in different 
parts of the country. Almost all States in India have 
one stockyard at least. Distribution of iron and steel 
is done in accordance with the procedure laid down by 
the Joint Plant Committee, 
In the Fertilizer industry, the Fertilizers and 
Chemicals Travancore Ltd., operates a multi-channel 
distribution system by utilising the services of various 
agencies like cooperative societies, private traders, 
Agro-industries Corporation, bulk customers like 
plantations, sugar factories, etc. The Fertilizer 
Corporatiorf of India affects 33 per cent of the total 
sales through cooperative institutional buyers and 67 
per cent through small traders. It does not encourage 
sole distributorship. 
Quality and price controls are maintained by the 
Indian Government and various state governments, In 
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many instances controlled prices have been kept relatively 
lov/, -with the result that prices frequently do not cover 
all costs of production. Controls have acted as disincen-
tives to new investment in the private sector and resulted 
in deficits in the public enterprises. 
One example is the fertilizer, a public industry 
that has been subject to price and distribution controls 
and which has accumulated large deficits. Recent food 
price increases are said to have encouraged greater 
demand for fertilizers. At the tame time there has been 
tardy progress in fertilizer projects licensed both in 
the private and public sectors, attributed partly to 
price and distribution controls enacted bji the govemmenta 
Not all price controls have succeeded. The govem-
ment's ability to regiilate prices has varied from 
industry to industry. As a rule the government appears 
to have been more successful in controlling wholesaJ.e 
prices charged by a lew large producers. It has been 
notably less successful in controlling the prices of 
goods etnd services produced by a number of small producers,** 
and especially retail prices charged by middlemen. As 
might be expected, there are thriving black markets 
for most scarce controlled commoditleSo 
Controls are supposed to stabilise retail prices 
and benefit small consumers. In fact, is the Scholar's 
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impression that the resxilt of wholesale price controls, 
where effective, has been a flourishing black market or 
increased profits for industries consuming controlled 
comraodities and able to buy these commodities at 
controlled prices. As a rule only large consumers 
capable of buying directly from factories or enforcing 
government regulations appear to have benefited from the 
government's price policies. Among the beneficiaries 
have been the various agencies and factories of the 
government itself. 
Unduly low prices for controlled comraodities and 
services are only one consequence of the government's 
price policies. Small price differentials for various 
grades of coal may be one reason why our metallurgical 
industries are unable to obtain adequate supplies of 
high grade coking coal. Small price differentials for 
various types of steel have also encouraged the production 
of poor quality steel, relatively heavy sections, and, 
in general, sections that require comparatively little 
rolling by our steel mills. Excessive telescoping of 
3 
railway rates for bulk goods has encouraged the location 
of consiuning industries in regions relatively distant 
from their sources of supply. Some of these distortions 
may be justified by social and political objectives of 
the governmento Even so, they have probably incurred a 
real cost to the economy, the inefficient use of resources. 
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It becomes obvious that price and distribution controls 
are fraught with .the danger of creating distortions in 
the economy. 
These illustrations are n6t random selection of 
the cases of the marketing management. It indicates 
that public enterprises suffer from defective distri-
bution system. Difficulties are experienced by 
customers due to defects in the channels of distribution. 
For instance, prior to f^e.^ ch 196^ the agency primarily 
responsible for the distribution of steel was the 
Office of the Iron and Steel Controller in Calcutta, a 
subdivision of the Steel Ministry. A consumer could 
place an indent directly on the Iron and Steel Controller 
for all but exceptionally scarce controlled categories 
of steel. To purchase scarce categcy:'ies the consiuner 
first had to obtain a quota certificate from an agency 
or ministry of the central or a state government. 
Indents for at least one wagon load, approximately 
twenty-two tons, were placed on the steel mills by the 
office of the Iron and Steel Controller after cons\il-
o 
tation with the representatives of the steel mills. 
Smaller orders were placed on middlemen known as 
stockists who in turn indented on the major producers 
through the Office of the Iron and Steel Controller, 
All imported steel was also purchased through this 
office. 
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There were countless lapses in the system, of 
controls governing the distribution of steel* The 
Office of the Iron and Steel Controller receifed no less 
than 50,000 indents each year. It was expected to 
scrutinize each indent, but in fact its staff was 
incapable of more than cursory examination based on 
information supplied by the indentor himself. As a 
result, many indents we^e accepted or rejected 
after cursory examination. Screening of indents did 
not eliminate over-indenting, nor did it equalise 
demand for controlled categories with their supply. 
As a consequence, a black market persisted to enable 
other consumers to purchase steel~that could not be 
obtained quickly through official channels. 
The Office of the Iron and Steel Controller was 
also unable to effect a meaningful audit to assure the 
use of steel by intended consumers rather than its 
resale on the black market. In mid-1963 galvanised 
sheets commanded a price on the black market approximately 
100 per cent and other flat products between 15 and 30 
per cent above the government's controlled selling 
1 
price. Because there was little risk of detection, 
the inducement to resell these types of steel was very 
1« Raj Committee, Report, Po53, 
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great indeed. 
Another aouae of the old sjst>ini oi' distribution 
control was the generous issuance of different types of 
priorities with the result that indents possessing various 
priority ratings accuimulated at the steel mills. In 
theory the issuance of priorities was based on the 
importance of particular uses to the fulfilment of plan 
objectives, defence and capital goods projects being 
accorded highest priorities. In practice the issueance 
of priorities was also based on political influence 
and ministerial pressures from the central and state 
governments. In effect, under the old system of distri-
buting steel the office of the Iron and Steel Controller 
had little independent power to allocate scarce sections. 
Steel consumed by medium and large-scale industries 
o-
was allocated by the Development Wing of the Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry, steel consumed by small-scale 
industries by the directors of industries of various 
states, and steel consumed by the ministries or organi-
sations under their direction by the ministries them-
selveSo In short, the office was able to distribute 
only those forms that were not scarce, that is to say, 
those forms for which distribution control was 
\mnecessaryo 
The failure of steel price and. distribution controls 
became increasingly obvious during the early I96OS, The 
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Government appointed Raj Committee in 19^2 to Investigate 
existing controls and suggest alternatives,, The Committee 
discussed at length the failings of existing controls, but 
concluded that some government regulation v/ould have to 
be retained to^dnsure allocation of steel to essential 
capital projects and small consumers» For this reason 
the Raj Committee contemplated only partial restoration 
of a free market for steel. 
Under the new system a Joint Plant Committee has 
been formed consisting of representatives from each of 
the steel companies, jthe Office of the Iron and Steel 
Controller, and the Railway Ministry acting on behalf 
of consumers of steel. This committee scrutinizes indents, 
plans rolling schedules, fixes prices for relatively 
abundant categories, and establishes price extras for 
different"qualities and specifications of steel. The 
prices of scarce categories of steel are still established 
by the Government. Retention and selling prices are now 
-t-
identi^ al and the Equalization Fund has been abolished. 
In its place the 'Development Fund' has been created. 
No attempt is made to regulate the price of steel after 
it has left the plants and trade in steel is permitted 
to anyone. Should inordinate profits accrue to producers, 
they will be absorbed by the government through the 
enactment of offsetting excise duties and surcharges. 
Steel prices will continue to be equalised throughout 
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India by means of a fund operated by the Joint Plant Committee 
Finally, the Government will establish priorities when shortages 
of specific sections impair the activities of essential user 
industries. 
During the years following these changes in the distri-
bution system, the Joint Plant Committee is credited with 
reducing the time need to process an indent to so little 
as one week, A central sales organisation for other basic 
scarce goods like fertilizer, apart from being economical, 
would lead to greater coordination, evolution of effective 
©ALES strategies and development of expertise in the field of 
sales management. 
Unrealistic production targets also account for under-
utilisation of capacity. 14anagement used to fix easily 
accessible targets to cover up their inefficiency. It is 
essential that annual targets- of production are laid down 
after taking into accoiant all the relevant factors, particularly 
rated capacity, size of deinand which must be assessed by the 
enterprise through market surveys. It calls for a system 
of checks and balances in productioij^  planning to avoid low 
targets of production. It is recommended that 'efficiency 
audit* must be introduced, in all the enterprises for ensuring 
optimum production. 
Nevertheless, strained industrial relations also account 
for heavy loss of production and low utilisation of capacity. 
To illustrate the point, table 3,2 presents losses suffered by 
•(105)' 
public steel raills alone during 1967-68 and 1970-71 owing 
to labour troubles. Total losses in all the public enter-
prises due to labour troubles can be anybody's guess, 
TABLE 3.2 - LOSSES FROM LABOUR TROUBLES IN HSL* PLANTS 
1967-68 1968-69 1969-70 1970-71 
Manhours lost 
(in lakhs) 11,11 5ol6 7»3^ 20,56 
Financial losses 
(Fixed charges 
( in Rs.lakhs) 921 o96 87oC5 85V.97 986.if5 
Value of Produc-
tion lost 
(in Rs,lakhs) 1803,16 1913.2^ 2320,97 1320,17 
SOURCE: Compiled by the Research Scholar from Hindustan 
Steel Estimates, quoted in Eastern Economist, 
Annu-al Number, 1972, p.113^« 
Certain practices that have prevailed at one or more 
of the public sector steel plants also contributed to 
under-utilization of capacity. These practices have, to 
some extent, been changed since the end of I962, Perhaps 
the best publicized has been abnormal deterioration in 
the equipment of the Rourkela and Durgapur mills. 
Instances of unusual destruction of Rourkela's equipment 
have been well documented by the press. Destruction of 
Durgapur's equipment, although less publicised, has also 
been excessive. The destruction of equipment has necessi-
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tated some premature replacement by the plants. However, 
the plants' effective capacity was considerably reduced. 
Destruction of equipment at Rourkela at one time 
necessitated some stripping of parts from one unit of a 
o 
1 
mill to replace parts in another. This practice was 
prompted by an inadequacy of spare parts and, to some 
extent, poor inventory control, some available spares 
actually being unknown to the plant's management. 
Inadequate stocks of spare parts were partly a result of 
an initial niggardliness in the provision of inventories, 
and partly a result of breakage of equipment for which 
spares are not normally held. 
Complicating the replacement of parts at both 
Rourkela and Durgapur has been the imposition on these 
plants of ^  cumbersome administrative organisation in 
their own offices, at Hindustan Steel Limited at Ranchi, 
and in New Delhi, 
It has been found that urgent requirements were 
seriously delayed by offices incapable of judging either 
the necessity or the urgency of the procurement. 
Reminders of the different plant sections were not 
attended to. At Durgapur, also, red tape has hindered 
the purchase of parts essential for restoring crippled 
units of the plant to full operating efficiency, 
1, The Hindustan Times, August 11, 1961, p»7» 
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Sorae destruction of equipment at: Rourkela and Durga-
pur was caused by negligence and misuse resulting from 
the inexperience of the plants • management and labour. 
Some can also be attributed to inadequate maintenanceo 
A second practice that was inimical to the long-run 
performance of India's public sector steel plants, \antil 
recently, was inadequate training by one of these plants, 
Durgapur. Training should receive priority at all steel 
plants. The staffing of these mills, with skilled and 
semi-skilled personnel is a major problem confronting 
their efficient operations and expajision programmes, not 
to mention the erection of new plants contemplated by 
the planners. 
At least two reasons were given for Durgapur's neglect 
a-
of trainings First, there was no provision in the original 
project report for the establishment of a training insti-
tute » Durgapur's present institute was established long 
after other units of the plant. Second, training at 
Durgapur has not received wholehearted support of the 
plant's management and in-plant training at least early 
in 1963 was opposed by it, 
A third factor that has had adverse consequences 
has been the demoralisation of skilled personnel* This 
is particularly true of young graduate engineers who, in 
some instances, have been recruited directly out of 
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collegeSa Their disillusion stems from imdue concentra-
tion of powers in the hands of the top managements of 
the plants. The purchase of needed replacements has 
been delayed by a c\ainbersome system of requisitions 
through administrative offices that do not possess the 
technical background necessary to judge the importance 
of a purchaseo Persons charged with quality and mainte-
nance have in the past been overruled by those charged 
with production, at times with the sanction of the top 
managements of the plants* Promotions and dismissals have 
been assumed by the personnel directors of the plants and 
the head office at Ranchi even though the middlek manage-
ments in the plants are best equipped to select or, at 
least recommend those persons meriting promotions and 
are responsible for the performance of those receiving 
thenio 
Fortunaljely, the need for some devolution of authority 
to the plants has been recognised by the Govemmento 
Powers of New Delhi governing the hiring and promotion 
of employees ^and the approval of expenditures were subs-
tantially curtailed. However, it is not certain that at 
the same time there was a parallel and equally necessary 
devolution of authority from the plants• top manage-
ments to their middle managements. Insofar as this 
devolution has not occurred, demoralisation of the plants' 
middle management could very well persist* 
The fcr^gcing analysis makes it amply clear that 
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s t ra ined i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , demoral i ; .a t ion of middle 
management, e t c . , are the outcomes of the l ack of a 
systemmatic approach to manpower planning and Inadequate 
importance given to manning the p r o j e c t wi th exper ienced 
persorjiel and p rov i s ion of t r a i n i n g pTogrammes, 
Whereas pub l i c s e c t o r s t e e l p l a n t s could not opera te 
e f f i c i e n t l y due t o poor maintenance and Inadequate inventory 
c o n t r o l , a number of pub l i c e n t e r p r i s e s bore excess ive 
cos t s of unnecessa r i ly l a r g e acciunulation of i n v e n t o r i e s . 
Table 3*3 r evea l s t h a t the i n v e n t o r i e s inc reased from 
Rs,36l c ro r e s in 1965-66 t o Rs«2,^85 c ro r e s in 1973-7'+; 
though the re was gradual and slow reduc t ion in inventory 
in terms of number of months of output from 7«9 t o ^«5« 
TABLE ^ , 3 - INVENTORY HOLDINGS IN PUBLIC COWGERNS 
Year 
1965-66 
1967T68 
1969-70 
1971-72 
1973-7^ 
Total output 
(ESo Crores) 
552 
1,921 
2,588 
3,81W 
6,795 
Inventories 
(Rs,Crores) 
361 
871 
1,187 
1,800 
2,lf85 
Number of 
Months of total , 
output 
7.9 
5.5 
5.5 
5.1 *> 
^.5 
SOURCE: Compiled by the Research Scholar from the Management 
Accoxmtant, Ca l cu t t a , December, 1976, pp«962-63o 
" I f i n d u s t r i a l concerns could reduce i n v e n t o r i e s t o 2 
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months* output, funds of RSft1,675o^ 9 crores v;-ould have 
been released for gainfixl employment in the undertakings," 
observed the Study Group on Public Undertakingso 
About 90 per cent of the working capital of most 
of our industries is locked up in inventories as against 
30 per cent in industrially advanced coixntries, A 
factor that has a great bearing on the problem of inventory 
control is lead-time. This has two broad components, viz«, 
procurement, which is a function of the market situation 
and the adequacy and efficiency of suppliers; and 
administrative lead-time, which is a factor that depends 
on the organisation and its operating procedures. Every 
simplification of the procedure of-the procurement and 
inspection will help shorten the administrative lead-time 
which, in turn, will tend to redti.ce the stock-holdings 
and the safety stock levels, and thus release a propor-
tion of the capital tied up in inventory. To the 
market situation is related inflationary price rise 
which the management endeavours to minimize by building 
up inventories in the interest of stabilizing prices 
of finished products and continuous employment. In 
addition, there are many external reasons for the heavy 
burden of inventories that public \mdertakings carry. 
The inadequacy of the necessary infra-structure, trans-
port bottlenecks, lack of supporting industries for 
the manufacture of spares and small items, apprehension 
of sudden import cuts due to foreign exchange problem 
(which has eased recently to a certain extent); general 
- ( 1 1 1 ) -
shortage and long waiting lists create an atmosphere 
which forces managements to play safe and err on the 
side of surplus for fear to stock-out and hold-up of 
worko 
Besides, there are certain problems which are 
injierited by management as a result of inadequacies and 
mistakes in the planning and construction of projectSo 
Yet much improvement can be affected if adequate attention 
is paid to this problemo The adoption of materials 
management techniques, accoixiing to the Public Accounts 
Committee Report, could result in the reduction of 
materials cost from 62 per cent to ^8 per cent in our 
public enterprises, Japain, U.S.A., and Britain are the 
examples where the firms have succeeded in reducing the 
inventory investment substantially. All these boil down 
to the fact that there is a great scope for cost reduction 
in our industries through inventory control. 
It can be inferred from the above that under-
utilisation in public enterprises and consequent upward 
trend in the cost of production is the resuJJb of wide-
ranging inter-acting factors including inadequate 
investment planning, production planning, distribution 
system, materials management and manpower planning. It 
is likely to make plants and machinery obsolete and 
unprofitable because of technological developments before 
full value of investment is realised if capacity continues 
to be under-utilised. 
• ( i 1 2 ) -
II - INFLUEKCE.^ i OL" COST. CO^POSITION 
In add it ion fw there are certain special influences 
on the cost of production in our public enterprises, as 
contrasted with a private enterprise. These are analysed 
under three heads: (1) Social Costs; (ii) Cost of Public 
Accountability; and (iii) Cost of Project Plajining» 
^^ ^ SOCIAL COSTS These are incurred by our 
public enterprises at least 
in three ways, e.g., (a) by carrying surplus labour, 
(b) by spending more heavily on wage-and-non-wage 
benefits; and (c) by providing for more consumer amenitaes 
than a private enterprise does, I proceed to investigate 
these factors in detail below: 
(a) Problem of Surplus Labour: Overstaffing is a common 
feature of almost every 
public enterprise. Although employment per ton of capacity 
at the public sector plants is slightly lower than at the 
private steel mills, it is far greater than had originally 
been anticipated. Initially, the public sector steel 
plants were to hire between 6,000 and 8,000 persons within 
their plants. The work forces of these mills are now 
1« Initial estimates of employment at the public sector 
mills can be found in the project reports for the Rcurkela 
and Bhilai mills. 
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dcuble the ori^i: :^- es t imates , and the sanct ioned s t r e n g t h 
of each p l a n t is suTstrJi t ial ly in excess of a c t u a l employ-
ment, mnpower positicn in Hindustan S t e e l Ltd . during 
1970 and 1973 is presented in Table 3„U-, 
TABLE 3^k " KA.\FCWER POSITION IN IISL AS OK 3I MAHCH 
Persons Employed 
P lan t 1970 1971 1972 1973 
B h i l a i ^ , 3 8 6 i+6,i+20 if9,538 ^ 9 , 9 1 ^ 
Durgapur S t e e l Plant 28,293 28,8o8 30,102 30,881 
Rourkela S t e e l Plant 3^»090 33,902 33,626 35,031 
TOTAL - 108,769 109,130 113,266 115,826 
fo Inc rease in 
J-fenpower *" 0,3^ 3o7^ 2«2^ 
SOURCE: Compiled by the Research Scholar from Bureau 
Reports of various years, Bureau of Public 
Enterprises, Op.cit* 
There; are many reasons for the unanticipated manpower 
employed by the public sector mills* Perhaps most import 
tantly initial work force estimates understated the actual 
demands of a new steel mill. The needs of several plant 
units were ignored by some of these estimates. 
Employment characteristics were also ignored. These 
include requirements resulting from high rate of absenteeism, 
the relatively low productivity' of labour* 
- ( im-) -
The Bhilai mill also retained much of its original 
construction staff, even though the staff remained idle 
for several years after Bhilai's initial plant and 
equipment v/ere erected. This has enabled the retention 
of skills and disciplines for use in Bhilai's expansion 
programmes, and has had political and humanitarian 
benefits. However, it has also involved an expense to 
the Bhilai plant, unnecessarily high costs of production* 
Emphasis on production and a relative disregard for 
cost minimisation havQ encouraged the hiring of additional 
workers to obtain marginal increments in output. Given 
the real low cost of unskilled and semiskilled labour, 
there may be good-reason for the employment of large 
n^ unbers hy our public enterprises. However, it is not 
tenable that all or most of the abnormally large man-
power at each enterprise can, 1*^  fact, he Tu'^ tified by 
cost consideratjons alone. Although I lack cost data of 
employing additional labour at our public sector steel 
plant, I suspect that additional cost of employing 
labour would far exceed the marginal revenue derived 
from it. 
Finally, excessive employment has resulted from 
a juxtaposition of powers at two of the three public 
sector steel plants, Promotjons and dismissals that are 
normally line functions performed by plant superinten-
dents and foremen were often made by the mills »•. 
chief personnel managers and general offices. Conversely, 
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plant superintendents and formen were, in effect, allowed 
to establish or to influence the standard labour forces 
of their iinits, usually a function of a plant's cost 
department. Perhaps, because of inexperience, the 
personnel offices of the public sector plants have not 
always been able to distinguish between legitimate and 
spurious requests for additional labour. Given the 
pressures on middle management to produce large tonnages 
of steel, the result, predictably, has been excessive 
staffing of many divisions. 
For some purposes the maintenance of a large labour 
force has probably been advantageous* Labour in our 
coxintry is relatively inexpensive. Moreover, the Bhilai 
plant, by retaining its construction staff intact, has 
minimised future problems of assembling the labour skills 
necessary for expanding its plant. Some rediindant labour 
is also learning industrial skills and disciplines 
that will toe needed in the future, Hov/ever, the mainte-
nance of a large number of employees also contributes to 
unduly high costs of production, londesirable work practices, 
o 
and labour problems arising from confusion about the 
duties and functions of individual employees. Whether 
excessive employment is, overall, beneficial is not 
altogether obvious. 
Reasons for excessive employment can be summarised 
as adhoc approaches to job creation, lack of restraint 
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to manifest needs; construction on departmental basis, 
staffing offices and recruiting clerical staff and class IV 
employees on the pattern of government administration, 
Overstaffing leads to absenteeism, A large numberoOf 
public enterprises are plagued by the absenteeism. To 
illustrate, table 3,3.5 presents per cent of mandays 
lost due to absenteeism in one the major public enter-
prises, Aircraft Factoiy and Engine Factory of the 
Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. 
rABLE 3,5 - RATE OF ABSENTEEISM IN PIINDUSTAN 
AERONAUTICS LTD. 
(1966-67) 
Aircraft Factory Engine Factory 
Months 
April, 1966 
May " 
June " 
July " 
August " 
September" 
October " 
November " 
December " 
January, 1967 
February " 
March " 
Average rate of absenteeism20,U-1 
27,9^ 
23.10 
22.30 
18.U0 
17.30 
18,C2 
I 6 . l l f 
17.30 
16.7V 
2»+,90 
26.60 
2^.00 
20. M
25.67 
28.08 
2^,53 
21.57 
16,87 
17.1lf 
17»1V 
15.9V 
18,80 
2V,79 
23*38 
23.02 
21,18 
SOURCE: Committee on Public Undertakings,on Hindustan 
Aeronautics Ltd., 1967-68, Fourth Lok Sabha, p,5V. 
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Tese two factories lost 20,^1 per cent and 21.18 per cent 
of man-days due to absenteeism in 1966-67» 
It is also significant to note that while there is 
a large number of surplus labour, there are instances of 
cvertime payments to the staff. The I'egular payment of 
overtime allowances encouraged the staff to postpone work 
beyond nonnal working hours to enable them to d2?aw overtime. 
Public enterprises are bearing heavy monetary buixien due to 
overtime allowances. For instance, Fertilizer Corporation 
of India, despite surplus labour, paid by way of overtime 
allowance to its staff Rs«l6,02 lakhs in 196M-65, RS»15P02 
lakhs in 1965-66 and Rs.l7.57 lakhs in 1966-67,^ It 
illustrates waste of scarce resources by public enterprises 
(b) Wage-and-'non-vage Benefits Higher costs of 
I production is also 
due to several kinds of wage-and-non-wage benefits avail-
able to employees of the public enterprises. The 
successive Five Year Plar.s emphasised the responsibilities 
of the public enterprises with regard to labour. The 
First Five Year Plam stated, "The profit motive and the 
exploitation of workers for' private gains have no place 
In a state-owned enterprise. The working conditions and 
welfare arrangements should lo fn fact serve as models," 
The Second Plan exhorted, "If conditions of work in public 
1. Estimate Committee on Public Undertakings, 3rd Report, 
Fourth Lok Sabha, p,35 
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undertakings are expected to set the pace for the 
private sector, administrators handling such undertakings 
have to be specially watchful of labour interest," 
The obligation of public sector was fur-ther specified 
in the Third Plan, "The large expansion of the public 
sector which is occurring and is being envisaged will 
make a qualitative difference In the tasks set for the 
labour movement.,,'* Explaining the implications of this 
approach the Plan pointed out "the economic activity has 
not to be conceived of only in terms of output and return; 
the principal test of this would be the good of all those 
who are engaged in it," 
AS the study Group on Labour Problems in the Public 
Sector pointed out that "apart from making the pace of 
welfare expenditure in the industrial sector, pubJPlc 
enterprises constitutes, to some extent, agency of natiwial 
policy for the provision of non-wage benefits for workers, 
and the promotion of health and dignity of life on the 
part of the workers. A public enterprise that neglects 
these responsibilities is at once vulnerable to criticism 
from almost every quarter," 
The Minister of Industrial Development and Company 
Affairs emphasised the wider social responsibilities of 
public enterprises by stating that the "urban communities 
that develop around the public sector projects, 
1. The Study Group was appointed by the "Uaticaial Commis-
sicn on Labour" with Professor Bamanadhsa as Cbalrrnan. 
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the hospitals, schools, coEciu-nity centres and other 
essential facilities that grow with the project must 
all be considered" as esseritial parts of one overall 
responsibilltyo The public sector cannot only not escape 
the responsibility fOT such overheads but must give a 
lead in this direction..." There is, however, a strong 
need to follow a balanced approach in incurring expenditure 
on productive and non-productive activities. They should 
have relationship with productivity which is not taken 
into consideration at present as Is clear frcn table 3o^<, 
306 - GROWTH PATTERN OF WAGES AMD LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
IN PUBLIC (CENTRAL GOVT.) ENTERPRISES 
Year/ 
Period 
EXPEND. 
PER EMPLOYEE (IN RUPEES) 
OUTPUT 
Expend, Output 
a t a t 
I96I-2 1961-62 
Price Price 
increase in Increase in 
expenditure output 
a t a t 1961-62 price 
1961-62 pr ice 
1965-66 
1969-70 
1971-72 
1972-73 
1973-7^ 
197W75 
1975-76 
25^ 
^,372 
if,721 
>+,260 
3,353 
3,8if6 
^,599 
16858 
35938 
36605 
3 ^ 2 3 
2508if 
33786 
36259 
16.29 
0,08 
-0„10 
-0 ,02 
O0I5 
0,20 
1*30 
0«,01 
-0 ,07 
-0 .23 
0*3^ 
0,07 
1965-70 
1971-76 
1965-76 
666 
COMPOUND RATES 
16,29 
0,05 
17*1 
1.30 
0,09 
1.15 
SOUfiCE; Computed by the Research Scholar from Annual Surveys 
of Industries of various years, C.S.O. 
1 „ Annual Report on the Working of Industrial & CoiDinercial 
Undertakings of the Central GovemiEent, 1976-77« 
• d i i c ) . 
To ask the public en terpr i ses to be 'model employers' 
on the basis of higher wage-and-non-wage benef i t s would 
be a misnomer, i f t h e i r product iv i ty and p ro f i t s are not 
increassdo To compare the working of public enterpr ises 
on the basis cf this" norm vi th the pr ivate en te rp r i se s , 
the l a t t e r are b e t t e r 'model employers' who pay higher 
wages and more non-v.-age benef i ts to t h e i r employeeSo 
Hence, public enterpr ises are overburdened \%rith f inancia l 
cost of wage and non-v/age benef i t s i f i t i s unmatched by 
the imcrease in product iv i ty . I t i s evident from the 
table 3,6 tha t increase in productivi ty of labour was 
l e s s than the increase in expenditure on workers which 
include \irages, social benef i ts and other amenitieso 
During the period 1965-66 and I969-70 ra te of increase 
in expenditure was 16.29 as compared with 1,30 r e r cent 
increase in labour p r o d u c ^ v i t y . I t was s t i l l l e ss during 
1971-72 and 1975-76 at 0*009 per cent as against 0„005 
per cent f?-^ expe^f^j tar's ^er employeeo For the whole 
period 1965-66 to 1975-76, compoxmd ra te increase in 
expenditure per emploj'ee ws.s 17ii1 and 1»15 per cexit for 
le.bour product iv i ty . 
o 
wherever the enhancement In expenditure on employees 
of the public units is not linked with productivity, a 
case emerges, as if a self-evident one, of inflated cost 
of production. It seems reasonable to suggest that the 
welfare expenditure of public entferprises must be decided 
on business economlciS rather than on social grounds. 
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Slmilarly, public enterprises cany tht burden 
or tovTiShipSo The Committee on Public Undertakings, 
while appreciating the fact that labour housing was not 
an economic propositon, referred to the government's 
scheme of a Housing Corporation to which all town-
ships of public enterprises would be transferred, "with 
a view to relieving the projects of the rather heavy 
burden" of expenditure on townshipso" Table 3"7 
TABLE 3,7 - IMPACT OF TOWNSHIP OUTLAYS ON RATE OF RETURN 
197^-76 
(RSoCrores) 
1# Investment 
Less Township Outlays 
11,^51.2 
•+06,9 
Investment after deducting 
township outlays 
2. Net Profit (Before taxes) 
11,0i+i+,3 
^76,0 
3, Rate of return on total capital 
invested (including township outlays 
ho Net Profit after including township 
recurring expenditure but after 
excluding income from rent 
5. Rate of Return on capital invested 
(excluding township outlays) 
3o6,^  /a 
571,0 
5.2% 
SOURCE: Computed by the Scholar from Bureau Report, Op.clt, 
1o Bureau of Public Enterprises, Annual Report on Industrial 
and Commercial Undertakings, 1976« 
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reveals that if township burden is removed, in most cases, 
it would have a favourable impact on the rate of return* 
The total gross capital expenditure on townships account 
for Rs,l+06,9 crores out of total gross fixed assets of 
Rsol 1,^ +5102 crores in 1976-77» The actual expenditure 
on townships constituted 3»6 per cent of the total gross 
investment in fixed assets. Rate of return on total 
capital invested was 3-D per cent. If the township 
outlays were excluded, it would have increased to 5«2.%» 
This percentage thus gives the rate of return which the 
enterprise would have if it were to have no commitment for 
its township either by way of capital expenditure or for 
recurring expenses, 
(c) COST OF 
FACILITIES FOR CONSUMERS The other way in 
which a public 
enterprise bears social cost is by providing certain of 
its outputs to consumers and regions that do not pay the 
related costs in fixll* For example, the Indian Airlines 
and th^ railways continue operations in several such 
areas. Wherever subsidised outputs are offered 
on social grounds, the operations arfe marked by 
elements of cost which the private enterprises do not 
usually have to provide for. The argument is not that 
such outputs are to be abandoned, but that the expenditure 
involved, being merged in the general pool of orosts of 
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the enterprise, inflate the overall cost-compocition to 
the disadvantage of the othei- consuirers. I'he demarcation 
between the socially imposed outputs from the commercially 
de^ jermined ones may not be accurate in many cases; nor can 
the understandable tendency on the part of the managers 
to act in the social interests of the needy consumers be 
funs'" located and the cost implications accurately traced. 
Yet the attempt is necessary, and the onus of deciding 
that certain services should be operated despite their 
inability to cover their costs out of revenues ought to 
rest with the government and not the Corporation, For 
example. Section-3^ of the Air Corporation Act aims to 
distinguish,^though conditionally,'between the autonomously 
determined services and those owing to governmental directioHc 
(ii) PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY Our public enterprises 
are singularly under 
the stress of having to incul* expenditure to satisfy 
the challenges of external vigilance over their activity. 
These are inevitable in a democratic society and may take 
the shape of investigations by Committee on Public 
Undertakings (CP.U.), criticism by the members of Parlia-
ment, audit by the Comptroller and Auditor-General and 
public criticism in the press. The public enterprises are 
impelled to conduct their operations, especially the 
expenditure operations in such a way that all the relevant 
-(12^)-
rnaies are satisfied and there is nothing 'irregular' about 
any transaction. The lowest tender system, the need to 
advertise the requirements of purchases, adherence to 
the necessary hierarchical formalities to secure sanctions, 
and strict compliance with the original budget estimates 
are aspects of public accountability on which the managers 
of a public entei^ prise soon learn to place priority as 
against methods which may prove substantially better but, 
in formal sense, are 'irregular'. The procedure built up 
for the sake accountability involve, as one of the important 
consequences, delays in decision-making. This has two serious 
defects: firstly, certain possible economies may be lost 
due to the impromptitudd of the decision; and secondly, 
a decisional framework characterised by delay dissuades 
the managers in the long run from evincing positive interest 
in prompt action. It is interesting to note that 
Professor J.K, Galbraith has even stress^  the "importance 
of timeliness as compared with the precision in industrial 
decisionSo" 
An interesting, but not widely realised, consequence 
of the accountability requirements is that a public enter-
prise is often compelled to maintain larger stores in 
reserve than are probable in a similar private enterprise. 
This is due to longer period of the purchase cycle in the 
public sector; excessive inventories are maintained by an 
1. Professor J.K. Galbraith's address on 'Public Administra-
tion And The Public Corporations" at the Indian Institute 
of Public Administration, New Delhi, on 25 August, I96I. 
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anxious manager in order to avoid the contingency of not 
being able to purchase the requirements by moving at 
the right time. The working capital needs of the enterprivse 
get inflated for this reason, as analysed in the conteiit 
of cost of inventories in the previous paragraphSo 
The procedure to be adopted for making a purchase or 
for ssnctjoning an expenditiire may occasionally have the 
consequence of v.'rong purchases being made by a public 
enterprise. This happens particularly where the lovrest 
tenderer cannot be rerused a contract under the rules, 
though he is knov/n to be likely to supply material oi 
insuiiicient durability and quality. It is true, in theory, 
that a proper recording of the reasons ror the inadmissi-
bility of the lowest tender helps the managers in convincing 
the audit machinery of the propriety of their action; 
but in practice, the course is so difficult that several 
ordinanr human beings treat it as a risk not worth courting. 
Further, there is an emphasis in the public sector on the 
distribution of purchase contracts among a few suppliers, 
as against concentration on one (or two). Whatever the 
rationale of this course, it denies the public enterprise 
the advantages accruing from adherence to a single good 
supplier, which is more common practice in the private 
sector. Diffused purchases may prove to be uneconomical 
purchases in the end. 
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(iii) Cost of Planning projects Inadeqi;ate attention 
at tne PxanniHf^  stage 
xeu to projLongation Ox tilt; perioa Ox conbtruv^tlon, Tnere 
are many projects' wni^h took longer time than waa orig,inaJ.iy 
piarjiea. ueiays in the implementation Ox projev^ t:^  in 
public sector have largelj' been attributed to the lack of 
technical, economic and financial planning. Lamenting at 
the slackness of the administration, the Committee on 
Public Undertakings observed, "Even specific recommendations 
made in the Third Plan in this regard have not been 
-J 
implemented so far," The Table 3o3»o gives an idea of 
TABLE 3,8 - PERIODS OF DELAY IN TrE COI^ bTRUCTIGW OF PROJECTS 
Name of the Project Delay 
1, Barunl Refinery About 2h months 
2, Streptomicine Plant of Hindustan 
Antibiotics Ltd. About 12 months 
3, Dugda Coal Washery of H.S.L. About 12 months 
h, Bhilai Plarit About 5 to 22 months 
in the completion 
of various satages 
5o Durgapur Plant About 2 to 8 months 
6o Rourkela Plant 
SOURCE: Committee on Public Undertakings, 13th Report, 
(Thifd Lok S^bha), p.'+3o 
the delay in the completion of various projects. It is 
illustrative of the fact that projects are completed with 
great dely. Factors which accounted for the delay in most 
A 
1. Committee On Public Undertakings, 13th Report, 3rd Lok 
Sabha, p.U-3o 
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of those projects i'-.ci"uded changes made in the installed 
capacity ana sites, delay in the placement of orders for 
plants and equipraents, delay in the finalisation of 
contracts, frequent breakdov.TiS of the construction work 
due to bad wcrkmanship and the defective decision machinery. 
CoEnenting on the tiTie-lapce of the steel plants, the 
Cotnrnittee on Public Undertakings observed, "It appears that 
forethought and adequate planning had not gone into the 
decisions taken from time to time to set up the plants in 
the coTxntry, Had steel plants been set up earlier, they 
might have cost on the basis of consultant's estimates 50 
or 60 per cent of v;hat the steel now under construction 
would cost," Increase in the actual cost over the estimated 
one is attributed to the defective planning and decision-
making machinery. "A certain measure of delay in the 
commissioning of the project might be inevitable due to 
dependence on foreign help or the nature and size of 
projects or the shortcomin.gs of materials. But it cannot 
2 be true for the whole „'• 
Broadly, costs of defective planning of projects and 
investments may occur in the follov/ing ways: 
o 
1» Capital may be locked up through decisions favouring 
a slow tempo of construction work, Thihgs of this type 
1o Committee on Public Undertakings, 13th Report, 3rd Lok 
Sabha, p* ^30 
2. Ibid, poMu 
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lengthen the period of gestation; and oy the tine the 
project is complete, the capital figure standing in the 
books includes a substantial araount of capital and 
interest on capital* Some of the instances of increased 
cost are furnished in the Table 3o9. It shows also the 
percentage increase of actual cost over tne estimated costs, 
This percentage is highest in the case of H.a.L. plants. 
TABLE 3«9 - ESTIt'iATED AND ACTUAL EXPEI©ITURE ON DIFFi^KEKT 
PROJECTS (RS.CaORES) 
Original Actual % 
Name of the Project Estimates Expend,Increase 
n Durgapur Steel Plant 115<,00 205o5 7W= 
2, Rourkela Steel Plant 128,00 230.UO bO% 
3, Bhilai Steel Plant 110.00. 202,2lf 83>? 
If, Hindustan Teleprinters 1,50 1»65 10^ 
5o Gauhati Refinery 13o00 1^,51 ^^% 
6, Hindustan Antibiotics: 
1. Pimpri Unit 1.15 1«59 38^ 
2, Pencillin Expansion Programme 0«U-5 0,61 36^ 
3* Streptomicine Unit 1,71 2,08 20;g 
7. H.JI.T. (Watch Factory) 2,50 3«68 h7% 
8, Fertilizer Corporation of India: 
1, Trombay Unit 2if,3^ + 33»MD 37^ 
2, Nangal Unit 20.90 31.20 M-9;^  
9. Heavy Electricals Ltd.(Bhopal) 35,25 ^9.30 ^% 
10, Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd.125<,95 208,50 6'K% 
SOURCE: Report of the Study Team on Public Sector Undertakings, 
Administrative Reforms Commission, New Delhi, June, 
P,8i+ 
(2) Where the governmental preference is for initial 
over-capitalisation, as against the method of graduated 
-Ci?:"--))-
expenditure, the enterprise is iru^ olved in imduly heavy 
overheads in the early periods. 
(3) Lack of complementary developments may subject 
an enterprise to unfavourable cost conditions» For 
example, the absence of a dry dock at the port of Vizag-
patnam made the operations of the shipyard less economical 
than otherwise; and the inadequacy of minor irrigation 
canals in the Damodar Valley Corporation area in Bihar 
limits the utlisation of its Irrigation capacity. 
The usual media through which these costs reveal 
themselves are periodical increases in capital costs, 
extravagance in the investment processes, formulation of 
defective designs and periodical changes and structural 
disadvantages relative to size. 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing analysis of the cost behaviour and 
cost composition reveals that the cost pattern of these 
undertakings is highly unsatisfactory. It has b®en undey-
linedthau the excessive cost of production or low profit-
ability is due to the effects of idle capacity, deficicxi-
ciGS in inves':raent techniques, production system, inventory 
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control, marketing maiiiiser'^ nt and utili'^ .'^ i:-^ . of '"•j-^ .powera 
To cI^'C a few examples, rctio of irventorics to working 
capital is as high as 90 per cent which ia cou;iterprroductive 
of the efficient functioning of these \mdertakings. In 
the same nanner, htig.e losses have heen suffered by these 
enterprises as a result of strained industrial relations, 
despite the fact that wage-and-ncn-wage benefits are 
provided to the v/orkers. In the case of H.S.L, alone in 
19'''0-71 value of production lost due to labour strikes 
totalled Rs,1,320 lakhs. Defects in the channel of 
distribution v/hich cause inccnvcn«ience to customers 
account for lov; sales. Likewise adhoc approach to job 
creation led to over-staffing, absenteeism and indiscipline. 
Emphasis on the role of public enterprises as 'Model 
Employer', though highly desirable, must not be regarded 
as a compulsion on them to pay excessively high wages 
and provide non-wage benefits irrespective of productivity 
and profitabilityo In this respect, the private sector 
would surpass the public sector as a 'Model Employer' 
because they maintain their profitability and also pay 
wage-and-non-wage benefits, Sim.ilarly, Parliamentary 
control v;hich envisages public accoiintability should be 
exercised with due care through parliamentary committees, 
Members of Parliament and the press. The procedure bhould 
be such as to maintain autonomy of these undertakings and 
help the decision-making process, For critical evaluation 
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of public enterprises, it is essential that these enter-
prises change their format to give true and fair yiew 
of their working. The process of innovation and risk-
taking should go side by side„ In the ultimate analysis, 
it can be pointed out that, if public enterprises are to 
be worthy of public confidence, they should make conti-
nuous efforts to serve the good of the public in an 
efficient manner. It cannot be contradicted that ultimate 
success can be achieved by reducing cost and increasing 
Tianagerial efficiency. The following chapter is devoted 
to the analysis of this problem in greater detail. 
CliAPTER IV 
COST PAT<TEm; Bi RELATION TO ORGAA'ISATIGi; & MAI•JAG£^ EHT 
Analysis in the preceding chapter has focussed attention 
on the fact that cost pattern is tilted to the disadvantage 
of public enterprises. Factors that have great bearing on 
cost are large idle capacities, social obligations that the 
public enterprises are made to bear as 'Model Employer' and 
supplier of 'Social Goods'. All these have rigged prices. 
In addition to these, there are many problems that the public 
enterprises have inherited due to poor planning, unscientific 
organisation and inefficient bureaucratic management. These 
enterprises bear the cost of organisation which is ineffi-
cient at various levels of management, such as delays in 
decision-making and consequent operational inefficiency. 
Professor Farooquee's comments in this respect are quite 
revealing, "These enterprises in spite of the best Government 
care and attention have failed to inspire the team-work. 
What is to say of giving lead to the pri/ate sector as regards 
sound management, they do not even approximate the conditions . 
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1 
obtaining in the enlightened private industrial concerns," 
It is sufficient indication that managerial efficiency of 
public enterprises is at its low ebb<, Hence, there is a 
good scope for reduction of cost through improvement in 
managerial efficiency and application of business principles 
in them, *'"' 
An analysis in this chapter has been tindertaken to 
identify main problems of the organisation and management 
of public enterprises of India, To limit the s-cope of this 
inquiry, I have confined myself to the major problems of 
managerial efficiency at the top level of management and 
their impact on the organi::^ ation as a v/hole, I now proceed 
to examine them in some detail* 
Problems of Managerial Efficiency Essence of all the 
in Public Enterprises of India problems in public 
enterprises is the 
problem as to how the public enterprises and services should 
be organised and managed so aa to promote national welfare 
without sacrificing the basic need of a commercial and 
industrial undertaking for efficiency and economy. To 
o 
quote Professor Farooquee again, "The manor problem lies in 
2 
their internal management and control," Indeed, choice of 
1, Farooquee, Q.H., "Incentives in Public Enterprises of 
India", Faculty of Commerce, A.M.U. Aligarh, 1967, Pe3 
2, Farooquee, Q,H., Ibid, pp.3-H-. 
(13'-) - \ iJ 
organisation and managemerib must accord objectively with 
the nature of the enterprises, operational and financial 
requirements, impact on the national economy, resources to 
acquire the necessary skill and experience, special produc-
tivity and managerial needs and the economic cliffiateo 
Subjectively, it has to be seen whether the intended form 
of organisation has the necessary operational and financial 
flexibility and structural elasticity. On the disregard 
of these basic tenets of management, Professor Farooquee 
has rightly remarked that "they are functioning as Govern-
ment departments." It is, therefore, iiecessary to take a 
look at the prevalent forms of organisation in the public 
sector and examine their suitability. 
In India, the prevalent forms comprise departmental, 
corporation and joint stock company forms of organisation. 
Recently, 'Holding Company* is added to the existing types 
of organisation. 
Of the three forms, it is now generally accepted that 
the form of the departmental undertaking is not suitable 
for commercial and industrial enterprises. Its reason is the 
application of the same procedure in these undertakings as 
those obtaining in the Government administration. Rail-
ways, posts and telegraphs and defence establishments 
1. Farooquee, Q.H., Ibid, pp, 3-^. 
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furnish the examples of this type of crganijation. In 
these cases, the departmental form is adopted because their 
operations, directly or indirectly, affect the entire 
community and the Parliament' and the Government have to 
keen direct and continuous control on their ODerationSo But, 
this form is not suitable for these public enterprises which 
need for their success as commercial and industrial concerns 
flexibility and autonomy. This cannot be expected of 
departmental type of organisation. These commercial and 
industrial enterprises should not be subject to the proce-
dures applicable in the administrative departments of 
Government including the procedures that govern budgeting, 
accounting and audit in these departments. 
However, public corporations and government company 
fulfil these requirements. It is significant to note that 
the Industrisa Policy Resolution of 194-8 had envisaged that 
the "management of State enterprises will, as a rule, be 
through the rnediiuu of public corporations tinder the statutory 
control of the Central Government," The revised resolution 
of 1956 did not modify this categorical statement of the 
Government's policy in t]^s behalf<, Nor is there any 
subsequent declaration of statement in Parliament in modifi-
cation of this statemtnto Nevertheless, the Government adopted 
the company form generally, A number of advantages have been 
claimed for this form of organisation, viz., participation 
of private capital -. national or foreign, While in other 
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forras cf organisation, private capital can be asiiocated 
in the form of loans, in the company form it can oe 
associatea as a share capital, fhe need for such associa-
tion may arise from the government's inability to provide 
the entire capital for the undertaking and secure suffi-
cient private capital (national and foreign) in the form 
of fixed interest-bearing loans owing to the availability 
of more profitable opportunities elsewhere. Sometimes, 
the Government may intend to enter a field of business 
just to initiate a process of development of private 
entrepreneurship. As such, it starts public undertakings 
in collaboration with the private interests with the 
intention of ultimately handing them over to private sector. 
In such cases also the company form of organisation is the 
most suitable form because it permits the desired change in 
ownership without the need for additional legislation. In 
some cases, the government acquires shares of a private 
undertaking of national importance to put its finances and 
management on a sotoid footing*, "The Government may have to 
acquire shares of an existing enterprise in an emergency, 
in response to financial or employment crisis, or in order 
to maintain a nationally important production or senrice 
which has become unprofitable or insolvent under private 
enterprise," 
The company form is popular in India because of the 
ease and convenience which it offers in setting up an 
1. Estimates Committee, Report on Organisation and Adminis-
tration of Nationalised Industrial Undertakings, 1955» Po^ 
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undertakingo The Government does not need the sanction of 
the legislators to start it* But the company is started 
hy the executive's own decision and action. Even in those 
cases in which the entire capital is provided by the Govern-
ment, company form has been adopted like Sindrl Fertilizers 
and Chemicals (p) Ltd., Hindustan Antibiotics Ltd., Hindus-
tan Cables Ltd., etc. It supports the contention that the 
company form is preferred by the Government mainly due to 
ease in formation. 
It is also claimed by the Government that the company 
form offers flexibility in regard to capital and managerial 
structures. Adjustments in this respect can be=made as 
expeditiously as necessary without legislative amendEents. 
A company, for instance, may issue different kinds of capital 
with corresponding dividend differentials to take gaximum 
benefit of the conditions of the money market and to raise 
the largest possible amount of capital. Loans may be 
converted into capital if their purpose is fo^ lnd to be 
permanent and profitable. Similarly, changes can be made 
in the management according to the economic conditions. 
Moreover, it al^o enjoys financial autonomy. It is not 
subject to cumbersome financial rules, restrictive proce-
dures and delays which are a permanent feature of the 
departmental organisation. 
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The actual working of the Joint Stock Companies in 
the public sector has, however, shown that the financial 
flexibility and autonorey are more a myth than a reality. 
The undefined and \mrestricted powers exercised by the 
Government Department responsible for the State under-
takings have such an all-round control that these compa-
nies are reduced to mere adjuncts to the ministries and 
treated more or less like subordinate offices of the 
ministry. The Estimates Committee observed, "In the 
relations between these undertakings and the ministry, 
the former are treated in the same manner as departments 
and offices of government controlled and supervised by 
the Secretaries. The State undertakings have thus 
become adjuncts to ministries and are treated more or 
less on the same lines as any subordinate organisation or 
office." The departmental representatives on the Board 
of Directors are often \inwilling or tmable to a8t in 
their individual capacity and have to refer the matters 
to their departments for guidance or instructions. In 
addition, the powers of the Board are restricted in many 
matters like borrowing, increase in share capital, 
appointment of General J^nager and Managing Director, 
appointments on salary exceeding a certain limit, placing 
large orders, entering into contracts, etc. The same is 
1, Estimates Committee, Report on Organisation and Adminis-
tration of Nationalised Industrial Undertakings, 1955, 
PPc.3-^ 0 
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true of finance. Any sctteme involving expenditure, 
appropriation of profits, maintenance of accounts and audit 
thereof is subject to the approval of the Finance Ministry, 
Government Control Over Composition of the Board, 
The Boards their pov/ers and area of 
action show that there 
can hardly be any flexi-
bility, autonomy, incentive to efficiency, or inclination 
to economy. The Board consists of (1) Chairman ..who is 
normally the Secretary of the Ministry concerned and is 
responsible for necessary action; (2) one or two officials 
of the rank of Deputy Secretary from the Ministry of 
Finance, They have great control over matters concerning 
finance; (3) Officials of any other ministry concerned 
with the enterprise; (V) any member from the participating 
states or collaborators, if they possess such a right; 
(5) there may be a member from outside non-officials, 
mainly industrialists; (6) a member with technical knov/ledge 
or experience in any particular problem concerning the 
enterprise may be appointed; (7) there may be a member 
representing labour interest in general; (8) the ^ fenaging 
Director and/or the General Manager holding overall charge 
of the concern is appointed, usually, though not necessarily, 
-(1^0)-
by the irinistry or the President of India, as the case 
may be, and not by the Board, 
Thus the Board is dominated by officials representing 
various ministries in their ex-officio capacity. Such a 
board cannot be homogeneous. It cannot have any consis-
tent and continued policy because the ex-officio members 
are frequently changed as and when they are transferred 
or leave their posts or for other reasons. Further, the 
Managing Director and/or the General I'lanager is frequently 
changed which is not very conducive to efficiency. This 
also affects the sense of responsibility and the incentive 
for economy. 
The pov/ers of the Board of the state-owned companies 
in India are much restricted in a niomber of ways. There 
is a general reluctance to delegate powers to the Board 
and the Board to the I^naging Directoro This impairs 
efficient fxinctioning and quick decisions. Above all, 
the officials lack desire, willingness and courage to 
act freely even in the area of their authority. They 
have a tendency to shift responsibilities for any decision^ 
to their ministries. 
The working of various companies shows that the 
boards have not been effective, efficient and economical. 
According to the Estimates Committee, "The Directors ,,, 
have not been fulfilling useful role.,,Nothing of importance 
~ ( 1 ^ 1 ) ~ 
either from the point of government or from that of the 
xindertaking has been done by them," The Comptroller 
and Auditor General of India observes, "The purpose of 
adopting the company form of management was to give 
these undertakings flexibility of operation and to free 
them from the application of niles and regulations framed 
for normal activities of the administration. The purpose 
has now come to be largely defeated since the control 
of the enterprise has been placed in the hands of permanent 
officials who are nominated to the boaixi of directors, 
A few non-officials have also been appointed to the 
beards, but they are in minority; they have, further, no 
financial stakes in the companies and are largely unconcerned 
with their efficient administration. The non-official 
directors drawn from trade and industry are not generally 
in sympathy with the policy of nationalisation; they 
concern themselves mainly with safeguarding the interests 
of industries in the same fields of production. The 
official members representing various ministries look 
to their ministers for direction, and matters brought up 
before the Board are often reserved for further considera-
tions by the government. Kor have the managing directors 
been given power and authority commensurate with their 
responsibilities or even comparable to those vested in 
managing directors of private enterprises. The cumulative 
1o Chanda, A.K., Indian Administration (London, 1950), 
pp.203-^0 
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effect of these arrangements has been to make these comparzies 
move even slovrer than government departments, although quick 
decision and speed are essential for their efficient 
1 
operation." 
Legal Ambiguities Another defect is the disse-
mination of scanty information 
about the activities of the company for public knowledge 
or refusal to supply information about them» For instance, 
the Minister refused information on the Sindri's on the 
ground that "he, as a shareholder, had no absolute right 
2 
to obtain it," This provoked criticiSD) in the Lok Sabha 
that each company "has become an 'imperium in imperio' -
small kngdoffi, completely assigned to, shall we say, the 
overlordship of the officer who happens to be the Managing 
Director or Chairman."-^  
Ifeny provisions of the Companies Act do not serve 
much purpose in the context of public enterprises, e»g,, 
provisions stipulating the holding of sinnual general 
meetings and requiring notices and returns to be filed with 
the Registrar of Companies. The Articles o:?> Association 
of the Government companies contain a number of provisions 
1, Chanda, A.K, O p . c i t , , pp,203-U-» 
2o Dr. Lankasundaram, Lok Sabha Debates , 10 December, 1953, 
CO0I918. 
3 . Dro Lankasundaran, I b i d , 
-(1^3)-
for transferring, making calls on and forfeiture of shares, 
and imposition of penalties vfhicn have hardly/- any signifi-
cance. In India state-ov-ned private limited companies, the 
entire share capital is owned by the Government of India 
in the name of the President except where a part of the 
share capital is allotted to some state government, or the 
collaborator supplying the technical Imow-how, but their 
share is normally nominal. In addition, to fulfil the 
legal requirements, one or two shares are held in the name 
of the officials. Being the sole shareholder, or a subs-
tantial shareholder, the President, working through the 
Ministry concerned, has the right to appoint all members 
barring a few nominated by other Interests, if any. The 
function of the shareholders rest with the ministry 
concerned. In this capacity, the ministry exercises the 
ultimate control over the whole functioning of the 
company. Thus the organisation is company type only in 
form and law, but is sole proprietorship concern in actual 
practice. 
Another example of the asymmetry between joint stock 
companies in the two sectors relates to the concept of 
limited liability. This principle has a purpose under the 
private enterprise. It safeguards a shareholder, whose 
interest may be limited to a safe dividend and who has 
neither the time nor the capacity to satisfy himself that 
•(lU.k)-
tlie company's affairs are absolutely in order, against tne 
possibility of oeing called upon to pay towards the defaults 
or disaster of the coniDany over and above the face value 
of the shares for which^ h'-'as undertaken responsibility. 
If ever the company goes in such a bad position that its 
available fiinds are adequate to fully pay the creditors, 
the company is declared insolvent and the shareholders 
are not held liable to the creditors of the company for 
the losses suffered by then). The principle of liniited 
liabilities does not have much relevance to a public 
undertaking because it will not be worthy of a government 
to write off payments to creditors taking advantage of 
the principle of limited liability. 
Under section 620 of the Cooipanies Act, the government 
is empowered to exempt any Government company from the 
operation of any provision of the Acto Hardly any use 
has been made of this section so far. Full use shoxild 
be made of this Section to reduce» to the minimtun the pro-
visions of the Companies Act which are to be applied to 
the government companies since most of their affairs are 
in any case controlled by the govexnment. ^  The actual 
provisions to be applied to a government company would 
have to be determined specifically In each case. 
The organisation of public enterprises "as companies 
only reduced their accountability to the audit authorities 
- ( I 'T-J ) -
1 
appointed under the Constitution and to the legislature." 
In the opinion of the Estimates Committee the propriety 
of earmarking separate sums froci the Consolidatai Fund 
for a large number of public undertakings in the shape of 
companies, and putting them out of ueach of norrnal 
Parliamentaiy control on expenditure on the ground that 
the undertakings are autonomous entities is open to 
2 
question. The ESCAPE Seminar stated two important reasons 
against the company form of public enterprises: "(1) The 
company device evades the Constitutional-responsibilities 
which a state controlled enterprise has, in a democratcG 
society, to the government and to parliament; (2) The 
use of company form and of the law regulating commercial 
companies usually becomes a mere fiction because all or 
most of the functions normally vested in che shareholders 
and in the management are reserved to the government by 
the statute setting up the companyo"-^  The company form 
of organisation has been sharply criticised by the Auditor 
General of India, "These private limited companies are, 
in my opinion, a fraud on the Companies Act and also on 
the Constitution, because money cannot be taken away from 
THE CONSOLIDATED FmD for the establishment and transformation 
la Economic Commission on Asia and Far East, Seminar on 
Management of Public Industrial Enterprises, Paper No,26, 
p»6. 
2. Estimates Committee, Op.cito, para 5«> 
3« Economic Commission on Asia and Far East, Ibid, p«13« 
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of certuix) concerns into private companies in the name of 
the President and Secretary to Government o.. Further, to 
convert a government concern into a private company solely 
by executive action is unconstitutional." 
The Companies Act, 195^, has considerably improved-
the situation and many criticisms originally levelled 
against the company form have lost their force. It defines 
a government company as "any company in which not less than 
fifty-one per cent of the share capital is held by the 
Central Government, or by any state government or govern-
ments, or partly by the Central Government and partly by 
2 
one or more State governments," It provided for the 
power of Comptroller and Auditor-General of India to direct 
the manner of the company's audit and to conduct also a 
test audit,-' It empowers the Central Government to suspend 
If 
or modify any o^the provisions of the Act as necessary. 
In doing so the Central Government is to place a copy of 
the draft notification regarding modification of the 
company law before both Houses of Parliament not less than 
thirty days before its issue for approval of both the 
Houses, The Parliament then gets the opportunity of 
o 
examining the case. 
1• Statement made by the Auditor-General to the Sub-Committee 
of Public Accounts Committee on 13 December, 1952, and 
quoted by Dr^ Lankasundaram, Lok Sabha Debates, 10 Dec, 
1953, Col.1915. 
2» Section 617, Companies Act, 1956« 
3* Section 619 (3)^ 
K Section 620 (1) 
In fact, there is need for a special Act of the govern-
ment as in various other countries like Canada, Sweden, etc., 
prescribing a code of conduct and providing that all the 
Government industrial and coHi;'^ ercial enterprises have to 
b^ , incorporated only under the Act. "Vnat is essential 
is not that public enterprises should be fitted into an 
existing act but that proper legislation must be promoted 
for governing the public enterprises," Shri Morarka 
suggested that "there should be a convention that before 
a company or a public corporation is actually floated, the 
minister concerned or the ministry must come before the 
House of Parliament and justify why they want to entrust 
a particular activity of government to that company or 
corporatioir; The House must be taken into confidence and 
must also be called upon to pass or give its consent by 
means of a resolution saying that the Minister or Ministry 
is autorised to float that company and entrust that 
A 
2 
particular activity to that corporation," This is 
essential because "the moment a company or corporation is 
floated, a certain activity and a certain amount of 
finance is taken away from the purview of the House and 
the purview of the Comptroller and Auditor-General, and 
the service people employed in that company or corporation 
are taken away from the purview of the Public Service 
Coramlssione "-^  
1, Ramanadham, V.V., The Structure of Public Enterprises 
in India, Bombay 196I, pp«l7^-75o 
2o Lok Sabha Debates, OpoCit, I9580 
So Lok Sabha, Debates, Ibid, 
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The Estimates Conmiittee recomaended that all wholly 
state-owned public undertaking's should generally be in 
the form of statutory corporations, and the company form 
sliould be an exception- to only (a) when the government may 
have to take over an existing enterprise in an emergency; 
(b) where the state wishes to launch an enterprise in 
association with private capital; or (c) where government 
wishes to start an enterprise with a view eventually to 
transferring it to private management. The government, 
however, did not accept this recommendation on the ground 
that the "company form was advantageous in that it allowed 
the flexibility and autonomy necessary for the successful 
operation of commercial enterprises and also provided for 
parliamentary control over the companies under the special 
2 provisions of the Companies Act," 
Tl^s question was also considered by the Administrative 
Reforms Commission, Among its most important recommenda-
tions was the recommendation about the formation of 
sector corporations. These corporations are to be formed 
by combining and integrating existing undertakings opera-
ting in the ten major industrial and commercial fields 
o 
for each of which a sector corporation has been named. 
This recommendation is based on the detailed inquiry by 
1, Estimates Committee, Op.cit,, p,5» 
2o Administrative Reforms Commission, Report of the Study 
Group on Public Sector Undertakings,, I967, p.2^, 
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the expert study group into the public undertakings which 
disclosed that "the establishment of a number of indivi-
dual imdertakings of varying sizes, very often functioning 
in the same field of industry, has led to fragmentation 
of industrial effort in the public sector," It'was mainly 
to remedy this fragmentation of effort and to attain the 
highest degree of coordination between akin institutions, 
that the Commission recommended the constitution of 
integral corporations. The Administrative Reforms 
Commission gave in particular four advantages in support 
of this" suggestion. The Commission stated that (a) it 
will reduce the dimensions of government control as many 
of the functions that are coordinatlve per se will be 
taken care of by the corporation; (b) it will make 
government control more effective by keeping it confined 
to a few vital and strategic points; (c) it will helpo-
to achieve the economies of large-scale operations and 
the establishment of otherwise expensive staff organisa-
tions and of common service facilities in the field of 
research and consultancy, training of personnel and 
sales promotion; and (d) it will lead to better personnel 
management, uniformity in the terms and conditions of 
service of employees, wider prospects for the managerial 
and technical personnel and the development of managerial 
1. Administrative Rex'^ orms Commission, Op.cit,, po25«) 
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resout^ ces in the public sector. 
To these a few more points in favour of the new proposal 
might be added. For instance, the sector corporation wo\ild 
help in developing and bringing up strong management 
institutions in the public sector which are iiuraediate need. 
Further, the bulk of the investment in the public sector 
relates to heavy industries and in these areas, as the 
foreign experience shov/s, only large aiid integrated bodies 
have proved to be commercially profitable propositions. 
Thirdly, the past experience in the direction of Research 
and Development (R<, & D.) has been lamentable. The modem 
technology and technological changes require colossal 
amounts of investments. The requisite dynamism and invest-
ments for making the country up-to-date in this regard can 
be provided by sector corporation. Moreover, the head of 
ao-sector corporation could be a better match for the 
ministerial administrative head in the government than tha 
present wholetime chairman/managing directoro While 
recommending this, the Commission observed that "a sector 
corporation shall not be allowed to crush under the weig^ t^ 
of its autonomy and size of the operation and autonomy of 
o 
1 
its units^ ' and their setting up "sho\ald not result in 
their functioning as large monopolies in the public sector 
eliminating competition among units producing a similar 
1 
range of products or providing similar services," The 
managerial personality of the constituent units will be 
1, Administrative Reforms Commission, Op<,cit, 
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preserved by giving each of theni a financial ffaraevork 
within which it is to operate and against which its 
performance is to be evaluated; to facilitate this and 
to help infusing a spirit of healthy competition in the 
matter of reducing costs and increasing productivity in 
the public undertakings, the budget accounts and perfor-
mance data of each of the units should be separately 
coicpiled. 
As against the various advantages ascribed to this 
particular recommendation by the Coimiission, there are 
certain demerits of the proposal. Some of these demerits 
are: (1) it will interpose yet another level between 
Parliament, Government and the public undertaking and 
slow dovm the speed of operations. It will involve a 
reduction in the powers of subsidiary lanits, and the 
concentration of power with the sector organisations 
will slacken the formulation and execution of policy 
decisions; (2) it will be very difficult to find capable , 
persons to head the proposed sector corporations especially 
when this problem had been acutely felt all these years 
for successfully running even the existing relatively 
smaller undertakings. The smaller undertakings would 
find it even more difficult to attract really talented 
persons than in the past; (3) as every major sector for 
which a separate corporation has been suggested has 
certain distinctive features, it would necessitate the 
•(152)-
passing of separate Acts of Parliament which woiild lead 
to volximlnous legislation; ik-) it will mean tcking over 
certain functions like planning, etc., which essentially 
belong to ministries; (5) a majority of ixndertakings are 
govemad by provisions of the Companies Act and by Articles 
of Association framed therexmder, which provide a good 
deal of flexibility to them* But vjhen separate acts of 
Parliament are passed, it would become difficult.to make 
changes in the statutes as specific amendments would have 
to be passed by Parliament which might not be possible 
to do easily and on time due to pressure on the time of 
Parliament and due to other difficulties; (6) seveva? 
undertakings for which sector corporations have been 
recommended on grounds of uniformity in tiie nature of 
their operations, are "polyglot" corporations engaging 
in totally xmconnected lines of activities and as such 
the working of the sector corporations might become not 
too smooth as administrative control or direction would 
come'from different ministries; (7) creation of gigantic 
corporation is based on the assumption that managers of 
a very high watermark of managerial competence to cope 
with**the range and complexity of the operations involved 
and to shoulder the enormously increased managerial 
responsibility exist in the countryo This assumption does 
not seem to be corroborated by actual facts as the top 
posts in some of the leading undertakings of the coijntry 
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have in the past not been rilled up and the search opera-
tions went on for several months; (8) expectations of 
affecting saving in manpower in managerial and technical 
echelons in tmdertakings would be difficult to realise as, 
notwithstanding the sector corporation, the constituent 
units would also be required to ^ be adequately maiined; and 
(9) the forriiation of sector corporations would make the 
national economy more vulnerable as while at present at 
least some units which are showing sone progress and 
yielding profits in the normal years, these would also 
slip down as the policy decisions are likely to be framed 
on the basis of the experience of marginal units and new 
standards would have a dulling effect on the relatively 
better units« Moreover, the enormously increased powers 
of the corporations is likely to be resented to by the 
private entrepreneurs who might slacken their own efforts 
on the production and productivity frgnts as they might 
develop deep fear psychosis from neft giants and in the 
result the national economy would suffer. 
The Government turned down the Administrative Reforms 
Commission's recommendation to form sector corporation on 
the ground that the company form is more advantagS'ous to , 
public concerns which need structural flexibility and 
financial autonomy. This question is therefore wide 
openo 
_(i5v)-
Emerging Pattern of It ±s difficuxt tc 
Organioacion & ••[anagement 
— pronounce final 
judgment on the 
s'everal types of organisation. In fact the controversy 
revolves around the size of administrative organisation 
and the degree of centralisation which should exist 
within a iDationalised indDstry, Soroetiives decentralised 
organisation is advocated in the field of nationalised 
industry because it tends to increase the opportunities 
for technical, administrative, commercial and financial 
experimentation. Sometimes, some great advantages are 
ascribed to centralised organisation of publicly ovmed 
industries to ensure 'public accountability', to permit 
effective planning of the development and management of 
the industry in the national interest; to carry out such 
central functions as capital developments, marketing, 
research and training, and to effect economies through 
\mification, integration and standardisation» However, 
one should not aim at over-centralisation because it breeds 
bureaucracy, causes frustration and inhibits initiative. 
Decentralisation should be carried forward so long as it 
ife consistent with central control of national policy and 
planning. 
Whatever the pattern of organisation, the problea 
of internal management are to be faced by all the public 
enterprises« These problems may be of two kinds - those 
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arising from factors external to the enterprise and those 
relating to factors within tne enterprise itself, ProbleiBS 
arising from factors external to the enterprise are generally 
those relating to plant location, size, layout", and avail-
ability of resources, Management problems within the enter-
prise can be broadly classified under three heads: 
(i) structural (ioe,, relationships between the 
Managing Director and the Board on the one hand and 
between the Managing Director and his departmental heads 
on the other); 
(11) procedural and supervisory (ioe,, operating procedures, 
direction and supervision, use of staff agencies and 
internal commimications); and 
(iii) personnel (i.e,, training programmes, assignment 
of duties, personnel relations^and pay systems). 
The management organisation must be structured to 
achieve the maximum long-term return on the investment 
consistent with (a) strengthening the marketing and. 
technological position, (b) providing the community with 
o 
products that are competitive in price, quality and 
service, and (c) ensuring the efficient and socially 
responsible utilisation of human resources^ Within these 
broad objectives, management must set for itself long-term 
and short-term objectives. 
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In the long-term, aanagement must develop tiic skills 
and promote the invest' ent ana technological advances 
needed to maintain and improve the role of public sector 
as a key factor in the growth of Indian economyo To achieve 
high productivi^ty, management must carve out a path of 
constructive role for trade unions through improved 
consultation and negotiation machinery. It will permit 
highest productivity comrrensurate with fair employment 
practices and social responsibilities of public enter-
prises, IVhile a competitor in the field of its activity, 
public enterprises must work towards cooperation with 
private sector for improvement of trading conditions, and 
move towards the development of large production units 
to enhance competitiveness in the world industry but with 
full recognition of the part that efficient small enter-
prises in the private and public sectors can play and 
of all the social implications of any changes. To this 
end, short-term objectives which would be achieved are: 
(i) to form all the companies into groups to establish 
immediate and effective management control of the public 
sector as a whole; (ii) to set up the management organi-
sation structure and the planning and control system 
needed to manage the new groups effectively, independent 
of bureaucracy; (iii) to develop and to implement, as 
soon as possible, planned programme for achieving the 
most efficient use of human and other resources; (ig) to 
reduce costs, and particularly fixed costs; (v) to 
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improve proauct^ ^^ riT;^  ,.y achieving the most efficient 
manning, in coCperation with the trade unions; (vl) to 
review and improve aiarketing arrangements so as to 
increase the volume and profitability of sales, including 
export; and (v^x)^to establish and maintain good rela-
tions with the private sector. 
In fact there must be decentralication subject to 
the conditions laid down above as well as coordination* 
The executive development programmes and modem super-
visory procedures have to be introduced. There must be 
proper utilisation of staff agencies, and the arrangements 
for internal communications must be based on human approach; 
the personnel administration programme must be intelli-' 
gent and progressive; and adequate use must be made of 
modem accounting systems and operational statistics. 
The above analysis of the objectives gives rise to 
some thoughts on the future form of management organisa-
tion which I venture to sketch below, 
(a) The Board Fo-rlhe effective and successfull 
operation of ^ public enterprises, 
the importance of governing board can hardly be exaggeratedo 
The board is the spearhead of the public enterprise. It 
should be much the master of the enterprise as it is the 
servant of the public. For the former it is responsible 
and to the latter it is accountable. The board must be 
-K ^'J0)~ 
the ultimate authority, instead of the mini;:;cry, to look 
after a group of corrjpaLnies, The success or failure of 
the national undertakings largely depends on tne quality 
of the board, for, from this flow all the decisions on 
policy and administration which make up good or bad 
management. In this context, Professor Farooquee empha-
sises the composition of the board in these word.s: 
"Balanced boards representing diversified talents to 
take a long range point of view are essential for the 
successful working of our public enterprises," Gorwala 
Committee made two broad statements with regards to the 
membership of the public undertakings. Negatively the 
composition of the board should not be such as to 
obscure the essential conditions of autonomy. It should 
not give rise to overlapping of responsibility or result 
in the introduction of control and interference by the 
backdoor. Positively, the composition of the board should 
be such as to subserve only one purpose, that of good 
and efficient direction in tne public interest. These 
observations by the various committees appointed by the 
Government and the eminent thinkers reveal dichotaneous 
approach of the government in composing the board. I 
recommend that the board, to fionction effectively, must 
be collectively responsible under the legislation for 
the conduct of the activities under the control of the 
1, Farooquee, Q.H,, Op,clto, p»7. 
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corporatioru The Doard's direct resrponsibilities naist 
include: (i) to set overall policy objectives for the 
corporationf (ii) to review and approve strategic plans 
for achievement of these objectives; (iii) to decide on 
entry into new fields of activity; (iv) to approve 
development and annual operating plans; (v) to approve 
or delegate the authorisation of all capital expenditures; 
(vi) to approve major organisational changes, subject to 
any ministerial consents, required; (vii) to approve, or 
delegate approval of, senior appointments; (vlii) to keep 
ixnder review general policies of employment; (ix) to deal 
with matters of policy affecting ministerial and govern-
mental relations; and (x) to take decisions on all 
matters not delegated by the boards 
For the foregoing matter, the board, presided over 
by the Chain^^ (who must not be a civil servant), must 
reach appropriate decisions and conclusions, subject to 
statutory constraints and to the powers reserved to the 
minister. 
For a balanced board, capable of discharging the 
above responsibilities, selection of the members shoiald 
be wide-ranging from amongst the private industrialists 
who subscribe to the philosophy of the public sector, 
bankers and financiers, engineers, technicians, cost 
accountants and auditors, trade unions, university 
-(160;-
teachers ind institutions of higher learning and rcsearcno 
Guiding principle should be such as to select those vho 
are not opposed to the public sector and can act with zeal 
and devotion to attain the objectives of public sector 
enterprises. 
(b) Committees of the Board T© facilitate the 
effective and speedy 
conduct of the board's business, committees of the board 
must be established to consider and report on certain 
matters, to make 'recommendatjons, or within prescribed 
limits, to take decisions on the board's behalf* To begin 
with, two committees of the board may be constituted, viz,, 
(a) Planning Committee, (b) Finance Committee. These 
committees must be chaired by the chairman and the deputy 
chairman. Membership of these committees should be 
confined to board members and managing directors who should 
be non-official. 
The Planning Committee shoiild recommend to the board 
plans for the maintenance and development of the corpora-
tion's principal activities. The Finance Committee should 
(1) recommend financial policies for the approval of the 
board, approve financial programmes and procedures, and 
receive reports on the implementation and monitoring of 
these policies, (2) advise the chairman on the financial 
resources available to the corporation and on the deployment 
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of these resources, (3) control on behalf of the board 
the authority to enter Into all financial cornrcitments 
(including capital expenditure and disposal of fixed 
assets) in name of the corporation or any of its subsi-
diaries, and (h) approve or submit to the board ^ or 
approval all consolidated budgets, forecasts, annual 
operating plans, annual investment reviews and similar 
documents. 
The Chairman Role of the chairman should be 
given to the Deputy Chairman. 
And the Chairman should be left free to concentrate on 
the initiation and development of policy, external 
relations, future planning, provision of finance and 
financial policy. It shoiild be the responsibility of 
the Chairman as such to implement the decisions of the 
board,to use such advice and assistance from the members 
of the board aind the corporation's staff as he deems fit. 
There shoiild be at least two internal committees to 
deal with appointments and management development. They 
must advise the Chairman/de-puty chairman. One must deal 
with appointments and salaries, and the other with 
management development, that is, it must review the 
corporation's management resources and arrangements for 
career planning. 
- ( 1 6 2 ) -
The Chief Executive The Chief Executive nrusx. 
be responsible through 
the chairman to the board in the conduct of the corpora-
t i o n ' s business v/ithin the board 's pol icieso The board 
should delegate to the chief executive respons ib i l i ty 
for the executive management of the corporation and for 
the Iffipleinentation of the board 's policy on matters 
which are not retained under i t s d i r e c t con t ro l . The 
Chief Executive may control d i r e c t l y the Product Divisions 
and subs id ia r ies . 
The chief execut ive 's advisory coin:nittee of which 
a l l the functional and d iv i s iona l managing d i rec to r s should 
be members must provide the p r inc ipa l forum a t which the 
chief executive can have consii l tation about the current 
management of the corporationo 
The Deputy Chairman There should be two deputy 
chairmen to be nominated 
by the minister a f te r consul tat ion with the chairman. 
They should not be given executive r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s for 
pa r t i cu l a r product divis ions of the corporat ion. With 
a view to promote the in tegra t ion of the various functions 
and product d iv is ions , the deputy chairmen should be 
delegated areas of r e spons ib i l i ty r e l a t ing to d i f ferent 
aspects of the corporat ion 's overa l l a c t i v i t i e s , each of 
which should embrace several functions and product 
d iv i s ions . One deputy chairman , who should also be the 
•(163)' 
chief executive, should supervise the preparation and 
monitoring of the annual operating plans of the various 
parts of the corporationo The other deputy chairinan 
should be mainly concerned with the government and inter-
national aspects of its affairs, if this-be an exporting 
corporationo In addition to the chairman, the deputy 
chairuian and the chief executive, there should be at 
least two full-tirae members on the board, with responsi-
bility to contribute fo strategic plaiming and corporate 
policy. They sho\ald have strong functional links with 
the corresponding parts of the chief executive's organi-
sation, which should be responsible for the conduct of 
the corporation's business. They should deal with much 
of the work of external relations in their respective 
areas, thus enabling the functional and divisional 
^managing directors to concentrate on running the actual 
business, 
Managing Directors There should be at least 
six functional managing 
directors,oin charge of commercial, finance, operations, 
supplies and transport and technical divisions» They 
should report to the chief executive to advise on and 
recommend policy, programmes and procedures on all matters 
relating to their functions. In practice, they should 
also exercise, in specific and precisely defined fields. 
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executive responsibilities delgated to them by the Chief 
Executives; for example, the responsibility to control 
and coordinate certain matters on a unified corporate basis. 
In the field of finance, the control and coordination can 
be in respect of, for example, the development of standaixi 
costing systems, the control of capital expenditure and 
the financial assessment of plans and capital expenditure 
proposals. 
The functional managing directors should be responsible 
for (i) developing policies for the approval of the board 
or the chief executive, as may be appropriate, (li) for 
implementing these policies when specifically required to 
do so, or for devising programmes and procedures for their 
implementation by the managing director of the product 
division, (iii) for providing, as head of a specialist 
sector of the corporation's organisation, technical 6T 
specialist advice and services to the other Head Office 
and the product divisions, and (iv) for monitoring and 
coordinating all activities within their functional spheres 
throughout the corporation, stimxilating their development 
and ensuring that corporation's policies, programmes 
and procedures are observed^ 
Product Division Product division should be 
looked after by a Managing 
Director, Each product division should operate as a 
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profit centre \mder its managing director vho should be 
personally responsible to the chief executive for running 
his division. Each managing director should be assijied 
and advised by a divisional board consisting of divisional 
line and functional directors and ^Iso paj^ t-tirne non-
executive directors, including both employee directors aad 
other persons experienced in such fields as local affairs, 
education, industry and commerce. Each managing director 
should have directly responsible to him the line directors 
of groups of works, the number of which would vaiy 
according to the size and nature of the particular division, 
He would have functional directors reporting to him, with 
responsibilities corresponding to those of their counter-
parts at Head Quarters, i-
The organisation of the products divisional head 
quarters sho\iLd be similar to that of the corporation's 
central organisation, in that there should be divisional 
functional directors reporting to the diviiSional managing 
director. The divisional fixnctional directors are 
to be responsible for (i) the coordination of activities 
in the*>divisioji within their own functions, (ii) the 
provision of divisional management and technical services, 
and (iii) in particular, for maintaining close contact 
with the corresponding functional division at Head 
Office and coordinating and monitoring the implementa-
tion of the relevant corporation's policies, programmes 
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and procedureso 
The divisions shoiild have divisional directors 
responsible for the finance, commercial personnel and 
social policy, operations and teclmical functions. The 
director of finance should be usually responsible for 
administrative matters other than information services -
which shoxild be the responsibility of the cominercial 
director with close liasion with the personnel functions 
for internal communications» In all cases where there 
is to be some departure from uniformity in the allocation 
of responsibility, the location of responsibility and the 
lines of commionication between the Head Office and the 
divisions and between divisional Head Office and works 
groups should be precisely defined to ensure that clear 
lines of communication between the Head Office and the 
divisions exist in these areas. 
The ways in which these clear lines should be estab-
lished are through detailed Job descriptions for indivi-
dual posts showing exactly who shouid be responsible for 
v;hat, an organisational manual to be issued summarising 
the allocation of responsibilities by subject-matter 
and the system of advisory committees which should ensure 
that the individuals across the corporation, responsible 
for the same functions, meet together regularly. 
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Line And Staff Functions The line and staff func-
tional organisation of 
management should extend throughout the corporation. 
The channel of centre], should be from the Chief Exe-
cutive through %he divisional managing director to the 
directors of groups of works» The heads of the func-
tional departments should be responsible to the 
appropriate line executive, for example, the divisional 
functional director will be responsible to the divisional 
managing director and the functional managing directors 
at the Head Office should be'responsible to the Chief 
Executive, It may be noted that the authority of functional 
managing director has to be quite different from that of 
the production division managing directors. It is to 
advise on and to rccominend policies, programmes or 
procedures on all matters relating to his functions which, 
when appointed by the corporation, should be implemented 
by the product divisions and all departments nt the Head 
Office, A functional head must ensure by a proper system 
of report and consultation to be laid down by the corpora-
tion that the agreed policies, prograrTures and procedures 
are enforced, A functional head, however, should have 
no line authority over executives in the divisions or lov;er 
levels of management other than that agreed to by the 
divisional managing director* In the event of disagreement, 
the issue should ultimately be referred to the Chief 
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Executive,- to whom the product division managing director 
and the fimctional heads should bear the same relation-
ship. In practice, of course, disagreements may arise 
to be resolved by consultation between the managing direc-
tors and the fuToctional heads. 
Individual works of the corporation should be 
regrouped according to the principal and products supplied 
by each. With various divisions to cover the wide range 
of products and diversified products made and sold by the 
corporation, and with many v;orks producing a vax'iety of 
these products both for sale and for further processing, 
a complete grouping of works into precise product categO'-
ries may not be possible, but it should be catered for 
by arrangement between the divisions concernedo Initially, 
existing patterns of production shoiild be retained, but 
the actual sales of t""specific" product should be handled 
entirely by the division to which that product has to be 
allocatedo 
The number of works and the variety of specific 
products to be allocated to each division may be too great 
to allow a direct line of authority from^  divisional 
managing directors to the managers of individual works 
and within the divisions many of the works may be 
grouped on a geographical or product "basis into manage-
ment units under a group of works director to whom maxlmrum 
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inanagerial author i ty shoiLLd. be delegated. In some cases 
these group-s should operate as a single integrated unit 
and prof i t cen t re ; in o thers , largely for geographical 
reasons, they should inclutie a number of works operatii^g 
as separate management and, in some cases, p rof i t u n i t s . 
This s t ruc ture should be in comformity with the corporat ion 's o 
pr inciple of maxiicura dlegation of managerial au thor i ty , 
Systeai of Control The organisation should be 
based on d i r ec t delegation 
of l ine au thor i ty for day-to-day execution of fflanagement 
pol ic ies to d iv i s iona l managing d i rec to r s and thence to 
the managers of works groups, works and departments. 
Within t h i s organisation, respons ib i l i ty for coordination 
should r e s t with the fionctional d i r ec to r s .and the i r staff* 
By th i s means divided r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s should be 
avoided and a c lear l ine of delegated managerial responsi-
b i l i t y preserved. For such a system of delegated managerial 
functions and t h e i r coordination to be successful corpora-
tion pol ic ies must be c lear ly s ta ted , the scope and l imi t s 
of individual r e spons ib i l i t i e s must be defined, de ta i led 
operating plans for the corporation, for the d iv is ions 
and for individual works must be agreed and maintained, 
and there must be a comprehensive and consis tent system 
of reporting on performance a t a l l l e v e l s . 
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Decioxons oii general corporation policy shoula oe pror:iul-,ated 
by the issue of corporation policy documents to give defini-
tion of instructions or definitive guidance on the implemen-
tation of such decisions. Where-necessaiy these should 
be converte„d into approved divisional Standing Instnictions 
to deal precisely with the circuinstances in each division 
and should be augmented in appropriate cases by the issue 
of instructional manuals by the Head Office fianctional 
divisions to ddal with detailed procedures where uniformity 
is necessary, for example, uniform standard costing manual, 
standard condition of employment, etc* 
Definition of the scope and limits of individual res-
ponsibility should be effected by the completion of detailed 
job descriptions for all managerial staff in the corporation. 
The preparation and approval of operating plans for all 
establishment irl^ the corporation and the formal monthly 
reporting against such plans should be catered for by the 
annual operating plan procedure. 
This system of detailed planning and the comparison 
of actual performance with such plans on the basis of 
individual responsibility i§ a key element in the corpora-
tion's principles of management. Introduction of the uniform 
standard costing system and development of the continuous 
review and monitoring of operating standards of all kinds 
would progressively raise the efficiency of this system 
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anci provide a comprGhensive instrument of control for 
ffianat^er/jent at all levels^ 
Continuous reviev? and monitoring should be achieved 
through a small unit in the operations division v:orking 
in collaboration with the product divisions, OperarAng 
standard should be agreed for inclusion in divisional 
annual operating plans and any variances reported to the 
chief executive once a month. 
Commiinications The organisation should be 
designed to give managers 
the power of speedy decision in the constantly changing 
circumstances of a dynamic industry* Such decisions 
must, however, conform to overall policy at every stage 
and must be coordinated with a variety of separate consi-
derations to secure the greatest benefits for the corpo-
ration as a whole. For this close contacts and effective 
communications are essential. In a large and diverse 
organisation, much of the necessary commu-nication must 
be in documentary form. The system of reporting perfor-
mance against agreed plans and standards should be 
designed to contribute to this need by the provision of 
accurate and"suitably analysed data for circulation to 
the appropriate levels of interest. 
To use such data effectively and to coordinate 
specific programmes and decisions, documentary communi-
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cation must be reinforced by personal contacts: and consul-
tation. There shoiild be constant and iiiformal contacts 
between senior management, whether line or functional, 
both for the corporation as a whole and within divisions. 
To increase and formalise the opportunities for such 
contacts a structure of advisory and consultative committees 
should be established,. These will not only provide a form 
at which the responsible executive at both Head Office 
ahd divisional level, can with his staff review relevant 
performances and consult them on current issues, but 
present an opport\inity for personal contacts between those 
with GOKDon interests and for the discussion of common 
problems. 
The key committee in this structure will be the Chief 
Executive's Advisory Committee at which the Chief Execu-
tijie shall review with his divisional and fimotional 
managing directors the current performance of the corpo-
ration and the divisions and also such other managerial 
issues as he thinks appropriate. At divisional level 
there shall be similar divisional advisory committees as 
well as divisional boards. The latter should include 
employees and part-tiffle directors to advise and assist 
the divisional managing directors on matters of divisional 
managing directors on matters of divisional policy and 
the like. At both Head Office and divisional level suppor-
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tliig fimctional advisorj" coarr.ittees should oe set up to 
consider and advise the appropriate furictionaJ. executive 
on all relevant matters. The timing and frequency of 
meetings of these committees should be so arranged as to 
make the minimum demands on the time of those involved. 
CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing analysis it follov/s that the 
Government prefer the company form of organisation because 
it is perhaps the only form where it can watch both policy 
and operations; and take the advantage of the parlia-
mentary convention that the Minister is not responsible 
for the day-to-day administration, a convention developed 
•0~-
principally for statutory corporations but extended on 
analogy to the company fonuo Nevertheless, close 
examination of the working of the public enterprises revealed' 
that the existing management had tended to be over-centra-
lised in the hands of bureaucrats who were reluctant to 
decentralise functions even though justified by economic 
expedienciesg Such practices have led to errors and 
delays in decisions and operations. Several attempts to 
reform the management of the public enterprises have 
been examined by the scholar, including recommendations 
by the Gorwala Committee and the Administrative Reforms' 
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Cominission, which the government turned down in favcr 
of the company form. The scholar discerns that cor.tr,:-
versy in most of the cases arises from the size of tr.e 
organisation and the degree of centralisation and decentra-
lisation. The question will elude^vany solution until and 
unless specific objectives are laid down for the puclic 
sector enterprises which are conspicuous by their a'r^ ence. 
It is, therefore, recommended that the organisation r^ ast 
be strxictured to achieve the goals of maximiim return on 
their investment consistent with (a) strengthening the 
marketing and technological position, (b) providing '.he 
community with products that are competitive in price, 
quality and quantity, and (c) ensuring the efficient and 
socially responsible utilisation of hviman resources. The 
public enterprises would not be anywhere within the reach 
'of the above objectives so long as they are not managed 
and-run on sound principles of management. For Instance, 
the process of decision-maklng should be rationalised, 
and decisions as far as possible be made on the spot where 
they occur. Only very costly decisions be made at the 
level^of power, i,e«, board of directors. To ensure 
success of public concerns, the boards must be composed 
of members drawn from diverse fields such as industry, 
banking, education and research, etc,, and they should 
be non-officials» Such a board must be collectively 
.responsible for the activities of the corporation and its 
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constituents to the ParliajBent, Instead of the Minister, 
tinder legislation. The board must enjoy powers commensu-
rate with its respcsisibilities, except in matters 
reserved to the miaistero 
Government control over policies and operations should 
not be rigid. It shoxild provide necessary managerial 
incentives for cost reduction and timely decisions. The 
question as to whether the pricing system in our public 
enterprises is adopted with the objectives of reducing the 
cost to the minimum and providing goods and services to 
consumers at competitive prices, quality and quantity is 
being examined in the forthcoming chapter. 
CHAPTER V 
PRICING SYSTEM IN PUBLIC ENTERPRISES 
The previous chapter critically examined the cost 
pattern in relation to organisation and management 
of our public enterprises. The analysis revealed many 
problems that the public enterprises have inherited due 
to poor planning, unscientific organisation and inefficient 
bureaucratic management. These enterprises bear the cost 
of organisation which is inefficient at various levels 
of management, such as delays in decision-making and 
consequent operational Inefficiency. The problem will 
elude any solution until and unless specific objectives 
are laid do%m for the public sector enterprises which are 
conspicuous by their absence. The organisation must be 
structured to achieve the goals of maximum return on their 
Investment consistent with (a) strengthening the marketing 
and technological position, (b) providing the community 
with products that are competitive in price, quality and 
quantity, and (c) ensuring the efficient and socially 
reepcmsible use of hiuuan resources. The public enterprises 
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woiild not be anywhere within the reach of the above objec-
tives so long as they are not managed and run on sound 
principles of management. For instance, the process of 
decision-saaklng should be rationalised, and decisions as 
far as possible be made on the spot where they occur. 
Only very costly decisions be made at the level of power, 
i.e., board of directors. To ensure success of public 
concerns, the boards must be composed of members drawn 
from diverse fields such as industry, education, research, 
etc. Government control over policies and operations 
should not be rigid. The question as to whether the 
pricing system in public enterprises of our country is 
adopted with the objectives of reducing the cost to the 
minimum and providing goods and services to consumers at 
competitive prices, quality and quantity is being examined 
in this chapter* 
Pricing system In our public sector is regarded as 
an Integral part of non-repayable finances. The prices 
of all the commodities produced ±n the public sector 
enterprises, together with tax-revenues from other sectors 
o -
are to secure sufficient income for financing socio^ 
economic programmes of the country. In these circumstances, 
it is not necessary to Include in the price of every 
commodity the 'surplus* for the development of its production 
In some cases the prices of particular commodities do not 
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only Include profit but are not sufficiently high to cover 
the cost incurred in their production, as revealed in 
Chapter III. Losses are covered from the govemrnent budget. 
The government also distributes the means for investments, 
regardless of income^eamed by the enterprises* Although 
this system made possible the necessaiy changes in the 
economic structure of the country but it at the saune time 
produced a number of negative phenomena. The system 
neither provided the enterprises with proper incentives 
to raise the effectiveness of their operations nor was 
it conducive to a more effective "utilisation of the capital 
and therefore created a number of problems for the national 
exchequer regarding investment. The need for basic trans-
formation of the economic structure of the country, together 
with the necessity of using intensively on a large scale 
the limited resources available for economic development, 
call for modifications and reforms of pricing system in 
our public enterprises. Before making suggestions for 
the reforms of pricing policy in our public enterprises, 
it is necessary to examine the existing pricing techniques. 
Pricing Techniques yhen a public enterprise operates 
in an effectively competitive 
marteet, few special problems of pricing arise. Its pricing 
policies will be dictated to it by the forces of the market. 
To make a profit or to »n)reak-eyen" it will have to offer 
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its goods and services to the constuner at prices comparable 
with those offered by its competitors. The main problem 
is that the government must take positive ^teps to 
preserve the freedom of the market by preventing the forma-
tion of monopolies and forbidding price-fixing agreements 
and other "restrictive practices", through instrumentalities 
such as the monopolies commission. Moreover, it will have 
to ensure that its public manufacturing enterprises do 
not enjoy any privileges, such as open or concesiled subsi-
dization, that are not available to comparable and compe-
titive enterprises ±n the private sector; likewise, it 
must refrain from imposing on its public manufacturing 
enterprises without adequate compensation, unremunerative 
responsibilities from which the private sector is exempto 
In some of the developed countries, there is some approxi-
mation to the conditions of competitive market. In Prance, 
for instance, even those enterprises (other than public 
utilities) that once had monopoly characteristics are 
feeling the impact of the availability of competitive 
products. Apart from a few exceptions, therefore, public 
o — 
manufacturing enterprises operate on a competitive basis •» 
one that has been widened as a result of Eu-ropean Common 
Market, In France, for most manxifacturing concerns in 
the public sector, competition sets the prices, and the 
freedom for such competition is guaranteed, as far as 
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possible, by legislation which renders liable to prosecution 
before the courts enterprises which take advantage of a 
dominant position to engage in agreed or arbitrary price-
fixing. For enterprises, vastly In the public utility 
field, where competition is absent or limited, prices are 
set in accordance with the principle of 'marginal cost 
pricing*• This principle is intended to reconcile the 
interests of the enterprise with those of its customers 
and of the nation as a whole, by encouraging resort to 
the less costly forms of consumpticxn and thereby ensuring 
the optimum use of cap-ital equipment and providing a guide-
line for the making of the most economicsil forms of invest-
ment* The French, therefore, have adopted a consistent 
price policy for their public manufacturing enterprises. 
In Sweden, the situation is not substantially different. 
There, for enterprises working in competiton, prices are 
set according to 'what the market will bear', while the 
monopoly enterprises that have some sort of price leader-
ship, prices are set to cover costs Including a certain 
profit. But genereilly marginal cost pricing is used by 
th© latter type of enterprises. For those undertakings 
which are run by central administrative boards, as distinct 
from those that have been given company "status", the 
government has price-fixing powers, but in most cases, 
it has delegated the right to the undertakings themselves. 
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In Italy, the state shareholding companies accept market 
price since they operate in a competitive market* 
In our country, the situation is-far different from 
that in the developed countries. In general, the public 
manufacturing enterprises here enjoy a "sheltered" market, 
sometimes because they are the CTily manufacturing enter-
prises in their particular fields, sometimes because the 
division of the market among the enterprises, both public 
and private, has in effect been 'frozen' by the operation 
of industrial licensing system, sometimes because effective 
demand so exceeds actual supply that there is a more-or-
less permanent •Sellers' market"* Hence, even though in 
some cases the enterprises are in theory free to fix their 
own prices, they must necessarily b« guided in doing so 
by certain rules made for them by higher authority. Such 
rules, however, are rarely formulated with any precision 
and all too often the enterprises are compelled to sell 
their products at prices somewhat arbitrarily fixed by 
supervising ministers in the light of conceptions of 
the "national interest" which tend to fluctuate according 
to the political fortunes or prospects of the government. 
Such arbitrariness is not confined to India alone. In 
developed countries like Britain, the pricing policies 
imposed by ministers on some of the nationalised industries 
of the U.K. during the 1950s have often been conditioned 
as econoEilcally unjustified and politically inspired. 
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AS a matter of general principle, prices are deter-
mined in public enterprises in India by addjjig an unspeci-
fied •margin' to average costs. This may be good eno\igh 
as a »rule-of-thumb •, provided that a serious effort is 
being made to keep costs down and that the 'margin' is 
decided in the light of some coherent policy governing 
the contribution that each class of enterprise is expected 
to make towards its own expansion and general capital 
formation. 
The enterprises' adopting this technique are Hindustan 
Cables Ltd,, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd,, Indian Telephone 
Industries Ltd., etc. These have for their main or only 
customer the government and enjoy monopoly in supplying 
the products in question. 
In support of this technique, it is said that it is 
fair to meet the actual costs in full in the case of those 
enterprises which are in the early stages of an enterprise 
in a new technology area where the production problems 
and long-term cost conditions cannot be predicted exactly. 
For enterprises having government as the main or the only 
customer, this pricing technique is justified on the 
ground that the government has the choice of either paying 
a price which includes 'profit' or a price lower than the 
cost; for in the latter case, the government happens to 
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bc in the position of making good losses of the enterprises 
by direct or indirect subsidization. 
This method of pricing has revealed certain deficiencies. 
Firstly it does not penalize inefficient managenientrj - for 
» 
whatever are the costs the price is sufficient to meet 
them. In fact it tends to place a premium on inefficiency. 
An interesting aspect of the fonmila is the addition of 
a set percentage to the cost of a product in order to arrive 
at its price. If the cost shoots up, due to work stoppages, 
material wastages or any other reason, the "margin" rises 
too. Non-uniform and abrupt changes In the costs of 
production change the real relations in profitability as 
compared with the assumed ones. This principle of covering 
the cost plus a minimum profit consists in making the 
profit in the price dependent upon the requirements of 
development in particular fields of production and increa-
sing its share in the priCe structure. 
Secondly, the cost-plus formula is apt to make every 
line of production profitable. As a result, the enterprises 
lose initiative to optiftise its. 'product scale* and 
•product-mix'. It does not try to regulate demand into 
the more eccxiomical outputs and produce them at optimum 
point of output. None of these economical measures is 
likely to emerge from the »cost-plus' formula. 
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In some other public enterprises, discriminatory 
pricing system has been adopted. For instance, Indian 
Railways, Indian Airlines, State Trading Corporation of 
India Ltd., etc., have discriminatory price structure 
for their services and. products. Within the framework 
of this principle the distribution of the commodities 
produced is based on the possibilitiesand readiness of 
consumer to pay the price thus determined. The price here 
is a factor of selection of potential purchasers and of 
limiting thftir demand to the available supply particularly 
in the case of such enterprises as State TJrading Corpora-
tion of India Ltd, Effect of this principle in the case 
of those"public enterprises engaged in the provision of 
service goods is also to divert the excessive demand during 
inflationary period to the sectors of the economy where 
no fresh investments are required to meet the increasing 
demand like railways, roadways, etc. In other cases, 
discriminatory prices play the role of balancing the 
demand for and the supply of a particiilar commodity, jua 
excessive rigidity of prices limits their distribution 
function because disturbances in the market equilibrium 
are removed only by changes in supplies or possibly by 
various measures affecting demand (changes in terms of 
sales, advertising, etc.). Differential prices make 
pricing system more elastic. In its absence, the total 
output or utilisation of capacity tends to decline so as 
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to raise the tmit cost fof the rest of the output. 
Apart from the above economic justifications, discri-
minatory pricing system is also politically inspired; or 
they resiilt from the casual pricing decisions on the 
part of the management, A few instances may be cited to 
support this view. For instance, there exists inter-
regional and inter-functional subsidisation of a severe 
nature in the case of railways and Indian Airlines, Under 
the guise of uniform rate^, South-Eg^stem Central and 
Eastern Railways have been subsidizing the operations of 
North-East Frontier, North-Eastem and Southern Railways 
since 195^. Goods traffic has been subsidizing passenger 
traffic and many branch lines have not been re covering ,,j^  
even the marginal costs, 
similarly, the cost price relationships are diverse 
aSig the different air-routes. The region-vise, routewise 
or aircraft-wise figures of cost and revenue offer evidence 
in support of this conclusion. In 1965-66, there were 
17 routes where the total revenue exceeded the total cost, 
15 routes on which-the prices covered the direct operating 
costs but fexx siu\j^'^ :^  *'^e* total cost, 12 routes on 
which the prices covered only the variable direct oi^ si-ating 
cost and M routes on whioh the prices did not cover even 
the variable direct operating cost. 
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In other public enterprises, "import parity" is used 
as a standard. This makes some sense only if the price 
of the imported product has not been already raised by 
means of import duties or lowered by exporter in a bid 
to aapture market. 
The Hindustan Shipyard Ltd. and Hindustan Aeronautics 
Ltd. are the best examples of the International parity 
price. The Avro aircraft built by the Hindustan Aero-
nautics Ltd, Is the replica of the Fokker Friendship 
aircraft; hence the sales price of this aircraft to Indian 
Airlines Corporation was determined on the basis of the 
price at which the Fokker Friendship could be imported 
from abroad. The difference between the cost of produc-
tion and the price so arrived at was made good by the 
government by way of subsidy to Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd, 
The Avro transactions of this nature are, however, a minor 
proportion of the total operations of this enterprise, 
Hindustan Shipyard Ltd, provides a complete Illustra-
tion of this pricing formula. At on© time the tou-yer of 
a ship was offered price parity with a corresponding 1I,K, 
ship; later the principle of international price parity 
was adopted, the reason being that the Indian ship-owner 
who bought a ship from Hindustan Shipyard Ltd, ought not 
to be at a disadvantage in capital cost in the competitive 
international shipping operations that he conducts. The 
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difference between the international parity prices and the 
actual cost of production at the shipyard was paid by the 
goveminent to the company as a subsidyo It is true that 
the subsidies are repayable to the government when the 
company earns profits exceeding a osrtain per cent on 
capital; it remains a target yet to be reached by the 
compsuiy. But for the subsidy element, it is instructive 
to note that the entire capital of the company would have 
been eaten up long ago« 
Some of the enterprises have adopted landed cost formula. 
Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd., Heavy Electricals (I) 
Ltd,, Hindustan Photo Films Manufacturing Co«, Ltd,, etc,, 
are its examples. The underlying idea is that the consumer 
oiight not to be burdened with the high costs of production 
of the enterprise. However, this price basis is character-
ised by certain difficulties. Firstly, it is not certain 
that the imported product to which the landed-cost basis 
applies exactly approximates, in quality, and technical 
composition, to the product manufactured at home. Secondly, 
the prices of the imports may be particularly low as a 
o -
matter of the '»dumping' policy adopted by foreign exporters; 
for example, a Japanese firm has quoted to a state elec-
tricity board a price for a steam turbo-generator set, 
which represented about half of the corresponding price 
that an established firm in the U.K. was capable of. 
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Fundamentally, the landed-cost basis has four variables 
in it: (i) the price at which the foreign producer decides 
on exporting the product to the Indian market, (ii) the 
rate of exchange between the foreign currency and the Indian 
currency, (iii) the import duty levied on the product, and 
(iv) the cost at which the foreign producer can produce 
the output. The first factor depends on a policy decision 
of the exporter, the second and the third depend on policy 
decisions by the government of India; and the last one 
depends on the production efficiency on the part of the 
foreign manufacturer. On grounds of both scale of output 
and established experience in the technology concerned, 
he is likely to have attained an economical level, which 
the new entrants in the field in liidia will take time to 
reach. 
An example of how this formula operates may be provided 
with reference to Heavy Electricals (I) Ltd. The prices 
of power transformers, large motors and generators are 
fixed at a certain per cent above the landed cost applicable 
to similar products imported from the U,K, This involves 
a reduction in the allocation of factoiy expanses, **The 
difference between the landed-cost basis and the inter-
national parity-price bases seems to lie in the large 
deficits involved in the latter case, which is assumed 
by the government. Another difference lies in the specu-
lation that the enterprises to which the landed-cost basis 
applies are expected to "break-even" aft^r a few years, 
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though it is a matter of doubt as to whether the Hindustan 
Aeronautics Ltd., and Hindustan Shipyard Ltd, will be 
able to operate at cost comparable with international 
prices in the foreseeable future. 
Moreover, certain prices are controlled by the govern-
ment on the ground of essentiality of the product irres-
pective of the fact that they are produced either by the 
public or the private sector. For instance, we find that 
uniform price control applies to both public and private 
undertakings to road transport, drugs, -fertilizers, steel, 
etc. The uniform prife control is desired to serve twin 
purposes of restricting demand to the available supply 
of scarce product so basic to industries and agriculture 
that the market forces cannot be allowed to determine 
prices without risking 'cost-push inflation'. This 
approach presents a complex problem: if unequal retention 
price is determined on the basis of cost pattern of 
individual firms, inefficiency gets subsidized; on the 
other hand, if equal retention price is determined on the 
cost pattern of marginal firm, the most efficient firm 
in the industry reaps a 'bonanza'. I, therefore, recommend 
that these unintended results of government control over 
the prices must be maintained to the minimrum by devising 
a meticulous system of price control. 
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Inter-enterprise pricing is a complex affair. In 
such cases too little use has been made of the funda-
mental principles of price determination, vlz», cost or 
the demand. Prices are determined arbitrarily, hfore 
often than not, price tribunals are appointed to settle 
disputes between them. For instance, there was price 
arbitration over the price dispute between Oil and 
Natural Gas Commission and Gujarat State Electricity 
Board, involving several questions of far-reaching conse-
quences like the computation of capital outlay involved 
in the supply of gas to the Board, the structure of 
prices of gas supplied by the Commission to different 
states, and the paying ability of the Board vis-a-vis the 
conditions of non-availability of alternative rates 
within the State of Gujarat, etc. 
The foregoing analysis of dfifferent techniques of 
product pricing system in public enterprises makes it 
amply clear that the autonomy of the public enterprises 
in the fixation of prices varies as between undertakings. 
To recapitulate the above discussion, for Instance, the 
selling price and distribution of essential^products like 
fertilizers, drugs, coal and petroleum products are 
controlled or regulated by the Government, In the case 
of steel (as will be examined In detail in the forth-
coming chapter VI), the price has been decontrolled since 
May 1, 1967» hut is still the subject of government control 
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so far as scarce categories of steel are concerned. In 
the case of fares and freight charges levied by the I.A.C., 
Mogul Lines, etc, the rates are subject to government 
approval. In the case of the Hindustan Shipyard, the 
purchasers are charged prices on the basis of the prevail-
ing international prices, and the excess of the cost of 
construction of ship over its actual sale price is 
reimbursed by the government as subsidy. This subsidy 
is repayable if and when the undertaking earns a profit 
of over a certain per cent on the paid-up capital. Under-
takings with foreign competitors like the Air India, 
Shipping Corporation of India, Indian Rare Earths, etc, 
have to go by the international market situation; in the 
case of the first two, the fares etc, are fixed by 
mutxxal agreement, among the international lines with the 
concurrence of the government. In the case of others, 
the general position is that the undertaking is free to 
price Its products. Usually these prices are fixed on 
•cost plus* basis or on the 'landed cost' formula. But, 
here, too, there is a degree of informal consultation 
with the government. 
It is significant to note that the pricing structures 
of the public enterprises are bound to contain an element 
of arbitrariness as these financial obligations have 
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not been indicated to the public undertakings in precise 
terms. Even the Third Five Year Plan, the Fourth and the 
Fifth Five Year Plans have given only a general indication 
that public enterprises should aim a rate of return on 
the capital employed. Such directives do not make it 
clear to the management whether each of them has to aim 
at this return or this is supposed to be an indication 
of the average performance expected from all the public 
enterprises taken together. It will not be a heeilthy 
development if public enterprises working under monopoly 
or near-monopoly conditions attempt to increase surpluses 
more by increasing prices, less by reducing costs and 
ensuring fuller utilisation of their capacity. The 
managements of such undertakings, as have a monopolistic 
element and are free to price their products should not 
attempt to bring larger surpluses by. increasing their 
prices without reference to their own production efficiency 
and the wholesome trends that such an increase in prices 
might generate. 
It has sometimes been suggested that the decision 
as to the level at which they (prices) shoiild be fixed 
must be taken out of politics by confiding It to a quasi-
judicial tribunal. In former days, Britain made use of 
such a body, the Transport Tribunal, to control the fares 
and freights charged by her railway transport undertakings. 
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Prices, however, are iiltimately a matter of national 
economic policy, which is something which cannot be 
determined by contentious proceedings before a panel of 
judges. The right price will not automatically emerge 
from a qiiasi-judicial balancing of the respective claims 
of the enterprise and its customers, which is the type 
of exercise in which a tribunal inevitably tends to 
perform, even though it may not be specifically enjoined 
to do so. 
Such bodies can play a useful role if they are 
staffed by persons adequately trained in the relevant 
branches of business economics. Such bodies can help the 
government to develop coherent and consistent pricing 
policies and thereby reduce the element of arbitrariness 
in the decision-making process. There is, in fact, a 
very strong case for insisting, by law, that the minister 
to whom approval of the prices proposed by the enter-
prises is confided should be compelled to seek the 
advice of such a body and publicly to state reasons if 
the decision is to reject or alter its recommendations. 
Whether this proviso is included in the law or not, there 
is now ample evidence of the value of control agencies 
for price investigation. Britain has her Prices And 
Income Board, France her Technical Committee on Price-
fixing, and Sweden her National Price and Cartel Office -
-(I9if)-
bodies very differently constituted and empowered, but 
all concerned with investigation and recommendation. 
Such bodies are almost certainly to be preferred to 
"mixed ones" such as the Italian International Committee 
on Prices, in which the politicians outnumber the 
experts by 10 to 3. 
In the last resort, of course, an "administered" 
price is a matter of judgment, since our Government 
running mixed economy has imperfect knowledge of the 
Impact of a whole niamber of exogenous factors which ought 
to be influencing its decisions, nh this respect, the 
Government of India is in a very different position 
from the governments of centrally-planned economies. 
Ideally, if not" always in reality, the latter kind of 
government fiks all the factors under its own control. 
Even when such control is reasonably complete, however, 
there will remain a conflict of objectives which somehow 
has to be resolved; for there are very few public enter-
prises, even in the field of manufacturing industry, which 
have not been given widgr social objectives as well as 
the latter clearly have to be taken into consideration 
when deciding pricing policies; but the ever-present 
danger is that they will b© used as excuses for bad 
policies rather than as reasons for good ones. Hence, 
the importance of at least starting the price-fixing 
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exercise by the most vigorous application of the best 
economic principles which are summed up in the phrase 
"marginal cost pricing" - although there is still plenty 
of controversy about the techniques of calculating 
marginal costs, about the precise circumstances that 
warrant the application of the short-tcnn as distinct from 
the long-term marginal cost principle and vice~versa, 
and about the modifications that may have to be made, 
particTilarly if it is decided that full accounting costs 
also have to be covered. The use of such pricing policies, 
as is well know^, is Impossible unless the right kind of 
accounting information is available to properly trained 
accountants. Though I am hesitant tc recommend it for 
immediate adoption by the public enterprises In the 
coiontry, it should carefully be considered by them, with 
a view to future adoption. 
In fact a system of price determination should serve 
three basic principal objectives, viz., it should be 
promotive of efficient investment decisions, lead to 
maximum productivity of inputs auid speed up the process 
of economic growth. It leads me to the discussicai of the 
problems of 'profitability and efficiency'. 
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PRICIMG POLICY IN BELATION TO xhe profit and 
PROFITABILITY AND EFFICIENCY 
• pricing policies 
are closely 
inter-related. It is obvious that if the average revenue 
of an enterprise is fixed while the average cost is allowed 
to increase^ the financial results of an enterprise, both 
in the public and the private sectors, will be below the 
prescribed standards^ and will fail to adequately reflect 
the cost reductions through greater efficiency that might 
be brought about by the management. In the case of our 
public enterprises, the fixed average revenue is the 
direct outcome of the widely divergent official policy, 
as observed in the preceding paragraphs. It is significant 
to note that this is not confined to India alone; it is 
also^ prevalent in a large number of developing countries. 
For instance, Argentina, Greece, Iran and Sudan are among 
the countries where public enterprises are not required 
to show profit on their operations, Iran attaches 
Importance to price stabilisation, which may be incompa-
tible with profitability and, inevitably if so, if the 
general economic situation is characterised by inflation, 
Sudan pursues "self-sufficiency" as the fundamental aim 
of her industrial policy, which means that profit-making, 
although not the "ultimate goal", is certainly not ruled 
out as a subsidiary one. In Argentina "profit-making" is 
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not regarded as a basic reqtiireinent, which suggests that 
profits may not be imdesirable. Profits in French manu-
facturing enterprises are regarded as the result of 
efficiency in production for a competitive market, and 
are normally required of them for the financing of 
expansion. In Sweden, long-term profit-maximisation is 
the goal of the public manufacturing enterprises that 
operate under competitive conditions, Italy requires her 
enterprises to remunerate at current rates of interest 
that portion of their capital which is raised from a 
competitive market. In Turkey, by law MfO, profitability 
Is declared "essential"; in Iraq, it is normally fixed 
^ at 10 per cent of the total cost of the products; in 
Ceylon public enterprises are required to make profits; 
ajid in Ghana they are expected to yield return. In India, 
with the exception of a few, the statutes governing the 
public corporations and the memorandum of association 
of government companies do not call for a commercial bias 
in their operations. To cite a few examples of the Acts 
speculating profits, Section 2h of the State Financial 
Corporations Act, 1951> requires that the "Board in 
discharging its functions under this Act shall act on © 
business principles." Strangely, there is no corresponding 
provision In the Industrial Finance Corporation Act, 19^ +8, 
though in practice this corporation has been running far 
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more profitably than the State Financial Corporations, 
The Air Corporations are required to act as far as may 
be on business principles under Section 9 of the Air 
Corporation Act, 1953. The Road Transportation Act, 
1950, lays dovn under Section 22 that the Road Transport 
Corporation in carrying on its undertaking shall act on 
"business principles", A similar proTision is made under 
the Delhi Transport Authority Act, 1950, The Electricity 
Supply Act, 1950, is the only other Act in which clear 
bias is found in favour of coaaDercial performance « It 
is, therefore, recommended that Acts of other corporations 
and the memorandum of association of government companies 
must be amended to provide for the right degree of emphasis 
on •'business principles" in-their performance. 
In addition, none of the Acts governing the public 
corporations specify the upper limit to the profits to 
be earned, or alternatively for effective control of 
prices. It is, therefore, desirable to introduce appro-
priate provisions that place automatic checks and balances 
on the profit targets of the public enterprises. 
Though it may be ass\amed that the statutes take for 
granted the requirements on the part of the public enter-
prises to recover not only their costs but also interest 
or dividend on capital, specific provisions to this effect 
are lacking. To point out the general absence of such 
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provisions in the Acts is not merely of econonjic value^ 
The non-declaration of dividend on capital as em item 
of cost has led to financial anomalies, as discussed 
in the previous chapters II and III« 
Finally, no public corporation Act or the memoranduni 
of association of public manufacturing companies provides 
for price modifications under conditions of deficit. It 
is necessary to provide this, for it will strengthen 
the possibility of a needy public enterprise seeking to 
raise its prices vis-a-vis ill-informed public criticism. 
From the above it becomes amply clear that the 
government companies and the public enterprises have 
fewer clear financial stipulations. In most cases the 
matters are left to be decided by the President, It 
tends to place in the hands of government "Executives 
uncontrolled power to enunciate pricing policies, -It 
is necessary to provide for a clear demarcation of 
functions in this respect between the ministry and the 
management of the enterprise. 
The variety of attitudes and statutory provisions 
illustrated above reflect a distinction between approaches 
adopted by the countries to suit their economic develop-
mentsuL programmes. In France, Italy and Sweden public 
manufacturing enterprises are subject to the operation 
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of c<Mipetition; their profitability, therefore, is not 
only expected but taken as a rough-and-ready loeasure of 
their efficiency. 
In Ofur country, competitive ccaiditions are either 
non-existent or extremely imperfect, particularly in 
those lines of production in which public manufacturing 
enterprises specialise. Profitability, therefore, is 
neither correlated with efficiency nor regarded as a 
means of measuring it, Vtoere expected, it is deliberately 
planned for as a means of providing self-generated 
resources for enterprise expansion and re-equipment or 
as a contribution to general capital-formation in the 
total national economy. 
In countries which have extensive systems of public 
manufacturing enterprises, the generation of surpluses 
by their enterprises is an important segment of economic 
growth, as noted In the previous chapter I, And those 
countries which rely more on the private sector or those 
whose industrial development is still in its early stage, 
place less emphasis on this objective. In Greece, for 
Instance, surpluses accruing from the operations of 
public manufacturing enterprises can hardly be more than 
marginal in their effect on the total economy, while for 
Sudan the immediate objective is the initial establishment 
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enterprises which can lead to greater industrial self-
sufficiency, irrespective of their profitability, at 
least in the short-term. 
Where profit is not the more-or-less automatic result 
of success in competition, it has to be planned for, by 
the enterprise itself or by the public authorities or by 
both, through a process of consultation and collaboration,_ 
Here, again, practices differ, depending partly on the 
extent to which the profits of the enterprises enter as 
important elements into the resource-calculations made 
for the national economic plan. In Ghana, where 
•financial planning' is very elementary, whether at the 
plant level or the national level, there are virtually 
no profit targets. In Argentina, Ceylon, Iran and Sudan 
the targetting is undertaken by the enterprises themselves. 
lra.^ has the rather curious system b ^ which one group of 
enterprises (l,e,, those directly under the control of 
the government) have their profit-targets set by,the 
national plan, while another group (i,e, those dependent 
on the 'holding compai^ r' known as the State Organisation 
for Industry) set their own. However, the dlstjypction 
between the different kinds of arrangement for profit-
targetting is not of much significance because profit-
ability is closely related to investment and pricing 
policies, in respect of which the enterprise is rarely 
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endowed with autonomy. Hence, even when the enterprise 
is left free to plan for the realisation of a particxilar 
level of profit, it does so within economic parameters 
stringently determined hy the public authorities. 
It is significant to note that, of sill the countries, 
in India govemnjent sets targets of resources for planned 
development. The Third Plan set an overall target of 
Rs.^ -50 crores, the Fourth Plan Rs, 1,265 crores and the 
Fifth Plan of Rs,1,6l5 crores (Chapter I). These targets 
were fixed too generally, too arbitrarily and without 
sufficient consultation with the enterprises themselves« 
This has led to the following comments by the Committee 
on Public Undertakings: "The C<mmilttee regret the manner 
in which the assessment of surpluses from the public 
undertakings has been made for the Third Plan. Ad hoc 
assessment of surpluses is unfortimate as it raises hopes 
which cannot be fulfilled and exposes the undertakings 
to public criticism. The Committee trust that, while 
making provision in the Fourth and subsequent plans,the 
estimates of siirpluses from public undertakings wotild be 
-I 
made on a realistic basis and in consultation with them«" 
An overall target for the profits to be realised by public 
enterprises is not very meaningful unless it represents 
1» Committee on Public Undertakings, ^ 3rd Report, Fourth 
Lok Sabha, 1969. 
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an aggregate or average of the individual targets for 
each of the enterprises, which can be realistically 
formulated only by a process of close consultation with 
the managements of the enterprises themselves, who alone 
can say what is feasible and what is unfeasible in the 
conditions under which they are required to conduct 
their operations. 
It may be usefully added that, whereas certain 
countries appear to be little concerned with the profit-
ability of their public manufacturing enterprises, and 
others - the majority - expect them to make profits or 
hope that they will do so, none adopt, as a general rule, 
the so-called "break even" policy. This policy was 
originally written into certain of the British "nationa-
lisation" laws, which required the newly nationalised 
industries to bring into bal\^ce their receipts and 
expenditure on Current account* It has been abandoned 
even in the country of its origin. There are now few 
who wotild seriously recommend its general adopticai, 
particularly by mantifacturing industries • although it 
may have its merits, in particular circumstances, for 
public utilities. 
Treatment of losses in public enterprises deserves 
apecial mention. When losses are registered by public 
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manufacturing enterprises, they may be covered by a great 
variety of methods, viz., straight-forward subsidization 
from national budgetary fimds; the granting of loan, 
sometimes interest-free; the waiver of service charges 
on outstanding loans or the declaration of a moratorium 
on loan repayments; the use of the enterprise's own 
reserves, etc. (as discussed in Chapter III in detail). 
It is impossible to say, except in relation to particular 
circumstances, which of these methods is to be regarded 
as superior to others. There are, however, certain 
principles which may be suggested with some confidence. 
Mich depends on the precise reason for the loss. 
In some cases, as analfSBA in Chapter III, it is the 
resiat of deliberate government policy. For social or 
political reasons, the government may have refused the 
enterprise permission to charge prices that will enable 
it to cover its costs of production, or have imposed upon 
it loss-making obligations which "put it in the red" in 
respect of the totality of its operations. In such cases, 
open subsidization, however arranged, is invariably the 
best method of covering the loss. Such subsidisation, 
however, needs to be calctilated with great care, since 
an enterprise (and sometimes the government itself) 
may be under strong temptation to attribute to extraneous 
factors of losses which are in fact the result of 
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msinagerial inefficiency. I would, therefore, siiggest that 
circmnstances \mder which subsidisation may be legitimately 
employed and the techniques that may. be used for the 
calcixlation of the amount are sub ejects to which the govern-
ment must pay careful attention. 
In continuation of the remedies already discussed 
in chapter II, it may be added that the use of the grant 
or even of the interest-free loan is normally an 
inappropriate methodto cover the losses if an enterprise 
fails to pay its way for reasons unconnected with any 
directives it may have received from the government. One 
must, of course, give due allowance for the enterprise 
with a lengthy maturation period, which may have been 
allocated to the public sector precisely for the reason 
that, during its fijpst years of operation, it will 
inevitably be loss-asaklng. Proper financial provision 
has therefore to be made for their "runnlng-ln period". 
If the project analysis has been inadequately done, and 
if the expected yield on invested capital is more than 
delayed, the enterprise therefore is entitled to a 
moratorium^on rather than waiver of^the financial obliga-
tions it woiild normally incur. Hence, the appropriate 
way of covering losses is to make a loan on which 
interest payments and amortization instalments are deferred 
for a number of years. Admittedly, this is a counsel of 
-(206)-
perfection, and it may well be that circiumstances will compel 
the governnient eventually to write off the charges as a result 
of the inability of the enterprise to meet them. It may even 
be that some portion of the enterprise's original capital 
will have to be written off. But these are the measures to 
be used <aily in the last resort, v^en all else has failed; 
for if the enterprise starts its life in the expectation 
that a solicitous government will provide it with "easy" 
money to cover any losses it may incur, its incentives to 
improve its efficiency and to achieve profitability will be 
reduced to a very low level. 
The use of depreciation funds for wiping out losses is 
not a desirable measure; for if it is continuously resorted 
to, the financial affairs of the enterprise will become more 
and more confused, and eventually its soundness as a 
commercial entity completely undermined* The use of reserves, 
however, falls into a different category, since the covering 
of temporary losses is one of the purposes for which the 
accuatulation of reserves are intended. In the developed 
coxmtries, such as France, losses are normally met in this 
way, with the exception of those which arise from the slow 
maturing of a project or from the need for its radical 
reconstruction. But it is obvious that reserves have to be 
created before they can be used, and the ability of an 
enterprise to have recourse to this method is in itself 
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evidence that it has already achieved a considerable 
financial success, 
DISTRIBUTION OF PROFIT AND When prices are fixed at the 
PRICING POLICY "^^ 
' «optimum level of output* of 
public enterprises and they 
Toake profit, the question of its disposition arises. Some 
countries have provided for the division of enterprises* 
profits in a tedious way. In Iraq, for instance, the 
manufacturing enterprises under the control of the State 
Organisation for Industry (SOI) are required to operate 
a tedious scheme of distribution of profit. At the other 
end of the scale is India, which has no clear and specific 
methods for the distribution of the profits generated by ' 
the public manufacturing enterprises. In practices, most 
of our public enterprises have been ploughing back their 
profits in the form of various reserves, e.g», general 
reserves, development rebate reserve, etc*, as seen in 
Chapter II» Such flexibility, of course, facilitates both 
the long-term planning and short-term adjustment of the 
national economy; but it is wide open to abuse by governments 
less responsible and development-minded, and does not embody 
any pattern of "incentives" that might guarantee rewards for 
managers and workers who make special efforts to achieve 
the targets they have been set. 
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Other countries without laws for the regulation of 
profit distribution have adopted varying practices. The 
Ghanian manufacturing enterprises, for instance, normally 
Retain their profits but sometimes pay some of them into 
the Treasury. The Sudanese enterprises use their profits, 
apparently in accordance with a series.-of ad hoc decisions 
by the govemment, for repayment of capital, payment of 
dividends and transfer to reserves. 
There is also a group of countries that specify by 
law the distribution of certain portion of their enter-
prises' profits but leave the remainder to be used as 
the enterprise or the govemment sees fit. In some cases, 
the law confines itself to stating the principles upon 
which bonuses shall be allocated to managers and workers. 
In France, for instance, the Act of 17 August, I967, on 
"participation by workers in gains through expansion" 
obliges enterprises with more than one hundred employees to 
pay their employees a s\im calculated according to pre-
determined norm. In other cases, the law makes general 
provisions for reserve creation and debt redesrption, 
Swedish companies, for instance, are required to contribute 
10 per cent of their profits to reserves until the reserve 
fund is equal to 20 per cent of the shareholders' capital, 
and to use a further 10 per cent for debt redemption so 
long as outstanding debts are greater than total equity 
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capital. The remaining profits are used for reinvestment 
or for the payment of dividends to the state, in accordance 
with decisions taken by managements of the companies 
themselves. There are yet other coimtries which, while 
making no general legal regulations for the (fistribution 
of profits, applicable to every enterprise or to all 
enterprises falling within certain categories, embody 
special provisions within each enterprise's constituting 
law. Turkey is one of these which, among other things, 
foresee the payments of premiums and dividends from,the 
net profits to the personnel who have played a role in 
increasing the productivity of all her. state economic 
enterprises. In Italy, the matter is entirely decided 
by the statute relating to the management agency concerned* 
The IBI, for instance, is required by its own le.w to 
contribute 20 per cent of its profits to a reserve fund, 
15 per cent to vocational training, management training, 
and technical and social assistance, and 65 per cent to 
the State Treasury, 
The above illustrations reveal the enormous variety 
of practices governing profit distribution, I shall 
therefore enxmciate four principles which, in my view, 
should as far as possible be observed by our public 
enterprises. Firstly, the pattern of profit-distribution 
shoiad be thought out in advance, and not left to a series 
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of ad hoc decisions. Secondly, it should not be so rigid 
as to inhibit distribution in a manner conforrcable with 
the requirements of the national economy as a whole. 
Thirdly, it should give the maxinnim practicable freedom 
to the managers and workers with financial incentives for 
the improvement of their performance. Fourthly - and most 
importantly - it should ensure that the highest possible 
portion of the enterprise's profits should be either 
ploughed back or used for purposes of general capital-
formation, I am aware, of course, that these principles 
are by no means complementary; indeed, they may frequently 
come into acute conflict with one other. What I am saying 
is"~simply that they shoizld all be borne in mind by those 
who are entrusted with the making deci: 
enterprises on this important subject. 
sions in our public 
EFFICIEMCY AKD THE As to the actual effect of 
PRICIUG POLICY , , ^^  4.. pricing policy promotive of 
efficiency, one must make a 
distinction between (a) the general effect deriving from 
the ability of the enterprise to show profit and from 
its freedom to exercise some control over the use to which 
that profit is put; and (b) the specific effect arising 
from the distribution of some portion of the profit in 
the form of bonuses to its personnel. 
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When an enterprise can claim that it is a venture that 
yields adequate returns to its founders and owners, it tends 
to g et favourable publicity. Moreover," profitable enterprise 
is likely to subject to less interference by the political 
and administrative authorities than an unprofitable one. 
Both of these factors obviously enhance the morale of the 
enterprise's managers, and it is even possible that some 
of the ordinary employees may begin to take a pride in the 
achievements of "their" concern. When profits have been 
genuinely won, such reactions are fully Justified, It 
must always be remembered, however, that in a situation 
where the enterprise enjoys some degree of monopoly or is . 
operating in a consistent seller's market, profits may be 
easy to obtain and hence offer no real criterion of 
efficiency. Such a situation prevails in India and other 
developing countries* Indeed, profitability which has 
been obtained as a result of no particular effort may 
induce complacency rather than stimulate initiative. As 
for management's freedom to use the profits that it makes 
or at least a significant proportion of them - for its own 
self-determined purposes, that the** greater the freedom 
accorded, the higher will be the morale, Msaiagers cannot 
be accorded total freedom to dispose of their net profits. 
If an enterprise is not scheduled for further expansion, 
it would be simply foolish to allow them to pursue an 
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indiscriminate policy of "ploughing back"; such a course 
would simply restrict the possibilities of capital-foraation 
in those areas where it was really required, and would be 
incompatible with coherent national economic planning. 
On the other hand, it would at least seem to be inimical 
to managerial morale if all the fruits of success were 
arbitrarily taken away by higher authority, to be used -
perhaps - for purpS>ses which seemed to the managers them-
selves to be of comparatively low priority. Perhaps the 
key word here is arbitrarily, and it may be that what 
managers really want is not the right to dispose of the 
profits they have made but to be seriously consulted 
about the disposition of such profits. There is plenty 
of evidence that consultation does not always take place 
or that when it does take place it is not always serious. 
The specific effect of boiuses for personnel, fed from 
the enterprises' profits, is also the subject of some 
controversy. In theory, it should be good for morale; in 
practice it is not always so. When an enterprise enjoys 
a comparatively sheltered existence, the payment of 
bonuses out of regularly accruing profits may settle down 
into a routine and the bonuses come to be regarded as a 
normal addition to standard wages and salaries. Equally 
serious is the situation where certain enterprises, through 
no particTilar effort of their own, are able to pay bonuses 
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whereas other enterprises, thro\igh no fault of their own, 
are unable to do so. In this case whatever stimulatory 
effect the bonus-paying regulations have on the first 
group of enterprise may be offset by the depressant effect 
on the second "group. Similar considerations apply to the 
use of profits for the provision of services in kind, such 
as housing and recreational facilities. Such services 
are provided on a fairly lavish scale in the public 
enterprises of our country. Much more useful, from this 
staJidpoint, is the payment of bonuses ajid provision of ser-
vices based, not on profitability, but on productivity, 
both individual and collective; but this requires that 
there should be reasonably sophisticated means of measuring 
productivity and of apportioning responsibility for it. 
So far as workers are concerned, the simplest method is 
the introduction ofeh-piece-work schemes; but whether this 
is possible depends both upon_the nature of the enterprise's 
operations and the reaction of the workers in this parti-
cular form of remuneration, which differ from Industry to 
industry. 
Among other specific Incentives is» the introduction 
of schemes for worker parti6'ipation in managerial functions, 
by way either of representation on decision-taking bodies 
or of membership of consitLtative committees. Most of 
the enterprises are equipped with some form of consultative 
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aiacliinery in India, and that a few have decided to 
involve the workers, usually through their trade unions, 
in actual managerial functions, of all the co\intries, 
Fr^ce has the longest experience of "participatory" 
practice. By her nationalisation laws, dating fronj the 
period immediately following the Second World War, she 
established "tripartite" boards of directors on which 
the workers received representation, India also has 
introduced a similar type of workers' participation in 
management at an,, experimental level. 
Measurement of Efficiency In i now turn to some 
Public Enterprises ^ ^ ^ 
: « of the problems of 
measuring efficiency 
in our public manufacturing enterprises. As already 
indicated, profit fails to provide a meaningful yardstick 
except where competitive conditions prevail, which is 
rarely the case in India, Even in the more developed it 
is rarely adopted as the sole criterion, France which 
regards other tests of efficiency as "secondary"-, never-
theless admits that there are cases where the profitability 
criterion is "debatable" (e.g., when the state is the sole 
buyer of the products of a public manufacturing enterprise) 
and where other criteria must be used (e.g., when the 
enterprise has as its main objective the trying out of 
certain technological Innovations, or is striving to 
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a-njL. 
obtain a foothold in markets that as yet potential rather 
than actual). 
Efficiency can be measured only In relation to 
defined objectives. As, in many coxmtries, the ob;)ectives 
of public manufacturing enterprises have received no more 
than vague and ambiguous definition, any form of efficiency 
measurement may be a difficiat exercise. Even where clear 
definition of objectives has been attempted, difficulties 
are likely to arise from the fact that many public manu-
facturing enterprises are expected to pursue "social" as 
well as purely commercial goals. The problem of giving 
each kind of goal its due emphasis is well illustrated 
by the document issued by the British Government in 196l,~ 
entitled "The Financial and Economic Objectives of the 
Nationalised Industries" which first defined the government's 
main task as that of measuring the efficiency to ensure 
"that the industries- are organised and administered 
efficiently and economically to carry out their responsi-
bilities, and that they are thus enabled to amke the maxi-
mum contribution to^rds the economic well-being of the . 
community as a whole", but then immediately added that 
"although the industries have obligations of a national 
and non-commercial kind, they are not, and ought not to 
be regarded as social services absolved from economic and 
commercial justification". From I96I onwards an attempt 
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was made to bridge this dichotoiny by setting five-yearly 
targets, expressed in terms of percentage return on 
total capital, which would take into consideration both 
the coaaaercial and the social obligations of the indus-
tries concerned. Of recent years, however, inoi;;e 
sophisticated techniques have been developed, using the 
devices of Discounted Cash Flow and cost-benefit calcu-
lations. These are useful both for choosing objectives 
and for defining them in quantitative tencs. They 
greatly facilitate the task of checking performance. But 
they, by no means, offer anything in the nature of 
automatic problem-solving devices. 
Once targets have been decided on, numerous criteria 
are available to measure the economic efficiency with 
which a public manufacturing enterprise is striving to 
reach them. One will be interested in how economicteLLly 
the enterprise is using its capital resources and its 
inputs of raw materials, fuel and power, in what steps it 
is taking to save on. overheads and inventories; In the 
results of its efforts - if any - to raise the produc-
tivity of labour; and in the changes that are taking 
place in cost per unit of production of given quality. 
On the basis of these and other criteria, an efficiency 
profile of the enterprise may be built up over the years, 
and with the help weaknesses may be identified and 
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corrected. In the developed coimtries such criteria are 
being regularly employed; in India they are often used, 
if at all, only fitfully and inexpertly. Government is 
sometimes afraid to use them, "because they do not wish 
to expose to public inspection the inefficiency of the 
enterprise for which they are respcaisible; but even in 
more favourable political circumstances, knowledge of 
how to use them is often absent among the inadeqoiate 
number of trained efficiency experts, usually concentrated 
in the central ministries rather than spread out among 
the enterprises themselves* 
In our country it is therefore a matter for no surprise 
that Planning Commission specifies "fulfilment of plan 
targets" and this, indeed, is an objective as important 
ag„ it is obvious. One is aware, however, that plan targets 
tend to be expressed in industry-by-industry figures for 
physical production* Unless these are broken down into 
specific assignments, both physical and financial, for 
each undertaking, they cannot offer even rough-and-ready 
criteria for the assessment of performance. Other criteria 
specified are "best use of resources", "output", "quality", 
"production costs", "prices", "meeting of demand", and 
"non-financial, social and economic objectives". Such a 
miscellaneous collection shows little more than that the 
Government is in favour of virtue and against sin. They 
do not provide evidence of any attempt at precise definition 
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of objectives or at precise measurenjent of the extent to 
which the objectives are being reached - although there 
is no doubt that such an attempt is actually being made, 
more vigorously in some countries than in others. 
The problems of product-pricing and operational 
efficiency are closely inter-linked issues. Low level 
of efficiency in public manufacturing enterprises, as 
evident from the analyses in the previous chapters, is 
one of the main criticisms currently- levelled against 
them. As public manufacturing enterprises are to remain 
an important segment of our economy, such criticisms must 
be met with a positive response, 
CONCLUSION 
It becomes amply clear from the foregoing analysis 
that conditions in India are generally different from 
those prevailing in advanced coimtries like France, U.K,, 
Sweden, Italy, etc. Public countries here enjoy a 
'•sheltered market", sometimes because they are the only 
manufacturing enterprises in their particular fields, 
sometimes because the division of the market among the 
enterprises, both public and private, has in effect been 
•frozen' by the operation of industrial licensing system, 
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sonjetimes because effective demand so exceeds actual supply 
that there is a more-or-less permanent 'seller's market'. 
Hence, the prices are fixed by 'higher' authority. However, 
administered prices are '^ foanoulated with any precision and 
all too often the enterprises are compelled to sell their 
products at prices arbitrarily fixed by the ministries in 
the light of conceptions of the 'national interest' which 
tends to fluctuate according to political fortimes or 
prospects of the government. The role of Central ministries 
must be one of monitoring their activities, asking questions 
and recommending courses of action. But the final decision 
must rest with the chief executive of the public enterprise 
and not as it does now with a deputy or joint secretary 
in a ministry, who today exercises power but is not held 
responsible for the consequences. The importance of this 
reform cannot be over-stressed, India has underpriced its 
steel, cement, coal, fertilizers and a horde of other 
products for two decades and then tied up literally the 
collossal Investment in public manufacturing enterprises 
when with more realistic pricing the growth of public 
enterprises would have been financed entirely from profits 
and normal bank borrowings. The analysis reveals that 
a number of public enterprises have been virtually starved 
of funds through administered pricing. As a resvat today 
more and more public money is being tied up in reviving 
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sick imits in the heavy industries which need never have 
becoEie sick at all. 
In fact, a system of price determination iliust be 
promotive of efficient inrvestment decisions, maxiimun 
productivity of inputs and accelerated economic growth* 
Hence it has been recommended that bodies comprising 
persons adequately trained in relevant branches of business 
economics must be set up to help the Government develop 
a coherent and consistent pricing policy and thereby 
reduce the eleraent of arbitrariness in the decision-
making process. But there will still remain a conflict 
between the objectives of maximum economic and social 
returns; hence the importance of fixing prices by applying 
the best economic principles summed up in the phrase 
•marginal cost pricing'. 
The prices must include profit margin which must be 
formulated realistically by a process of .close consulta-
tion with the management of the enterprises themselves, 
who alone can say what is feasible and what is unfeasible 
in the conditions tander which they are required to conduct 
their operations. At present these targets are actually 
determined too generally, too arbitrarily and without 
sufficient consiiltation with the enterprises themselves* 
An overall target for the profits -to be realised by public 
enterprises is not very meaningful unless it represents 
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the aggregate or average of the individual targets to 
be included in prices for each of the enterprises. 
As regards losses registered by public enterprises, 
prices must not be raised to cover them unless factors 
causing losses are known. In such cases as the losses 
are the result of 'administered prices', open subsidisa-
tion is invariably the best method. If the enterprise 
is expected to pay its way, but fails to do so for aixy 
reasons unconnected with any directives from the 
government, the use of grant or even interest-free 
loan is normally an appropriate method of covering the 
losses. If the project analysis has been inadequately 
done and the expected yield^pn invested capital is more 
than delayed, the enterprise is entitled to a moratorium 
on the financial obligations. The use of depreciation 
fund for wiping out losses is not a desirable practice 
because it eventually undermines the financial soundness 
of these enterprises as a commercial entity. 
In addition, pricing policy must facilitate the 
checking of performance. One will be interested in how 
economically the enterprise is using its capital resources, 
its Inputs of raw materials, fuel and power, In what steps 
it is taking to save on overheads and inventories; in the 
res\ilts of its efforts to raise the productivity of 
labour; and in the changes that are taking place In cost 
per \mit of output of given quality. On the basis of 
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these criteria, an efficiency profile of the enterprise 
may be built up over the years and with its help weaknesses 
may be identified and corrected. In the developed countries 
such criteria are regularly employed, but in India the 
government is afraid to use them, because they do not 
wish to expose to public inspection the inefficiency of 
the enterprise for which they are responsible. Application 
of these criteria would ensure that prices are fixed at 
the level of mininrum cost and optimum output. 
It is significant to note that questions of pricing 
product, profitability and efficiency are inter-related 
issues. AS public enterprises are to play a key role in 
the economic growth of our country,by providing infra-
structure and acting as *toodel employers', administered 
pricing system must give way to •marginal cost pricing". 
In the subsequent chapter, a case study of pricing 
system in iron and steel Industry is made to identify 
its weakness. 
CHAPTER VI 
PRICING SYSTEM IN ^^  
IRON AND STEEL INDUSTHI OF INDIA 
(A CASE STUDY) 
After macro-analysis of the pricing system In public 
enterprises in the preceding chapter, the present chapter 
is devoted to an analytical case study of the price beha-
viour of a basic metal, i.e., steel. The steel industry 
is a basic industry. The entire civilisation of England 
is based;^..iron and steel industry. The strategic sig-
niflcance of steel prices in the context of econcanic 
growth has been recognised in unambiguous terms, One 
important study attempted in the Indian context states, 
"Steel is one of the important sinews of industry,* 
Stability of steel prices ensures stability of manufac-
tures in partictalar and wholesale prices generally." 
More ambitiously, the price of steel has been related to 
the price-cost behaviour of industrial economy in general. 
In the Indian context, even though the cost-price 
1» Govt, of India, Committee on Cost of Production of Steel 
Report, 1966, p.l. 
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relationship of steel Is approached Indirectly through 
returns analysis , attempts at estimation of actual 
unit cost of steel are found to be rare; particularly 
during recent years with the only exception of the 
efforts of the Conunittee on Cost of Production of Steel " 
(1966), The present study estimates the works cost of 
saleable steel in India and decomposes it into its 
component parts during 1956 and 1973-7^. 
In the course of the analysis, attention is primarily 
focussed on the cost of production per unit of output 
incurred by the marginal manufacturer to examine as to 
whether the prices fixed by the Government are consistent 
with the cost of production to permit self-financing of 
the industry and to generate resources for general-
capital formation. To examine in depth the Impact of 
pricing steel categories, the cost compcHients are divided 
into two general categories, viz,, *Works Cost' and 
'Overheads'. This classificatory scheme has been evolved 
on the basis of the one used by the Indian Tariff 
Commission. The research scholar has made independent 
estimates of the important raw-materials suid labour 
components on an average basis since the cost data on 
the Individual components of Works Cost were not presented 
1« Govt, of India, Committee on Cost of Production of 
Steel, Ibid. 
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in the Tariff Conmission^s 1956 Report. And adequacy of 
the estimates of Overheads has also been investigated by 
the research scholar because they were rather arbitrarily 
determined by the Commission, 
COST OF RAW MATERIALS The raw-material component 
of works cost is influenced 
by the physical considerations and the money prices of 
these materials at the point of consumpticai. The average 
delivered prices of raw materials in 1956 were calculated 
from the data presented In the Census of Manufactures, 
By dividing the quantity of each major material consumed 
by the industry during 1956 into the value of each material 
2 
consumed, the following delivered prices were obtained: 
o— Coking coal - Rs.2^ 4-080; Iron Ore - Rs,llf,75; 
Limestone - Rs,l5,86; Scrap - Rs,229«76, 
( Scrap was the most expensive material purchased 
by the mills followed by coking coal, limestone 
and iron ore). 
The cost of raw materials per unit of output is a 
o -
function of both the prices and respective quantities of 
these materials consumed per unit of output. The esti-
mates of the raw material costs per ton of saleable steel 
1, Central Statistical Office. Eleventh Census of Manu-
factures, 1956, pp, 373-378. 
2, Figures are related to materials purchased whether during 
the year or earlier and consumed. 
Elhance, D,N.. Economic Statistics of India Since Inde-
pendence, p.267. 
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were obtained by miltiplying the factor prices by the input 
coefficients. The results of these computations are summa-
rised in Table 6.1, 
TABLE 6,1 - RAW MATERIAL COST PER TON OF SALEABLE STEE - 1956 
Mv material As % of the 
cost per ton of sale- Total 
Item able steel 
Power and Fuel (Coking Coal); 
Delivered cos t 
Coef f i c i en t 
Cost per q'liantity of 
I ron Ore: 
Del ivered c o s t 
Co -e f f i c i en t 
Cost per q u a n t i t y of 
Limestone: 
Del ivered cos t 
Co-e f f i c i en t 
Cost per q u a n t i t y of 
Purchased Scrap: 
Del ivered cos t 
C o - e f f i c i e n t 
Cost per q u a n t i t y of 
s a l e a b l e 
S t e e l 
s a l e a b l e 
S t e e l 
s a l e a b l e 
S t e e l 
s a l e a b l e 
S t e e l 
TOTAL HAW MATERIAL COST 
Rs,25,00 
2,199 
Rs.55*00 
Rs. l5»00 
2M3 
Rs,36.00 
Rs. l6»00 
0o732 
Rs.12.00 
Rs.230.00 
0,199 
Rs<,V6,00 
Rs.lJ+9»00 
37% 
37% 
2h% 
0-^. 
8^ 
31^ 
lOOjg 
SOURCE: Co-efficients have been computed by the research 
scholar from the data presented in the Central 
Statistical Office, Eleventh Census of ^ fenufactu^es, 
1956, pp. 373-78. 
NOTE: The total input of materials was divided by the 
quantity of hot-rolled steel products, Including 
castings and semi-finished steel for sale. 
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On the basis of these data, the cost of raw materials 
was estimated to be Rs,1^9 per ton« As of the individual 
elements of raw material cost, powerjand fuel accounted 
for 37 per cent, scrap 31 per cent, iron ore 2^ per cent 
and linestone 8 per cent. 
LABOUR COST; Labour cost per unit of 
saleable steel was computed 
by combining data ai hourly payroll cost and man-hours worked 
per ton of saleable steel produced. To find the hourly 
payroll cost, the fringe benefits received by the 
production workers were euided to the annual wage payments. 
In this endeavour, an arbitrary distribution was made of 
the total benefits paid to productive workers and others, 
as shown in the Indian Census of hfejiufactures (Eleventh), 
The annual payroll cost was divided by. the munber of 
mah-hours worked. The resialts of these calculations are 
summarised in the Table 6»2, 
Items 
Steel 
Finished 
TABLE 6. 
Steel 
,2 •• UNIT 
«» 
LABOUR COST 
Unit 
Rs, 
Rs, 
labour 
.77 
110 
cost 
SOURCE: Computed by the research scholar from the data 
presented in the Central Statistical Office, 
Census of Ifenufactures (Eleventh). 
-(228)-. 
OTHEB WQBKS COST The remaining components of 
works cost as defined by the 
Tariff Commission were lumped by the companies into a 
category labelled 'Other Works Cost.' The major elements 
in this category were housing, medicine and food supplied 
to workers. Power and fuel oil, stores and spare parts, 
excise tax on steel ingots. In the pre-grent study, a 
number of these items were included with either the raw 
material or labour costs* Power and fuel oil costs, which 
accounted for approximately 3I+ per cent of IISCO's other 
works costs in 1955-56, were treated as components of the 
power and fuel costs under raw materials. In addition, 
the housing, medicine and food supplied to workers were 
previously Included under labour costs. 
The largest compcaient of other worlfe^ ' costs not previ-
ously discussed was the excise duty on steel ingots* The 
duty amounted to Rs,^ per long ton of steel Ingots produced 
in 1956 and comprised over 20 per cent of IISCO's other 
costs in that year. In order to ascertain the incidence 
of this tax per ton of saleable steel, the appropri^e 
saleable steel - crude steel conversion rates were applied 
to IISCO's saleable steel product mix in 1956. On the 
basis of these calculations it was estimated that the 
excise tax per metric ton of saleable steel amounted to 
approximately Rs«5»00, 
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Slnce adequate data on the other components in this 
category were lacking, no additional calculations were 
attempted. The remaining items, however, were relatively 
minor and no great loss of accuracy resulted from their 
omission, .^_ 
WORKS COST PER TON OF By combining the raw material, 
SALEABLE STEEL - 19^6 T v. ^ 4 4. ^ icu-^Ai^ -uo .^x.t^.u ly^v labour and excise tax costs 
computed previously, a crude 
approximation of the works costs per ton of saleable steel 
could be obtained. The average works costs estimated are 
presented in the Table 6,3, Using the actual input costs 
TABLE 6»3 - WORKS COST PER TON OF SALSABLE STEEL - 19^6 
Works Cost per As ^ of the 
Ton of Sale- Total Cost 
Items ' able Steel 
Raw Materials: 
Power & Fuel 
Iron Ore 
Limestone flux 
Purchased Scrap 
TOTAL RAW MATERIALS 
labour 
Excise 
total Works Cost 
Rs. 55 
Rs. 36 
Rs, 12 
Rs, 1+6 
Rs.1^9 
Rs.110 
Rs« 5 
R3,26l4-
2^% 
5^% 
k2% 
2% 
100jg 
SOURCE: See Tables 6,1, 6.2 and the subject-matter in 
the foregoing paragraphs. 
-(230)-
for 1956, the actual average works cost per ton of sale-
able steel was estimated to be Rs,26if. This figure was 
remarkably close to the works cost estimate prepared by 
the Indian Tariff Coaunission at that time. Working with 
detailed cost data supplied by IISCO, the Cost Accountants 
of the Commission concluded that IISCO's average works 
cost per ton of saleable steel between 1955-56 and 1956-57 
amovinted to Rs«266, Thus the estimate derived in the 
present study is a reasonable approximation of the actual 
works cost during 1956. 
OVEBHEADS Remaining components of the steel 
• retention price were classified as 
'Overheads^ by the Tariff Commission. The major items 
contained in this category were depreciation and return 
on • fixed capital, interest on working capital, and some 
minor non-capital items such as selling and administra-
tive expenses. Compared to its assessment of works cost, 
however, the Tariff Commission's estimates of overheads 
co\ild be considered rather arbitrary, since these were 
o 
obtained, for the most part, by applying fixed formulae 
to the asset and cost structure of the highest cost producer, 
IISCO. As a restat, in this section each of the overhead 
compcaaents of the steel price must be assessed in order 
1. Tariff Commission, 1956, Report, p.10. 
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to determine whether the formulae adopted by the Commission 
provided an accurate reflection of the costs involved. The 
non-capital items will be Investigated first, followed by 
an assessment., of the charges provided for working and fixed 
capital, 
NON-CAPITAL OVERHEADS PEA TON OF SALEABLE STEEL 
The noncapital items arbitrarily included within the 
overheads category by the Tariff Commission were selling 
expenses, margin for contingencies, and head office 
expenses; selling expenses were allowed by the Tariff 
Commission at Rs,2 per ton of saleable steel, a figure accep-
ted by the firm as being representative of the actual costs 
incurred. As regards the margin for contingencies, Rs,5 
per ton was included in its retention price "so as to cover 
any possible increases in the prices of materials, etc., 
during the later part of the year. Finally, although head 
office (administrative) expenses were not explicitly 
expressed on a per ton basis by the Commission, it was 
possible to compute this figure. The head office expense 
per year of IISCO was estimated to be Rs,2,311,000 which 
was then divided by IISCO's actual output of ssileable steel 
in 1955-56 Eind in 1956-57 yielded a per ton cost of approxi-
mately Rs«5» The sum of these non-capital compcaients of 
overhead amounted to Rs,12 per ton of saleable st*el in 1956, 
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INTEREST ON WORKING The T a r i f f Commission a l s o 
CAPITAL 
allowed interest on the 
working capital of the 
producers as an explicit cost item which was to be included 
in the steel price. The need for such capital on the 
part of the steel producers is large because substantial 
quantities of steel are always in process or in inventory. 
Indeed it has been estimated that fire months' production 
remained in process or in th^orm of semi-finished or 
finished steel. Moreover, large stocks of raw materials, 
stores, and spares have to be maintained for an efficient 
operation of the plant. 
The method used by the Commissic»i for establishing 
the appropriate interest cost per ton of saleable steel 
was somewhSt arbitrary. Due to the difficulties associated 
with determining the- exact amount of working capital 
required, the Commission assiimed that the working 
capital requirements of the producers were equivalent 
to six months* works cost. Jjnteirest on this estimate 
of working capital was<,then allowed at M-,5 per cent, a 
figure which was traditionally 1 per cent above the 
•J 
official bank rate, 
1, Tariff Commission, 1956, Report, p.^. 
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It was necessary to examine whether the true costs 
associated with working capital were accurately reflected 
by this procedure. The hase, six months' works costs, 
was considered by the firms to yield a close approxima-
tion of their working capital requirements. The interest 
rate allowed, however, while sufficient in terms of the 
actual short-term rates existing in the country at that 
time, did not reflect the true market value of short-
term capital in India, 
Two estimates of the interest cost on working capital 
per ton of saleable steel were thus calculated, one based 
on the actual interest rate used by the Commission, the 
other based on the estimated true rate. Both rates were 
applied to the six months' works cost of IISCO in 1956, 
which was calculated to be Es,131 per ton of saleable 
1 ~ 
steel. At ^ -,5 P^ i* cent, the actual Interest cost on 
working capital per ton of saleable steel amounted to 
Rs«6, The true interest cost per ton, on the other hand, 
was estimated to be Rs.10, if the 7*5 P®^ cent interest 
rate was used. The Tarfff. Commission's estimate of the 
interest cost on working capital per ton of saleable 
steel was thus Rs,U-/- less on this basis. 
1 • This figure was obtained by dividing the works cost per 
ton of Rs,26^ calculated in the study by me. See 
Table 6,3, 
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DEPBECIATION AKD RETUEK The largest and most arbit-
ON FIXED CAPITAL 
rary components of overhead 
were those associated with 
fixed capital. The amount of depreciation and return 
allowed by the Tariff Commission per ton of saleable 
steel was generally determined by the application of a 
rate formula to the fixed capital base of the highest cost 
producers. 
Thus before analysing the rate formulae and conse-
quent amounts allowed per ton of saleable steel, the rate 
base itself inust be brie'fly discussed. 
The fixed capital base on which the return and depre-
ciation were calculated was termed "gross block", a 
concept devised expressly by the Tariff Conmission for the 
purpose of price fixing. Gross block could be defined 
loosely as a firm's undepreciated, original capital invest-
ment in fixed assets. The compositon of the gross block 
was either arbitrary, since the decision as to which 
capital assets were to be Included within the block was 
the result of long negotiations between the Tariff Commission 
and the producers. For example, although Aiany ancillary 
facilities such as town buildings and raw material leases 
had been specifically treated as an integral part of the 
gross block since 19^ +7, company-owned collieries were not 
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included until 195^* For purpose of price fixing, the firms 
desired the largest block possible, since the return and 
depreciation allowed by the ComiDission were based on a 
fixed percentage of this block. 
In 1956, the fixed capital base employed by the Tariff 
Commission was the IISCO's gross block per ton of sale-
able steel output. Although the exact figure was not 
presented in the Tariff Commission's 1956 Report, a crude 
estimate was obtained by dividing IISCO's saleable steel 
output into its gross block for both 1955-56 and 1956-57 
and then taking the average of the two years. On the 
basis of the data presented in the Table 6,'4-, it was 
TABLE e^h - ESTIMATE OF IISCO'S GROSS BLOCK PER TON OF 
SALEABLE STEEL 
^' (RS.CROEES) 
Ttem 1955-56 1956-57 Average 
Gross Block 21.^2 22.85 
Saleable Steel 
(Metric tons) H60,159.09«t50,812.00 
Gross block per 
ton of saleable steel W65.Q0 507*00 W65.00 
SOURCES; Gross block and saleable steel figures obtained 
from IISCO, Awmal Report, 1955-56, 1956-57, Po27 
estimated that IISCO's gross block per ton of saleable steel 
in 1956 amounted to Rs.if65» 
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The gross block.per ton figure obtained for IISCO 
reflected the original cost of the company's fixed assets, 
however, not their replacenient cost. Indeed, the capital 
cost per ton of a new plant would have been substantially 
higher, Althoiigh there has been a long debate in the 
public over the relative merits of the original versus 
reproduction cost as the appropriate rate base, the weight 
of opinion today inclines towa3:^ s original cost* Moreover, 
in view of the static nature of the analysis of the present 
chapter, it was-felt that original cost was the most 
appropriate base on which to compute depreciation and 
return. With this background, the depreciation and return 
components of retention price can now be discussed, 
DEPEECIATION COST PEH It was the policy of the 
TON OF SALEABLE STEEL tariff Commission to include-
an allowance in the steel 
price for the depreciation of the producer's fixed capital. 
The depreciation charge was in the nature of an operating 
expense because it "reflected the systemmatic and gradual 
transfer of capital costs into a series of charges to 
current operations during the estimated useful lives of 
the fixed assets. In this way, an attempt was made to 
apportion the costs of the assets among the years during 
which they performed their services instead of charging 
them in lumps either in the year of acquisition or of 
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retirement. There were, of course, many methods of allo-
cating these charges and the final procedure adopted was, 
in the final analysis, rather arbitrary. 
The initial policy of the Tariff Commission'In 19^ +9 
was to allow •normal' depreciaticai on the gross block. 
According to the Income Tax Act, normal depreciaion was 
to be calculated by applying a rate of 10 per cent to the 
"written down value" of these assets. In order to enable 
the industry to carry out all the replacements and improve-
ments which were considered essential for maintaining plant 
facilities and to stabilize production, however, a special 
depreciation in excess of normal depreciation was allowed 
in 1951• The Tariff Commission stipulated that this 
extra depreciation, amounting to Rs»5|000,000 per year for 
TISCO and Rs. 51,98,000 for IISCO, should not be treated 
as profits for the purpose of determining the profit-
sharing bonus or thfe managing agency commission and that 
the companies should actually set apart the total amount 
in a special plant and rehabilitation fund* Moreover, from 
1953 onwai^ i, depreciation wjas also allowed at 6-1A per 
cent on fresh additi<ais to gross block over and above 
the normal and special depreciation referred to above. 
Finally, in 1955» the government allowed the producers. 
1« Tariff Commission, I962 Report, p.22« The subsequent 
discussion is derived from this source. 
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a "development rebate" or tax-credit amoiinting to 25 per 
cent of the nev capital investment in plant and equipment. 
Thus the firms, in effect, could depreciate 25 per cent of 
their new capital additions. All of these additional dep-
reciations' allowances were designed to enable the firms 
to obtain a portion of their capital requirements for 
replacement and expansion from internal sources. 
To ascertain the most appropriate amount of deprecia-
tion to be included in the steel price as an operating 
expense, it w^s decided in the present study to exclude 
the development rebate and special depreciation. Both of 
these allowances were over and above the original cost of 
the capital assets and, in line with the procedure adopted 
with respect to gross block, were considered to belong 
more appropriately under profits. Additional support ^ r 
this treatment of depreciation coxild be derived from the 
fact that TISCO included these items as components of its 
profits.^ 
For the purposes of the present study, a crude 
estimate of the depreciation per ton of saleable steel 
was obtained by dividing IISCO's normal depreciation 
allowance for each of the years 1955-56 and 1956-57 as 
presented in the Tariff Commission's 1956 Report by its 
production of saleable steel in those years and then 
computing their average. On the basis of the data 
1. TISCO, Annual Report, 1962-63, p,26 
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presented in the Table 6,5» i* was estimated that the 
depreciation cost per ton of saleable steel in 1956 ajnoimted 
TABLE 6.5 - ESTIMATE OF DEPRECIATION COST^ER TON OF 
SALEABLE STEEL- I956 
Items 1955-56 1956-57 Average RS • RS • Ho • 
Normal Depreciation 10,71^,712 12,033,167 
Saleable Steel 
(Metric tons) if60,l59 ^50,812 
Depreciation per ton 
of saleable steel 2^*88 26*56 25o72 
SOURCE: Tariff Commission, 1956 Report, p«9 
to Rs«2if.88o 
o — 
The depreciation charge estimated in this computation 
appeared to be closely related to the technical or engi-
neering lives of the producer's fixed capital assets. The 
majority of the assets in a steel plant possess a useful 
life of frcaa twelve to twenty-five years with twenty years 
considered as ^ erage* » On a straight line basis, a uni-
form depreciation rate of 5 per cent on gross block would 
constitute a reasonable allocation to costs. For India, 
the depreciation allowance of Rs.2U-«88 per ton on a gross 
I0 Tariff Commission, I962 Report, p.30o 
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capital block of Rs,*465 per ton represented a depreciation 
rate on gross block of 5»1 P^r cent. On the basis of 
useful life, the estimate derived here yields a reason-
able approxiiuation of depreciation. 
RATE OF RETUBN The largest and most arbit-
rary component of overheads 
was the retuiTi or profit allowed the producers. The 
return represented the excess in operating revenues over 
and above current operating deductions, including allowances 
for depreciation and interest and working capital. In 
India, however, the Tariff Commission did not allow the 
mamaging agency commission, profit-sharing bonus, or 
corporate profits taxes as separate items of cost, and 
the producers had to meet these items from the return. 
The producers of iron and steel had long maintained 
that the return allowed on their gross block was too low 
and unfair. If it could be demonstrated that the return 
allowed was too low by some objective standard, then 
the retention price of steel established by the Commission 
was not fair. In this section, it is thus necessary to 
examine whether the claims of the producers with respect 
to rate of return were valid in 1956» 
1« See Tables 6,if and 6.5 
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The standard practice followed by the Tariff Connnission, 
as judged by the majority of its reports, was to allow a 
return of 8 per cent by way of profits on the gross block 
of the highest cost producer. *^ "In the 1956 price inquiry, 
however, the Conanission felt that a higher return than 
8 per cent was reqtiired so that the producers could "obtain 
a reasonable proportion of their capital requirements from 
2 internal sources," The actual rate of return allowed the 
highest cost producer, IISCO, was not explicitly stated 
in the Tariff Commission's 1956 Report and thus had to be 
computed indirectly. 
TABLE 6.6 - ESTIMATION OF BETURN PER TON OF SALEABLE 
STEEL FOR IISCO - 1956 
Average price of steel 
(Including miscellaneous recoveries) Rs« 396 
LESS : 
Works cost 
Selling costs 
Head Office Costs 
Margin for contingencies 
Depreciation 
Interest on Working Capital 
Return per tonne of steel 
Gross Block per ton 
Rate of Return 
Rs, 
SOURCE: See Tables 6.3, 6«if and 6.5. 
26I+.OO 
2o00 
5.00 
5«oo 
25.72 
5o90 
-
307.62 
88.38 
Rs.V86.00 
18.18^ 
1• The concept profit is used in its accounting sense rather 
its pure economic sense. 
2» Tariff Commission, 1956 Report, p.M-. 
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An approximation of the return allowed IISCO was 
obtained by subtracting the actual operating costs pre-
viously calciilated in this study from the weighted average 
retention price per ton of saleable steel iiltimately estab-
lished by the Tariff Comraission In 1956.^ The data on 
which this calculation was based are summarised in Table 
6,7» Depreciation, actual interest on working capitaJL, 
TABLE 6.7 - ESTIMATE OF ADJUSTED BETURN PER TON OF 
SALEABLE STEEL FOR IISCO - 1956. 
Average Price of Steel 
LESS : 
Works Cost Rs, 
Selling Costs 
Head Office Cost 
Margin for contingencies 
Depreciation 
Interest on Working Capital 
Managing Agency Cc»mnission 
Total Operating Costs 
Return per ton of saleable steel 
• 
.26^ -,00 
2.00 
5.00 
0— 
25«72 
^•90 
7.23 
Rate of Return 
Gross block per ton of saleable steel 
Rs« 
-• 
Rs« 
Rs, 
Rs. 
o -
396,00 
31^.85 
81.15 
16.7J? 
W6.00 
SOURCE: See Table 6.6 and also the text, 
selling and administrative costs, and margin for contin-
1. To the price of saleable steel, however, was added an 
allowance for miscellaneous recoveries resulting from 
the sale of by-products, surplus coke, and surplus pig 
iron as provided for IISCO, I 
-(2lf3)-
gencles were included as components of the operating costs 
along with the actual works cost. On the basis of these 
data, it was estimated that the return per ton of sale-
able steel amounted to Rs«88ft38« 
Given this figure, the rate of return on gross block 
could be easily calculated. The previously obtained 
estimate of IISCO GROSS BLOCK PER TON of saleable steel, 
which the Tariff Conunission had considered the appropriate 
rate base, was divided into the above return per ton. 
On the basis of this computationy the crude rate of return 
was estimated to be 18«$ per cent for the highest cost 
producer, IISCO, in 1956« (See Table 606 for calculations.) 
One could argue that the rate of return figure was 
too high due to the use of actual costs in the calcula-
ticai euid the failure to Include the managing agency 
commission as a cost component. Thus an alternative 
computation of the rate of return was constructed in 
which these factors were taken into consideration. 
The data from which the return was computed are 
reproduced in Table 64>7» The adjusted works cost figure 
as well as the previously derived estimate of the true 
interest on working capital were utilised in calculating 
the operating costs. Moreover, an estimate of the 
managing agency commission per ton of saleable steel was 
«(2Mf)-
also included, since this factor coiild be considered an 
operating cost rather than a component of return. Although 
no such statistics existed, an approximation, was obtained 
by dividing IISCO's actual managing agency commission by 
its saleable steel output in both 1955-56 and 1956-57, and 
it vas estimated that the managing agency commission 
amounted to Rs,7.23 per ton of saleable steel in 1956* 
If these adjusted costs were utilised in the 
calculation, the rate of return on gross block In steel 
industry would have amovinted to T6.7 per cent (Table 6»7)o 
Thus, the rate of return declined by only 1*5 per cent 
approximately after all the adjustments in operating costs 
had been made* 
In order to check the validity of these indirect esti-
mates of the rate of retum,*~a direct calculation was 
attempted, utilising the data contained in the annual 
reports of IISCO for 1955-56 and 1956-57» A number of 
adjustments had to be made in IISCO»s reported profits 
figure to make it consistent with the concept of return 
used in the previous estimates. For exsaaple, the alloca-
tions to general reserves aind works and iron ore extensions 
reserve in the Profit & Loss Account were deducted by 
IISCO*s cost accountants before obtaining the reported 
profits figure. Since in normal accounting practices, these 
items are treated as comp<xients of profits, these two 
.(2lf5)-
items had to be added to IISCO's reported profits figures 
in the present study. Moreover, appropriations to the 
Plant and Rehabilitation Fund, development rebate reserve 
and extension,^.special reserve, all reserve funds out of 
which new Investment was to be financed, were also added 
to the reported profits figure. This corresponded with 
the treatment accorded these items In the previous deter-
HJination of the rate of return. Finally, the provision 
for Income taxition was added to the reported profits 
in order to obtain a figure inclusive of the corporate 
profits tax. The relevant data from which IISCO's return 
for the years 1955-56 and 1956-57 was calculated are 
suDnnarised in Table 6«S« 
TABLE 6.8 - ESTIMATE OP BATE OP RETURN FOR IISCO 
Item 1955-56 1956-57 
RS. RS. 
Reported Profits 25,008,383 22,088,201 
Plant & Rehabilitation Fund 5,9^7,620 if,508,196 
Development Rebate Reserve 699,720 ' 9^9,620 
Extension Special Reserve 2,9^+6,658 2,369,052 
Taxation Provision 27,988,800 31,887,2^ 
TOTAL ESTIMATED PROFIT 62,5^1,181 61,802,309 
Gross Block 21U-,200,000 228,500,000 
Bate of Return 30^^% 26«1Jf 
SOURCE: IISCO, Annual Report, 1955-56, 1956-57, pp.l8-19 
1» In 1956, the corporate profits tax amounted to M-5 per 
cent CO gross profits (See Taxation In India, p«332,) 
-(2^6)^ 
On the basis of these figures a direct estimate of 
IISCO's rate of return o^lross block could be obtained. 
By dividing the computed return for the two years by IISCO's 
corresponding gross blocks for these years and then avera-
ging the two resulting rates, it was estimated that IISCO's 
rate of return on gross block for this period amoimted to 
26«1 per cent* There are grounds for discounting this 
figure somev/hat in Yiew of the peculiar manner in which 
IISCO presented the data in its Final Accounts, Nevertheless, 
the results of the direct computation of return did indi-
cate that the previous indirect estimates of the rate 
of return on gross block were not unduly low. 
Assuming for the moment that 18«7 per cent represented 
a reasonable approximation of the actual rate of return 
on gross block in>-the iron and steel industry for 1956, 
it was essential to determine whether this late was adequate 
or fair* For the purpose of the present st\idy, three 
criteria of adequacy were used: (1) the marginal rate 
of return on capital, (2) the rate of return earned by 
the steel industries In other countries, and (3) the 
o 
rate of return considered as a minimum by persons associated 
with the industry. 
According to economic theory, the rate of return 
allowed the industry should have been at least as high as 
the marginal rate of return on general capital. This 
'{2k-7)" 
figure represented the opportunity cost of capital to the 
economy and thus the miniinum return that had to be earned 
by any viable industry. Although estimates of the margi-
nalwrate of return on general capital varied, the esti-
mates of most analysis ranged from 10 to 15 per cent» 
The rate of return earned by the iron and steel industry, 
however, exceeded 15 per cent, and thus by this criterion 
the industry's rate of return must be considered adequate* 
The second criterion of adequacy adopted was the 
rate of return earned in the iron and steel industries of 
the developed nations. If the rate of return earned by 
the Indian iron and steel industry was found ^" substan-
tially below rates of return obtained in other countries, 
then groimds would exist for considering the profit rate 
too low. Thus estimates of the return on gross block in 
the steel industries of the United States and the Itaited 
Kingdom were calculated to serve as a standard comparison* 
AS Table 6«9 demonstrates, the rate of return earned by 
TABLE 6»9 • ESTIMATES OF RATE OF RETURN ON GROSS FIXED 
ASSETS IN THE STEEL INDUSTRIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
Country 1956 1957 1958 
U,S.A« 17^ 9«^  16^0 9^ 0 
P»K, 20.8 18 17.7 
SOURCE: Computed from Welfred Ifelenbaum. Comparative Costs 
And Economic Development, pp*39o-397» 
1o Johnson, W,A., The Steel Industry of India, pp»256-.7» 
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these two coimtries did not differ markedly from the 
rate of return of our steel industry. Indeed, the actual 
rate of return on gross block here in 1956 was slightly 
above that earned in tjae United States and only 2 per 
cent below that earned in the United Kingdom, Despite the 
limitations in the data and in the caQ.culation proceudres 
used, it must be concluded that the rate of return here 
was not low even by world standards, 
AS a final criterion, the long-run rate of return on 
gross block that persons associated with the steel 
industry considered to be the minimum essential for the 
economic production of steel in India was adopted, 
M.D.J, Brisby maintained that a return on gross block of*""" 
12 per cent was required by the Indian Iron and Steel 
Industrjjj^ .. The 18,7 per cent rate of return earned by 
our ircai and steel industry in 1956 clearly satisfied 
this criterion. 
On the basis of all the three criteria proposed in 
this study, the rate of return on gross block was found 
to be adequate in 19^6, The, average retention price, the 
sum of works cost and overheads was sufficient to cover 
all operating costs as well as to provide an adequate or 
more than adequate rate of return to the industry. 
1, Brisby, M.D.J"., The Development of a Steel Industry • 
Pattern Affecting The Economics of Steel, , pp,35-^* 
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COST-PRICE EELATIONSKIP AFTER With the expansion 
EXPANSION OF THE IRON & STEEL 
INDUSTRY of the industry's 
capacity after 
1956, a new structure of costs emerged as new firms 
entered the industry and old firms expanded their exis-
ting capacities. To evaluate properly whether the prices 
of the steel industry were fixed at a level yielding a 
fair return on capital, the unit, costs of this Industry 
were examined. 
The following method of analysis was adopted. The 
works cost and capital costs incurred by the major iron 
and steel producers were first examined in detail for 
the fiscal year I96I-62, the year the industry's Initial 
expainsion programmes were completed. In that year, the 
Tariff Connnission published a detailed analysis of <»he 
estimated saleable steel cost both at the 196l'-62 levels 
and at the levels of production assximed to be optimum. 
Armed with these data, the rate of return on capital 
earned by the highest cost producer could then be calculated 
and compared with the opportunity cost of this capital. 
However, since the Tariff Commission provided only estimated 
cost data for these firms and since the optimum levels of 
production were not actually attained or exceeded by these 
firms until the 196^-65 fiscal year, it was necessary to 
undertake a second analysis in which the rate of return 
-(250)-
of the marginal producer woxild be calculated in 196^65. 
To assess the adequacy of the present pricing policy which 
is marked by partial decontrol of steel prices, the rats 
return of public steel enterprises has been computed* 
As g^lrst step in the analysis, estimates of the unit 
cost of production incurred by the major mills in ^^6^ 
must be examined* This investigation will not only 
illustrate what happened to costs as a result of the 
expansion in the industry's capacity, but will also reveal 
which of the mills appeared to be the highest cost producer, 
WORKS COSTS PER TON Crude estimates of the works 
OF SALEABLE STEEL - 1961* ^ ^ ^ ^ ,^. 
^J: ww^iz..tujx^ K,j.i:^x, LZiLL* cost incurred.^y the major 
producer in 1961 are shown 
in Table 6«10. These figures were prepared by the cost 
accotmtants of the Tariff Commission on the basis of a 
detailed examination of the books of both the public and 
private producers* Although the Commission did express 
some reservations about the methods of accounting and 
costing used by the public sector mills, it felt that 
the data on the whole were quite reliable. 
Focussing first on the change in works costs between 
1956 and 1961, it was clear that the works costs of the 
major private producers increased with the expansion In 
industry's capacity. The average works cost of IISCO, 
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for example, was HSo358 per ton of saleable steel In I96I 
compared to Rs* 26^ per ton In 1956, an Increase of approxi-
mately 37 per cent. Although a detailed break~down of the 
works cost components was not provided in the Tariff 
Commission's 1962 Report, a brief picture of the nature of 
this cost increase can be gained from other sources* 
One of the more obvious causes of the higher 
works cost was the increase in the excise tajc on steel ingots. 
In 1957» the govemmen^t raised the excise tax on this product 
from Rs©V to Rs»UO per tcaio The change in thfe tax was 
affected solely to increase the revenue. 
The changes in the remaining components of the works 
cost, on the other hand, were more directly related to the 
increase in the industry's capacityo Table 6«11 is an index 
T.4BLE 6.11 - INDEX OF IISCO'S WORKS COST COMPONENTS - 196I 
(1956-57 = 100) 
Labour cost per ton of 
saleable steel* 93*6 
Eaw-material pit head cost 
per ton of saleable steel 135o2 
Raw-material transport cost 
per ton of saleable steel 162»8 
SOURCE: The index is computed from the Chairman's Statement 
dealing with the year ended March, I96I, Economics 
Times, April 20, I96I0 
NOTE : * Labour cost includes "Fringe benefits" also* 
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of the ma;)or works cost components computed from the 
Chairman's statement dealing with the year ended March, 
1961. 
According to these data, labour costs per ton of 
saleable steel actually declined by over 6 per cent during 
this period despite the increase in total works cost. As 
noted in the previous section of this chapter, the private 
mills had accumiilated an excessive amoimt of workers on 
their rolls during the late forties and early fifties. 
However, by not being substantial numbers of additional 
workers as their plants were expanded, and through the 
retrenchment of their labour forces, the private mills were 
able to reduce the sizes of their work forces during the 
Second Five Year Plan, Thus despite a constant increase 
in the wage costs per labourer, *the mills were able_^decrease 
their labour costs per ton of steel with the increase in 
their capacities. 
The raw-material pit-head costs per ton of saleable 
steel, on the other hand, increased by approximately 35 
per cent between 1956 and 196I0 One of the©causes of 
this rise was the increase in the pit-head prices of the 
ma;jor steel making raw materials. Between 1955 and I96I, 
for example, IISCO's pit-coal prices increased 56 per 
cent, its pit-head iron ore prices increased ^1 per cent 
-(25^)^ 
and Its pit-head limestone price increased 3^ per cent. 
The major cause of this increase was the deterioration 
in the quality of the materials used by the industry. To 
some extent, the effects of the poorer quality of raw 
materials were offset by the improved technology of raw 
material preparation and coke and pig iron production at 
plants. But despite these improved techniques, the raw 
material input co-efficierts for the two private mills 
were higher, except for iron ore in 1961 than in 1956 
(Table 6.12). 
TABLE 6,12 - RAW MATERIAL CONSUMEaO UJ THE BLAST FURNACE 
PER TON OF PIG IRON PRODUCED IN TISCO & IISCO « 1956 & 1961 
Year Iron Ore Coke Limestone 
1956 n6l ^_ 0*883 0.357 
1961 1.59 0,932 0,391 
SOURCE: CalcTolated fro^ J the data presented in Iron & Steel 
controller, Monthly Bulletin, Various months 
(April 1961 to Jfarch 1962). 
The cost of transporting these raw materials to the 
mills, however, Increased at an even faster rate than the 
pit-head costs of the materials. During this period the 
Railway Board awarded the rail-road generous rate increase, 
partially to compensate for its deiay in raising these 
rates. Thus, between 1956 and 196I, the increase in the 
-(255)-
works cost of the existing plants was primarily traceable 
to the higher railraod rates, the deterioration in the 
quality of the steel making raw materials, the higher raw 
niateriar*Tpit-head prices and the increase in the excise 
duty on steel ingots. 
Although the works cost of the private plants had 
increased with the expansion in the industry's capacity, 
their works costs in 196I were still lower than those of 
the new public sector plants* This factor is shown clearly 
by comparing the probable 1961-62 works costs of these 
plants presented in the Table 6«10« If the TISCO was to 
produce the same eombinatlon of products as did the public 
steel plants in I96I, TISCO's average works cost per ton 
of saleable steel woiild have been approximately the same 
as Rourkela's or Bhilai•'s probable average works costs per 
ton. 
One reason for the higher works costs incurred by the 
public sector steel mills was that these units had not yet 
normalised their operations. As Table 6»13 demonstrates, 
the public sector plants in 1961-62 were still producing 
saleable steel at levels substantially below their rated 
capacities. Since a portion of the works costs were in 
the nature of either fixed or smi-fixed charges, the works 
cost per ton of output should decline as the mills operate 
"(256)-
TABLE 6»13 - PBODUCTIOK OF SALEABLE STEEL AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF RATED CAPACITT 
Actual rated Production as per cent 
capacity of capacity 
(millions of 1961-62 196^-65 
metric tons) Plant 
TISCO 1.52 87 103 
IISCO Go 81 91 93 
Bhilai 0.77 71 1l8 . 
Durgapur 0»82 kk 88 
Rourkela 0<,72 26 96 
SOURCE: Tariff Commission, 1962 Report, and Hindustan Steel 
Ltd., Statistics For Iron and Steel Industry of India, 
1970, P.7. 
closer to their rated capacities. Fortunately, the Tariff 
Commission also prepared estimates of the works costs of 
the three jjublic sector mills on the assumption that their 
optimum level of production at 90 per cent of capacity had 
been achieved. These estimates of the works costs at what 
the Commission considered to be an optimum level of produc-
tion are shown in Table 6o10# 
According to these data, however, the works costs of 
o 
both Durgapur and Bhilai continued to remain above the 
costs of the private sector plants even if these plants 
of the public sector operated at their optimum levels of 
production. For example, If Bhilai and Durgapur produced 
at 90 per cent of their rated capacities, their average 
-(257)-
works cost per ton of output would have been 11 and 9 per 
cents higher respectively th*"an the average works costs of 
TISCO's mill producing the same combination of products. 
Inde^, the Bhilai mill, even if it had operated at 90 per 
cent capacity, would possess the highest average works cost 
per ton of saleable steel at that time - Rs;378, The 
Durgapur mill closely followed with an average works cost 
of ' .' Rs«368 per ton, a works cost still Rs» 31 per ton 
above that of TISCO. The cause of higher works cost at 
Bhilai and Durgapur extended beyond their failure to 
operate at the optimum levels of production. 
Although the new public sector steel plants were able 
to instal the most modem and efficient methods of production, 
this advantage was reduced by a number of offsetting factors. 
The public sector mills, for example, were not as favourably 
located with respect to their supplies of raw materials 
as were the private sector mills, As Table 6»lU- demonstrates, 
the ton-mile requirements of iron ore and coal to produce 
one ton of pig iron at the public sector mills substantially 
exceeded those at the private sector mills. 
Moreover, the new mills had difficulties in obtaining 
the needed number of experienced personnel to operate their 
plants. Although these mills were able to draw upon TISCO 
and IISCO for some of their skilled labour requirements, 
1, See Table 6,10. 
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there were not clearly enough experienced personnel to 
fill the industry's needs after 1956« Thus the new 
mills had to employ a large nujoaber of fresh college 
graduates in positions normally filled by seasoned 
workmen. 
TABLE 6^^k - TON-MILES OF COAL AKD IRON ORE PER TON OF 
PIG IRON - 1961 
Plan t Ton-Miles 
TISCO 2^8 
iisco 322 
Durgapur h^6 
Rourkela U^2 
Bhilai 731 
SOURCE:*^Johnson, The Steel Industry of India, pp. 2lf5-82. 
In addition to fill a part of this skilled labour 
gap, these mills were forced to Import many high cost 
technicians from abroad to assist in the operation of 
their plants. In tfce last week of 1963, for example, there 
were 333 foreign personnel in maintenance or production 
positions within the three public sector mills» The 
works cost differential between the public and private 
1. Hindustan Steel Ltd., Statistics for Ircji & Steel 
Industry in India, 1966, p.192* 
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sector firms in I96I was largely traceable to the shortage 
of skilled and experienced workers at the public sector 
plants and to the less favourable location of their 
plants with respect to raw material sources. 
CAPITAL COSTS PER TON OF 
SALEABLE STEEL - I96I: 
The capital costs of 
the new mills also 
exceeded those of 
the old established plants in I96U This fact is 
clearly shown in Table 6p^% in which the capital costs 
TABLE 6.15 - CAPITAL COSTS PER TON OF SALEABLE STEEL 
CAPACITY. 
Plant 
Tariff Commission's 
1961-62 Estimates 
Actual capacity cost 
per ton 
After comp- After comp- After com- Jlfter comp-
letion of letion of pletion of leticaa of 
II Plants III Plan«s II Plan's III Plan»s 
Expansion E:cpansion Expansion Expansion 
TISCO 
I I SCO 
Durgapur 
Rourkela 
Bhi la i 
Rs« 1558 
1115 
21lf3 
3261 
2250 
RS» 1558 
1115 
1852 
2566 
1563 
Hs* I3M 
1131 
2385 
3056 
2623 
Rs.13^1 
1131 
2130 
3097 
I8if7 
SOURCE: Tariff Commission«s, 1962 Report, pp»93-9S (For 
Tariff Commission's 1961-62 Estimates). 
Hindustan Steel Ltd., Eleventh Annual Report, p. 17, 
and Fifteenth AnnueJ- Report, p.17. and Statistics 
For Iron & Steel industry, 1966, (For capital cost 
data)• 
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or gross blocks, of the public and private sector mills 
are expressed per ton of their respective saleable steel 
capacities. 
The inflation in plant and equipmeftt costs was 
primarily responsible for the capital cost differential 
between the public and private sector mills. As mentioned 
previously, between the late forties and late fifties, the 
cost of plant and equipment increased over 60 per cent* 
Since a substantial portion of TISCO's and IISCO's gross 
block represented plant and equipment purchased before' 
1956, their gross blocks per ton of capacity were thus 
2 
below those of the newer public sector mills. 
The Tariff Commission expected that public sector 
mills' capital costs per ton of capacity, however, would 
decline after their planned expansion programmes were 
completed. The cost of expanding an established mill would 
have been much less than the initial cost of erecting the 
new public sector mills due to the existence of excess 
capacity in certain indivisible plant and ancillary units. 
1, See the text of this chapter. Some of the increase in 
cost, however, reflected improvements in the x^ lant and 
equipment, 
2, According to the Tariff Commission, 1956 Report, p,2^, 
"Thirty per cent of TISCO*s block represented plant and 
machinery purchased befo^ 195^*" 
-(261)-
For example, the cost of expanding IISCO's mill during the 
fifties amoiinted to Rs«93lf per ton of saleable steel capa-
city, while the cost of erecting Bhilai*s first stage of 
capacity, which occured at approximately the same time, 
1 
amovmted to RSo2,127 per ton, Bhilai's capital cost per 
ton of capacity, however, was estimated to decline to 
Rso1,^ 77<.98 per ton after the mill's capacity had been 
expanded from 1 million to 2*5 million ingot tons. Yet, 
even at that point, it was estimated that its costs per 
ton of capacity would still exceed those of the private 
sector mlllSo 
Aincaig the public sector plants, the Tariff Commission 
estimated that Rourkela's capital costs per tcaa of sale-
able steel wo\ald exceed Bhilai's, This results, however, 
because the Rourkela mill was to specialise In the 
production of flat products, which are nore costly to 
produce, Bhilai's capital cost advantage over Rourkela, 
however, was more than offset by the higher works costs 
Bhilai possessed and by the lower prices Bhilai's products 
commanded,* On the basis of this brief analysis, it 
appeared that from the perspective of the Tariff Commission 
in 1961-62 the marginal producer was the new public sector 
plant at Bhilai, The plant possessed not only the highest 
1, IISCO's cost per ton figure was calculated from data 
presented in the Planning Commission, Programmes of 
Industrial Development, 19^6-61, ppft2-6, 
2o See Table 6«16 
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estimated works cost but also the second highest capital 
costs' per ton of capacity. Thus the Bhilai plant was the 
marginal firm used in the subsequent analysis. 
ifw-^  
RATE OF BETUM ESTIMATE, 1961»62; 
Given data on the estimated imit costs of the marginal 
steel producer in 196I, it was possible to evaluate whether 
the prices determined by the Government were consistent 
with the fair return on capital. 
The cost data from which these rates were computed 
are summarised ±0 the Table 6«,16, The Tariff Commission 
TABLE 6«16 « ESTIMATES OP EETUM ON CAPITAL EARNED BY 
BHILAI PLANT BASED ON TARIFF COMMISSION»S ESTIMATES, 
1961-62 
In i t i a l , capacity Expanded capacity (1 mil l ion ingot (2»5 mil l ion ingot 
Items tons) tons) 
Average c.i^f. import 
price R3. 6 ^ Rs, 6N-8 
Cost of production Rs,378 RSo378 
Interest on working 
capital lV 
Other expenses 06 
Miscellaneous 
Recoveries -02 
Depreciation II3 
Return 
Capital cost per ton 
of saleable steel 
Rate of Return on 
capital 6^ 11^ 
SOURCE : Tables 6.10, 6»17, 6.I6. 
Tariff Commission, I962 Report, p»Mf (For other 
expenses figu^s). 
511 
137 
2250 
06 
- 02 
J8 W76 
172 
1563 
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esimates of Bhilai's works costs when this mill was opera-
ting at its optimum level of production were assumed to 
provide a reasonable first estimate of the works cost of 
the marginal firm both at th? initisil level of capacity 
and after the completion of its Third Plan expansion 
prograxmne. As for the overhead cost components, interest 
on '. working capital was allowed at 7-1/2 per cent of 
Bhilai's works cost for six months. Finally, the depre-
ciation was allowed at 5 per cent of Bhilai's capital 
block at both its initial and expanded levels of capacity. 
The price used to compute the rates of return earned 
by the Bhilai mill at both levels of capacity was the 
average landed price of imported steel in 1961-62* This 
price was obtained by weighting the prices of the indivi-
dual categories of steel imported 2n that year by the 
product-mix of the Bhilai Steel mill* In that year, 
however, the prices of steel in world markets had been 
depressed as many nations had temporarily found themselves 
with a surplus steel capacity« Thus this price, if 
anything, understated the long-run Import pric% and, 
hence, the rate of return earned by the Bhilai mill» 
On the basis of these estimates (!feble 6» 16), Tariff 
Commission data, gave a rate of return on its capital 6 
1« United Nations Economic Commission For Europe, The 
European Steel f^erket, 1962, pp«7?-77« 
-(26i-*-)~ 
per cent at its initial level of capacity and a return 
11 per cent after it had completed its subsequent expansicai 
programmeo The opportunity cost of the capital, on the 
other hand, was estiroated to be no lower than 10 per 
cent. Although the rate of return earned by Bhilai on its 
capital marginally exceed the lower estimate of 'opportu-
nity cost* of this capital once the plant's capacity had 
been expanded, the rate of return was not significantly 
higher than this required rate« Thus, on the basis of 
these computations, it could not be definitely asserted that 
the highest cost producer of iron and steel possessed a 
comparative advantage in this line of production. 
RATB OF RETURN ESTIMATE, 196tf«.65: 
Although the Tariff Connnission's cost estimates were 
felt to be quite reliable, it must be pointed out that 
these estimates were made in 1961, several years before 
the public sector plants actually reached their optimum 
levels of production. Thus it was considered important to 
calculate the actual rates of return earned by these firms 
in a normal post-expansion year* 
For the purpose of the analysis, the 196J+-65 fiscal 
year woiild appear to be most suitable. By that time, all 
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TABLE 6,17 - ESTIMATES OF RATES OF RETURN ON CAPITAL 
EARNED m BHILAI PLANT BASED ON 196^ 4-65, 
Items 
Initial capacity 
(1 million ingot 
tons) 
Expanded capacity 
(2.5 million ingot 
tons) 
Average c«i«f« price 
Cost of Production 
(ecluding returns) RSoU-29 
Total Works Cost 
Composed of: 
Estimated works 
cost 1961-62 Rs,378 
Adjusted inc-
reases in ingot cost 21 
Adjusted for inc-
reases in steel 
excise tax 30 
Rfro655 Rs*655 
Rs»if29 
Rs.378 
21 
30 
Interest on working 
capital 
Other expenses 
Misc» Recoveries^ 
Depreciation 
TOTAL COST OF PRODUCTION 
Return 
Capital cost per ton 
of saleable steel 
Rate of Return 
16 
6 
- 2 
110 
^ 
559 
96 
220J+ 
^.3% 
16 
6 
« 2 
92 
5^ 4-1 
11^ 
18^7 
6% 
SOUSCES: a - Table 6»l8; b - Table 6»10; c - Table 6,16; 
d - At the initial level 5^ of Bhilai's actual 
capital cost per ton of 196^*65 saleable steel 
output, at the expanded level ^% of Bhilai's 
actxial capital costs per ton of its expanded 
capacity, 
e - At the initial level, actual capital cost 
(Rso2020»5 million) per ton of Bhilai's 196^65 
saleable steel output (9*16.000 tons), at the 
expanded level of capacity (see table 6*l6)e 
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of the public sector plants had normalised their operations, 
and all were producing saleable steel at rates that equalled 
or exceeded their optiraum levels of production. Moreover, 
the operations of these mills had not yet been affected 
by the recession that was to hit the engineering industry 
in the latter part of 1965» 
In order to ascertain the rate of return earned by 
the Bhilai mill in I96U-65, it was necessary to obtain 
data on its costs and prices in that year. Fortianately, 
in 1965 a select committee was appointed by the government 
to examine the reasons for the rising cost of steel in 
India» Its report provided actual cost data that cotad 
be used in this ancdysis. The cost data used to compute 
the 196^65 rate of return are summarised in Table 6,17, 
The works costs were estimated to higher than those 
that had been estimated by the Tariff Commission in 196I-62, 
a difference traceable to higher level of steel ingot costs 
and to a higher steel excise duty, Bhilai's steel ingot 
costs, exclusive of the excise duty, for example, were 
Hs,21 per ton higher than had been estimated previously by^  
the Tariff Commission's estimates of Bhilai's saleable 
steel works costs. As in the earlier period, this increase 
was due 'A primarily to the continued increases in raw 
material costs. 
•K^^^/ ) ' 
The excise duty in 196^65' was also higher than the 
Tariff Commission envisaged in 1961-62. In 1961-62, the 
duty was levied on the steel ingot and amounted to RSo^7oVc 
per ton of Bhilai's saleable steel output. In 196^-65, 
however, the duty was increased and levied at various rates 
on the finished products rather than on the steel ingots. 
On the basis of Bhilai's 196if-65 product-Eix, Bhilai's 
duty now amounted to Rs,77 per ton of saleable steel, an 
increase of Rs«30 over the earlier periodo 
As in the previous analysis, hpwever, it was assumed 
that the works costs estimated for Bhilai's initial level 
of capacity would also hold at its expanded level of 
capacityo In addition, for the cfrerhead components of costs, 
interest on working capital was once again allowed at 7-1/2 
per cent on Bhilai's works costs for six months. Moreover, 
the other minor components were assumed to be vmchanged 
from the previous analysis. Finally, depreciation was 
allowed at 5 P^r cent on the actual capital costs of 
Bhilai's initial plant per ton of its actual saleable steel 
output In 196^65 at 5 per cent of the actual capital costs 
of fehilai's expanded plant per ton of its expanded capacity. 
From an examination of Table 6«16, it is apparent that 
Bhilai's actual capital costs per ton of capacity were 
substantially higher than had been originally envisaged 
by the Tariff Commission« Bhilai's capital cost per ton 
of its actual saleable steel output In 196^6^ was lower 
than the Tariff Commission had estimated, however, because 
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Ehilai was operating at 118 per cent of its saleable steel 
capacity in that year. 
The price used to compute the rates of return for 
Bhilai was the average^ landed price of imported steel in 
196H-65, a price derived by weighting the individual 
import prices by Bhilai's 196^-65 product-mix, As 
Table 6«18 demonstrates, although the prices of steel 
generally were higher in 196U-65 than in I96I-62, the 
TABLE 6«18 - PRICES OF IMPORTED STEEL DURING 1961-65 
Bhilai's Production^ 
Import Price Percentage 
Optimum*^ Actual 
V. capacity 196^65 
Items 1961-62^ 196W65° 196I-62 
Semi-finished steel Rs.562 583 20 28 
Structurals 69I ^ 70^ 37 29 
Rails 617 60if 26 25 
Bars and Rods 699 760 17 18 
SOURCES: (a) Johnson, The Steel Industry of India, Po98. 
(b) Ccmputed from data presented Commercial 
Intelligence and Statistics, Monthly Statistics 
of Foreign Trade of India, March, 1965« 
(c) Computed from the data -presgnted in Tariff 
ComaJission, 1962, Report, pp«5l» 88"and 
Hindustan Steel Ltd,, Statistics For Iron & 
Steel Industry in India, 19660 
(d) Based on Bhilai's product-mix of "Optimum 
Capacity" assumed in 1961-62, 
(e) Based on Bhilai's actual product-iaix in 196lt-.65< 
average price of the type of steel produced at Bhilai 
increased only 1 per cent. 
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Anr.ed with these data, a more accurate estimate of the rate 
of return earned by the marginal steel firm in a normal post-
expansion year could then be calculated. The results of these 
calculations--^ are sumrriarised In Table 6,l6« On the basis of 
196^—65 cost and price data, Bhilai was earning a revised rate 
of return k-^3 per cent at its initial output level sjid a return c 
6 per cent after it had completed its Third Plan expansion 
schere. Both rates of return were lower than those obtained 
when using the Tariff Commission's I96I-62 estimate. Moreover, 
since both of those rates "of return on capital were lower than 
the ^opportunity cost" of capital, it could not be asserted that 
the rsarginal producer of iron and steel received a fair priceo 
RAT£ OF BETURI'J ESTlrlATES, I973..7lf; 
Although the steel prices have been decontrolled partially 
since ija-y^ I967, the basic structure evolved by the I962 Tariff 
Connsission still endures. For the purpose of analysis, the 
1973-7^ fiscal year seemed to be the most suitable year 
because, by that time, the major part of the exapnsion programme 
was complete. The installed capacity «f the public sector 
plants had reached the 5*9 million tons of salable steel mark. 
All these plants were producing steel at optimum level of 
output» 
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All the units of Hindustan Steel Limited earned a 
profit of Bs, ^ ,71 crores on their operations after the 
lapse of about 10 years since 196^65. An examination 
of the FiRancial Accoimts of these imits revealed steeip-
rise in the cost of production which is largely traceable 
to increases in the price of raw-materials, higher wages, 
higher freights and hike in the excise duty. The cost of 
production was higher by Rs, 971 than had been in 196^ *'65. 
Interest on working capital was higher because the public 
sector plants had required more working capital to finance 
their inventories which amounted to nine months' cost of 
production in 1973-7^. As a result, the interest charges 
v/ere higher by Hs, 3^ per ton of salable steel. Though 
the figures for excise duty could not be computed 
separately from ^ he data presented in the financial 
statements of the public steel mills, it v/as, however, 
assessed that the Government raised them substantially 
with the purpose of raising more funds through this 
device. Expansion In production has, indeed, led to 
reduction in capital cost per ton of salable steel 
from Rs. 2,202 In 196^65 to Rs»2,072 In 1973-7^. 
The price used to compute tjie return is the average 
price per ton of the salable steel produced in 1973-7^o 
The data so collected facilitated the estimation of 
return earned by the public sector steel units. The 
^'{27^)'' 
results of these calculations are summarised in Table 6»20, 
TABLE 6020 - ESTIMATE OF RATE OF RETURN ON CAPITAL EAR^ IED 
BY HINDUSTAN STEEL LIMITED IN 1973-7lf, 
Expanded capacity (5'«9 
Items million tons) 
Average Price 
Cost of production (excluding returns): 
Rs,1l400 
Depreciation I85 
Interest on Working capital 69 
Miscellaneous expenses 7 
Miscellaneous recoveries - U^ 
TOTAL COST OF PRODUCTION 
Return 
Capital cost per ton of saleable steel 
Rate of aretum 
RS0I623 
I613 
10 
2072 
.005^ 
SOTJRCE: Hindustan Steel Limited, Annual Report, 1973-7^« 
On the basis of the costs and price data in 1973-7^, Hind-
ustan Steel Ltd. earned a meagre amount of Rs,10 per ton 
of saleable steel in 1973-7^, yielding the rate of 
return #005 per cent. This rate is far below the rate 
of return 6 per cent that had obtained in 196V-65o Had 
the Government given a forward-looking price structure, 
the public sector steel firms would have presented a 
different picture. 
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TRENDS IN COSTS & STEEL The price control is marked 
PRICES 
by two-tier price system. 
The prices paid for steel 
by consumers are not the same as the pri^s received by 
the producers. Rather, until 1973-7^, the integrated steel 
producers received a separate set of prices known as 
retention prices, which were substantially below the 
controlled sales prices. In 1956> for example, the 
average retention price was 53 per cent lower than the 
average sales price, 11 per cent In 196^65 and k-^8 per 
cent in 1973-7^, as demonstrated by Table 6«21» 
TABLE 6,21 - AVERAGE RETENTION AND SALES PRICES FOB 
STEEL PRODUCTS 
Average Price 1956-57 1961-62 196it-65 1973-7^ 
—v • 
Retention^ 
Prices Rs,253*^2 Bs,6k3 Rs.655 Rs,l623 
Wholesale 
Prices 388«76 651 729 1702 
Percent excess 
of wholesale 
prices over 
retention 
prices " 53^ O^^jS 11J^  KQ% 
SOUBCES: a - See Tables 6»7, 6^16 and 6^17. 
b • C.S.O,, Index Number of Wholesale Prices In 
India for various years, 
NOTE; Differential rate of growth in wholseale prices 
have been computed from the above sources by the 
scholaro 
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The difference between the sales and retention prices, 
until 196^, accrued to Iron and Steel Equalisation Fund 
established by the Government. The fund was used primarily 
to subsidize the importation of the higher priced foreign 
steel, so that domestic and imported steel coiild be sold 
to consumers at one uniform price. Thus the higher cost 
steel imports were financed essentially by a direct tax 
on the private producers, equivalent to the difference 
between the sales and the retention prices« 
- From the current fiscal year, 1979-^0, however, the 
Government has decided to levy surcharges on steel products 
to establish "Steel Development Fund". These increases in 
the price will generate additional resources which after 
providing for cost escalation would be utilised for the 
approved development outlays on this sector. I ai^pf the 
opinion that these price increases will generate Inflation 
in the economy. On the basis of current prices and the 
anticipated production in 1979-80, the internal resources 
of the public sector steel industry available for utilisa-
tion towards the plan outlay coiild at best be around 
Rs,30 crores. This modest amount would probably be eroded 
by cost escalation. 
As already stated in this study, the retention prices 
were established by the Government on the basis of the 
-(27^)-
recommendations made by the Tariff Commissione These 
recommendations were based on detailed cost enquiries 
conducted periodically by the Comraission« The first 
inquiry was vindertaken in 19^8 and was followed by a 
series of other investigations as either the Government 
or the producers asked for price adjustmentSo 
The retention prices established during the 
fifties were conciliatory to the industry as demonstra-
ted by Table 6«22» In 1956, the Cojomission had abandoned 
TABLE 6o22 - AVERAGE PRICE AND RETURN PER TON OF SALEABLE 
STEEL AVAILABLE TO MARGINAL PRODUCER, 1956-7^. 
Items 19?6-57^ 1961-62^ 196^ =^ 65° 1973-7^^ 
Average price Rs« 396 Rs,6^^ Rs»655 Rs*l623 
Total Cost of 
production 31^»85 ^76 5^ 1 I613 
Return per ton of 
saleable steel 81,15 172 11»f 10 
Gross block per 
ton of saleable steel W6,00 
Rate of Return 
Rate of Increase 
in average price 
Rate of Increase 
In cost of production 
SOURCES: a - Table 6.7; b - Table 6*16; c • Table 6,17; 
d - Table 6o20o 
its previous method of calculating the retention prices. 
h86, 
16< 
,  
,7% 
tm 
1563 
l l j g 
6h% 
51^ 
181+7 
s% 
0^002% 
l i f^ 
2072 
Oa005^ 
1if8^ 
198^ 
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No predetermined rate of return was established and prices 
were now explicitly set at a level which enabled both the 
producers to obtain a portion of their capital requirements 
from internal sources. Both TISCO and IISCO received 
common retention prices of Rs, 39^ in 195^ which were based 
on the estimate of the internal resource requirements 
of the highest cost producer, IISCO, It was only with 
the implementation of the 1956 price policy that retention 
prides were established at a sufficiently high level to 
encourage the existing firms to expand. The return on 
capital per ton of saleable steel in IISCO, the marginal 
producer, was 16*7 per cent. 
Pricing policy was reviewed by the Tariff Commission 
for the last time in 1962 and their "report on the ex-works 
retention prices for steel from April 1, 1960,'*tb March 31, 
1962", still endures* In 1961, the government sought to" 
introduce the principle of standard cost instead of histo- ^ 
rical cost as the basis of price fixationj but the Tariff 
Commission made their recoiamendations in I962 on the basis 
of a hypothetical block of Rs»l800, Subsequent revisions 
have been also made on the same basis. The Government 
rejected the Commission's proposal, partly because the 
Commission had allowed depreciation and return on capital 
assuming production at 90 per cent of capacity, a production 
rate achieved by IISCO, In the belief that the companies 
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should be penalised for failing to reach 100 per cent of 
their capacities, the government reduced the estimate of 
their capital per ten of output to Rs#1,176 upon which 
return and depreciation were computedo The Government's 
unwillingness to allow the increase in the retention 
price contemplated by the Tariff CoEomission discouraged 
greater production of tested steel by the steel plants* 
Although the plants received additions to their prices, 
known as price extras, to compensate them for the greater 
costs of producing tested steel products. In fact, these 
extras were not remunerative during the early '6O3, The 
margined producer*s cost of production, Bhilai*s, increased 
by 1V per cent as ccwipared to 0«002 per cent In its product »s 
prices in 196^65. As a result, the rate of return declined 
steeply from 11 per cent in 196I-62 to 6 per cent in 196if-65. 
The major reason was that the Government adhered to tradi-
tional absolute price differentials within any one category 
of steel* 
Against the assumed capital block of Rs«1,176 per 
ton, the actual block of H,S.L., at the million ton stage, 
was*al56ut Bs^2072 In 1973-7^ Even for private steel 
mills, the capital block of Rs«1,176 had been unrealistiCo 
Even if the block of Rs,1,800 is taken to demonstrate the 
cumulative effect on return earned by the public sector 
mills, prices should be raised by 13 per cent which is 
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equlvalent to the difference of Rs<,600 that lies between 
the capital block per ton of H.S.L. RsolSOO and Rs»1200 
(or RSo1,176). In other words, steel prices would have 
to be raised by about Rs,80 per ton, l»e,, 13 per cent 
of Rso600, the difference between Rs.1,800 and Rs«1,200 
(or Rs<,1,176) to enable the marginal producer, H.S.Lo, 
earn a fair return on its block capital per ton of 
saleable steel* As a result of denial of this capital 
per ton of saleable steel for computation of depreciation 
allowances and retention prices, H.S.L, obtained a meagre 
return Oo005 per cent on the gross block per ton in 
1973-7^ (Table 6.22)• The cumulative loss of revenue to 
H.S.L. amoxinted to Rs«196 crores \mtil the end of 1975-76, 
owing to unrealistic pricing policy of the Government. 
AS about two-thirds of stegl produced by H,S.L» is 
purchased by the Government departments and public 
undertakings, H,S«L. has been forced to bear losses. 
Another aspect of this cost-plus formula is that it does 
not contain any incentive for cost reduction. In fact, 
it encourages cost inflation which consists In the pro-
o 
vision of depreciation, tax rebates for development and 
retained profits or reserves which are deployed for 
expansion of capital base. Higher becomes the capital 
base, higher up are the prices adjusted to allow the 
1. H.S.L., Annual Report, 1975-76, pp. I8-I9. 
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guaranteed return on this enlarged capital base. The 
*cost plus formula* is not an economic principle of pricing 
which leads to accelerated costs. The sticky prices and 
rigid cost pattern dtHPlng slack period reduce the level 
of output and push the unit cost of production. The 
effect of this policy is also to make the production of 
less costly and substandard alternatives, such as untested 
steel, more remunerative to the steel plants. For this 
reason, the Government's policy encouraged the substitution 
of untested for tested steel after 196I-62, 
Perhaps the most serious defect of steel price 
control was the distortion of both retention and selling 
prices relative to the pri6'es of other commodities and the 
cost of producing steel in India, as revealed by Table 6«23« 
TABLE 6«a3 - INDEX WTT-MRTCPR nt? yfpj^T.TC.qATTT vvrrT?r nt? *rr— 
. eoMwuuiTiJiia, i^-nmh PKICES AND COST OF 
•STEEL PRODUCTION 
' • • 1 - r • I • II . •! — „ „ _ . I 111 1. -
Items 1961-62 196U-65 1969-70 
Al l Conraodities^ 100 122 172 
Cost of Steel Production^lOO 165 190 
Average Prices of All^ 
Steel Products 100 107 151 
SOUBCES; a and d - C.S.O, Index Number of Wholesale prices 
in India (for various y e a r s ) , 
b and c - Table 6.22. 
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Most strikingly, the rate of growth of steel prices 
was lowest when compared to all commodites and cost of 
production of steel in our coiontry. Against the annual 
rate of growth of prices of 8 per cent In the case of 
all commodities, 10 per cent in the case of cost of steel 
production in the country, the recorded rate of growth 
of retention prices of steel is barely 5o5 per cent per 
annum during the period under consideration. In the 
context of spiralling cost of production and low retention 
prices of steel, the lower rate of growth of return, as 
demonstrated by Table 6,22, has definite implications on 
the qxiality of products rolled and economic efficiency 
of the undertakings. 
Although operating costs were as a rule fully covered 
by retention prices, overheads were not, as analysed in 
this study. Not only were the rates used in computing 
overheads inadequate, so were estimates of total investmeibt, 
or capital block, to which they were applied. In its 
last enquiry the Tariff Commission used a standard block 
of Rs.1,800 per annual ton, assuming production of 90 per 
cent of capacity* This was reduced to Rs4,1,176 per ton 
by the Government, as observed earlier In this analysis. 
Both estimates were derived from the actual purchase costs 
of TISCO's plant and equipment, which were mostly installed 
before or Immediately after World War 11, and were in no 
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way related to replacement costs. 
These measures of capital block were particularly 
untenable as bases for the computation of return to the 
publiCj^ jgector steel plants. At the end of their initial 
stages of construction, the public sector steel plants' 
had an average capital block of RSo202lf per ton of 
saleable steel, assuming production at rated capacity. 
The same reached Rs,2072 per ton of salable steel after 
the completion of third stage. The public sector mills 
had difficulty meeting operating costs from their 
retention prices and had to burrow from the banks to cover 
their deficits. Even if their operating costs had been 
reduced, it would^have been impossible for them to earn 
an adequate return on their investment so long as they 
received prices based on the out-of-date capital costs 
of the private sector plants, as revealed by Table 6«20o 
It is, therefore, recommended that the 'marginal cost 
principle of pricing* products be adopted in place of the 
cost-plus formula* 
-(28l)~ 
CONCLUSION 
The foregoing analysis in this chapter reveals *^ -
that prices for the steel products determined by 
the Government operate to hamper the growth of the 
steel industry. It has produced a number of negative 
phenomena. For instance, the retention prices received 
by the producers were substantially below the controlled 
sales prices until 1973-7'+» The Government »s xinwillingness 
to allow sufficient increases in the retention price 
actually discouraged greater production of tested steel. 
Another distortion of the pricing system adopted by 
the Government In the case of iron and steel industiy is 
that it does n6:t"Provide for cost reduction. In fact, 
it encourages cost Inflation which consists in the provi-
sion of depreciation, tax rebates for development and re-
tained profits which are deployed for expansion of 
capital base which is used for the ccanputation of the 
retention prices* Higher becomes the capital base, higher 
up are the prices adjusted to allow the guaranteed return 
on this enlarged capital base. The sticky prices and 
the rigid cost pattern during slack period reduce the 
level of output and push the unit cost of production. The 
effect of this policy is .also to make the production of 
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less costly and substandard alternatives, such as untested 
steel, more remunerative to the producers. For this 
reason, the Goveriiment• s pricing policy for the steel 
industry encouraged the substitution of inferior for the 
superior quality of steel products. 
The most serious defect of steel price control and 
pricing system was the distortion of both retention and 
selling prices relative to the prices of other commodities 
and the cost of producing steel iji India, The spiralling 
cost of production and low retention prices yielded low 
return on capital per ton of saleable steel, viz«, O.OO? 
per cent in the case of Bhilai, the marginal producer, in 
1973-7^» It also has definite implications on the 
quality of„products rolled and economic efficiency of the 
undertakings. 
Although operating costs were as a rule fully covered 
by retention prices, overheads were not. The estimate of 
a standard block capital per ton of saleable steel in 
1962 was derived from the actual purchase costs of TISCO's 
plant and equipment, which were mostly installed before 
or immediately after World War II, and were in no way 
related to replacement costs. 
These measures of capital block were particularly 
untenable as bases for the computation of return to the 
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the public sector steel plants» The public sector mills 
had difficulty meeting operating costs from their reten-
tion prices and had' to "borrow from the banks to cover 
their deficits« It would have been impossible for them 
to earn an adequate return on their investment so iong 
as they received prices based on the out-of-date capital 
costs of the private sector plants* To give a forward 
looking price structure to the steel plants and also to 
provide incentive for cost »minimization* in the public 
sector steel plants, it is recommended that the principle 
of »marginal cost pricing' be substituted for the cost-plus 
formula. 
CHAPTER - VII 
C. O N C L U S I O K S 
The t h e s i s concerns i t s e l f wi th a c r i t i c a l 
examination as to how f a r t h e a s p i r a t i o n s of 
•Democratic Soc ia l i sm ' have been achieved; whether 
t h e msixiinum good of the maximum number has been the 
r e s u l t of the working of p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s or they 
have f a i l e d t o achieve the d e s i r e d r e s u l t s . 
The a n a l y s i s in Chapter I demonstra tes t h a t 
p u b l i c s e c t o r in Ind ia i s wedded t o 'Democratic 
Soc ia l i sm ' which promises t o l i f t the economy from 
lower l e v e l t o a h ighe r l e v e l of equ i l ib r ium and 
improve the l i v i n g s t andard of t h e populace* The 
p r i v a t e s e c t o r by and l a r g e i s not i n t e r e s t e d In 
providing t he se s o c i a l and economic overheads a l though 
they a re becoming conscious of t h e i r s o c i a l r e s p o n s i -
b i l i t i e s . Hence, the onus i s on the Government t o 
provide through p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s r i g h t type of goods 
and s e r v i c e s which would ensure a c c e l e r a t e d economic 
development of the coun t ry . This being the g o a l , the 
S t a t e has made massive investment t o t a l l i n g Rs<,11,097 
c ro res t i l l the end of 1975-76 in the p u b l i c e n t e r p r i s e s . 
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To step up the growth rate further, it is also essential 
that the capital is accumulated at every convenient point 
of activity. The public enterprises s^uld not lag 
behind the rest of the economy in capital format ion ^  In 
fact 'surplus' from public enterprises would constitute 
savings for productive investment on the one hand and 
contribution to the national social welfare programmes 
on the other. 'Surplus' is also necessary for public 
enterprises to self-finance their expansion, improvement 
and modernisation and for providing further employment 
opportunities in the country, 
• • > . -
Chapter II critically evaluates In the light of 
the above avowed aims of the public enterprises their 
working results during the period 1965~66 and 1973-"?'+• 
The study'~reveals that public enterprises have yet to 
be an effective means of resource-generation. This 
contention is supported by the low profits and large 
deficits. For instance, of the whole decade under 
review, public entejrprises made a notional profit of 
Rs,75 crore which yielded a return of less than 2 per 
cent only In 1973"7'+« Of the 95 running concerns, 
sixty-two enterprises had declared dividend on equity 
which was as low as "less than 1 per cent". The 
aggregate capital of these enterprises amo-unted to 1^ 
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per cent of the total equity. Assuming that if high 
dividends were not declared, high profit-ploughbacks 
would amount to resource-mobilisation, it is noted that 
average rate of return v;as 1.68 per cent, which v/as far 
less than the 'opportunity cost' of the capital invested, 
It can, therefore, be safely concluded that the 
performance of public enterprises remained highly 
tinsatisfactory» 
Contrary is true to say that they have acted as a 
drain on the national exchequer due to heavy deficits 
which worked out at l^f per cent of the equity at the 
end of 1973~7'+o This, in the ultimate analysis, has to 
be made good by the Government unless future operations 
of these enterprises become compensatorily profitable. 
The hard pressed case of cumulative deficits is the 
Engineering Industry of the public sector whose cumula-
tive deficits amounted to Rs,231,21 crore or 21 per cent" 
of the total capital invested. It does not mean that 
other public enterprises are not "in the red". All 
the public enterprises, excluding Petroleum, Trading 
and Marketing, have accumulated very large deficits 
over the period of their operations under review. 
Besides, loss of income to the Government is also 
implicit In equity-device of capitalisation to the 
extent of cost of capital whenever an enterprise does 
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not earn profits enough to pay a dividend on equity. For 
instance, in the solitaiy year of profit, vizo, 1973-7^, 
eight enterprises with am aggregate capital of Rs698o95 
crore, which did not declare dividend, entailed loss of 
Rs,5«9 crore, if this was computed at the minimurn 6 per 
cent rate of interest. The cost of capital or 'opt)ortu-
nity cost' may be regarded as an 'unnoticed recurrent 
loss' of income because this does not enter the books 
of accounts. It may be said that the 'explicit' and 
'•implicit' losses amount to a very high pro'portion of 
the capital over the period of their operationSo 
In Chapter III, inquiry into the factors causing 
deficits revealed that"cost of production in public 
enterprises was excessive due to, in the first instance, 
large idle capacity. For example, in 1972-73> out of 
35 units analysed, it was found that in 1^ enterprises 
utilisation of capacity was above ']^ per cent; in the 
case of 12 units it was above 50 per cent; in the case 
of 6 it was less than 50 per cent, and three could 
utilise evfen less than 25 per cent. Idle capacity on 
such a large scale is attributable primarily to long 
period of gestation in capital-intensive projects, 
Hindustan Electricals (India) Ltd, furnishes an example 
which was incorporated on 29 August, 1955<» The project 
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report^ as accepted by the Government, had anticipated 
eight years to achieve full production in the factory. 
The eight years were a period of abnormally high undcr-
utilisation of capacity. Teething problems, including 
technological difficulties and initial bottlenecks, also 
acted as constraints which militated against full 
utilisation of capacity in a number of cases. For 
instance, fertilizer plants of Neyveli Lignite Corpora-
tion which were commissioned in 19^5 had to work to low 
capacity until 19^9 due to technological difficiilties and 
Initial bottlenecks. 
In addition to these, there are evidences to 
suggest that, on balance, investment planning at the very 
beginning did not take into account demand for the , 
product. For instance, Government entered into an 
agreement with fche Government of USSR on 29 May, 1959> 
to establish in the public sector plants for the manu-
facture of antibiotics, synthetic drugs, surgiaal instini-
ments, phyto-chemicals and glandular products though 
demand for those products did not justify establishment 
of these units. As a consequence, the level of 
production, in the first two years, in surgical instru-
ments; plant was about 19 per cent of its capacity» In 
1972-73, it was 2^+ per cent, and in subsequent years also 
the level of production did not rise much. In antibiotics 
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plant at Rishikesh, the production of commissioned 
products was 1+8 per cent in 1975-76<, Such instances 
support the contention that demand was not adequately 
assessed for the products at the time of initial 
capital investmento 
Likewise, lack of coordinated market research and 
development prograinKes is yet another factor contri~ 
buting to lov7 utilisation of capacity. For example, 
Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd, (IDPL) can 
increase demand for its products by producing consumer-
end products, follov7ing the suit of the international 
companies like Bayer, Parke,ipavis, Sandoz^ , Glaxo, etc., 
which manufacture products extending from cosmetics to 
electronics, veterinary products, pharmaceuticals, dye-
stuffs, laboratory chemicals, industrial raw-materials 
and intermediate, textile chemicals, agro-chemicals, 
baby-food, tooth-pastes, shaving creams, etc« 
Unrealistic production targets also account for 
Idle capacity In the public enterprises* Management 
used to fix easily accessible targets to cover up their 
inefficiency. It is essential that annual targets of 
production are laid down after taking into account all 
the relevant factors, including rated capacity and the 
size of demand which must be assessed by the enterprise 
through market surveys. It calls for a system of 
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»checks and abalances' in production planning to avoid 
low targets of production„ 
Yet another cause of low utilisation of capacity 
is the strained industrial relations. To illustrate 
the point, public steel mills alone lost 20*96 lakh 
manhours during 1967-68 and 1970-71, entiailing financial 
losses of Rs,986«^5 lo.kh<, 
Poor maintenance of equipments and machinery also 
brought in its trail loss of production« For example, 
destruction of equipment at Rourkela at one time 
necessitated some stripping of parts from one unit of a 
mill to replace parts in anothero Whereas public 
sector steel plants could not operate efficiently, other 
public enterprises bore •exc^ g.sive costs of unnecessarily 
large acciimulation of inventories* For instance, 
inventories of public enterprises increased from Rs»36l 
crore In 1965-66 to Rs» 2,lf85 crore in. 1973-7^* If 
public enterprises could reduce inventories to 2 months» 
output, substantial funds would have been available 
o—~ 
for gainful employinent in the undertakings» 
It is worth considering that cost pattern of 
public enterprises is aJLso Influenced by »social 
interests' comprising surplus labour, excessive cost 
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of wage-and-non-v/age benefits, provision of more 
consumer-amenities than a private enterprise, 
Overstaffing is a common feature of almost every 
public enterpriseo For instance, the public sector 
steel pi&nts were to hire between 6,000 and 8,000-
persons. The actual work force of these enterprises 
is now double the original estimates^ Relative 
disregard for cost minimisation has encouraged the 
hiring of additional workers to obtain marginal 
increments in output. 
Bane of overstaffing is seen in the form of 
absenteeism and indfltiipline. To illustrate, the 
Aircraft Factory and the Engine Factory of the 
Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd, lost 20B^1 per cent and 
21ol8 per cent of mandays respectively due to 
absenteeism in 1966-.6?« it is significant to note 
that while there is surplus labour, there are 
instances of overtime payments to the staff. For 
example, Fertilizer Corporation of India, despite 
surplus labour, paid by way of overtime allowances 
Rs,16*02 lakh in 1966"67, It illustrates waste of 
scarce resources by public enterprises. 
Higher cost of production is also traceable to 
excessive spendings on wage-and-non-wage benefits to 
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employees of the public enterpriseSo The successive 
five year plans emphasised the responsibilities of the 
public enterprises with regard to labour* Explaining 
the implications of this approach, the Third Five 
Year Plan pointed out that the economic activity was 
not to be conceived of only in terms of output and 
returns; the principal, test of this would be the good 
of all those who were engaged In it. There is, however, 
a strong need to follow a balanced approach in incurring 
expenditure on productive and non-productive activities. 
They should have relationship with productivity which 
is not taken into consideration at present. To ask 
the public enterprises to be 'model employers' on the 
basis of higher wage-»and-non-wage benefits would be a 
misnomer, if their productivity and profits are not 
increased* To csrapare the working of public enterprises 
on the basis of this norm with the private enterprises, 
the latter are better »model ^ employers' who pay higher 
wages and more non«wage benefits to their employees. 
Public enterprises are over-burdened with financial 
cost of these benefits. For iivstance, during 1965-66 
and 1969-70 rate of increase in expenditure was 16,29 
per cent as against 1»30 per cent of Increase in 
labour productivity. For the whole period 1965-66 to 
1975-76, compound rate of increase in expenditure per 
employee was 17,1 per cejnt as against 1,15 per cent for 
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labour prod\ictivity. Wherever the enhancement in 
expenditure on employees of the public enterprise5 is 
notJLinked with productivity, a case emerges, as if a 
self-evident one, of inflated cost of production, i^  
therefore, recommend that the welfare expenditure of 
public enterprises must be decided on business economics 
rather than on social grounds. 
Similarly, public enterprises carry the burden of 
townships. The total gross capital expenditure on town-
ships accounted for RSono6o9 crore out of the total gross 
fixed assets of Rs,11,V5lo2 crore in 1976-77. Thus, the 
expenditure on townships constituted 3»6 per cent of the 
total gross investment in fixed assets. Rate of return 
on total capital invested in 1976-77 was 3»6 per cent. 
If the township outlays were excluded, it would have 
increased to 5»2 per cent. If to^ ,'nship burden is 
removed, it would thus have a favourable impact on the 
return. 
The other way in which a public enterprise bears 
social cost is by providing certain of its outputs to 
consumers and regions that do not pay the related costs 
in full. Such operations of public enterprises are 
marked by excessive costs which their counterparts in the 
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private sector do not usually have to provide for. The 
argument is not that such operations should be given 
up, but that the expenditures incurred, being merged 
in the general costs of the enterprise, inflate the 
overall cost pattern to the disadvantage of the 'bther 
consumers. 
Additionally, our public enterprises are also under 
the stress of having to incur expenditure to satisfy the 
rules of 'public accountability' which take the shape of 
investigations by Committee on Public Undertakings, 
criticism by the members of Parliament, audit by the 
Comptroller and Auditor-General and public criticism in 
the press. The public enterprises are impelled to 
conduct their operations, especially the "expenditure 
operations, in such a way that all the relevant rules 
are satisfied and there is nothing 'irregular' about 
any transaction. The procedure built up for the sake 
of »public accountability* involves, as one of the 
1 
important consequences, delays in decision-making. This 
has two defiectsj firstly, certain possible economies may 
be lost due to impromptltude "of i;he decision; and 
secondly, a decisional framework characterised by delay 
dissuades the managers in the long run from evincing 
positive interest in prompt action. It is interesting 
to note that Professor J.K, Galbraith has stressed the 
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importance of timeliness in preference to precision In 
business decisions. 
It would also be necessary to organise public 
relations and publicity work to achieve the xDbjective 
of keeping the public adequately informed and to secure 
acceptance of public enterprise policies, more so 
because no statutory requirements regarding consumers» 
consultative councils exist for these enterprises, 
^ On the basis of the foregoing analysis, the-
conclusion is drawn that the cost pattern of our public 
enterprises is excessi\>^ e due to idle capacity, deficien-
tfeles In investment techniques, production planning, * 
Inventory control, marketing management and planning of 
manpower, Streearon the public enterprises to act as 
•model employer' and fulfil the needs of <public *^ '"" 
accountability* has added to the cost of production* 
In my opinion, 'social obligations* must also be wedded 
to productivity and profitabilityo Similarly, Parliamen-
tary control which envisages public accoontability should 
be exercised with due care. The procedure should be such 
as to maintain autonomy of the public enterprises and 
help the decision-making process. If bright image of 
public enterprises is to be projected and if they ai*e 
not to suffer due to lack of consumers* consultative 
councils J endeavours must be made to organise public 
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relations and publicity work. In the ultirjate analysis, 
if the public enterprises are to be worthy of public 
confidence, they should make continuous efforts to 
serve the good of the public in an efficient manner. 
Nevertheless, excessive cost and low returns are 
the raanifestations of unscientific organisation and 
inefficient bureaucratic management, Analysis In the 
Chapter IV discloses the fact that these enterprises 
bear the cost of organisation which is inefficient at 
various levels of management, such as delays in decisioa* 
making and consequent operational inefficiency, 
professor Q»H, Parooquee»s comments in this respect are 
quite revealing, "These enterprises, in spitcvof the 
best Government care and attention, have failed to 
Inspire the team-work, "What is to say of giving lead 
to th^^private sector as regards sound management, they 
do not even approximate the conditions obtaining in the 
enlightened private industrial concems," It is 
sufficient indication that managerial efficiency of 
public enterprises is at its low ebb. Hence, there 
. o-—,, 
is a good scope for reduction of costs through improve-
ment in managerial efficiency and application of 
business principles in them. 
Close examination of the working of the public 
1, See the text of the Chapter IV, 
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enterprises revealed that the existing management has 
tended to be over-centralised in the hands of bureaucrats 
who are reluctant to decentralise functions even though 
justified by economic expediencies,^ Such practices have 
led to delays in decisions and operations» 
From the analyses in the Chapters I to IV have 
emerged' four questions of significance in relation to 
pricing system in our public enterprises which have 
been fully iBE-"-e3tigated in the Chapters V and 71, viz: 
(a) have the objectives been specified to harmo-
nize econonic and social interests which the public 
enterprises are called upon to fulfil and the norms to 
measure efficiency; 
(b) is there a consistent pricing policy; 
(c) does there obtain 'minimum cost level" viz-a-
viz pricing; and 
(d) does there exist a system of sufficient consul-
tation with the management to fix prices including pi«Df-it 
or * surplus' targets to provide incentives to management? 
Findings of the analyses in the Chapters V and 
VI support the view that there is need for separation of 
non-com.mercial activities of a public enterprise from 
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eccanomic ones to avoid confusion. The management, at 
present, in roost cases, does not fulfil financial 
obligations. If objectives are specified for individual 
public concerns either on the basis of product, custoraer, 
market or zone, there will emerge accordingly a policy 
of 'subsidy' for losses sustained by public enterprises 
under different sets of circxiiEStances, Losses resulting 
from "administered prices" or those resulting from 
"inadequate project planning" and "constructional delays" 
must be subsidized. However, the present practice of 
using "Depreciation Fund" for wiping out losses is not 
a desirable practice because it eventually underlines 
the financial soundness of these enterprises as a 
commercial entity^ 
It is significant to note that objectives have to 
be determined for the disposition of 'surplus' to 
harmonize the economic and social InterestSo In this 
context, it is worth considering that, first, the 
patteki of distribution of »surplus' must be laid down 
o 
in advance'; secondly, the pattern must be flexible enough 
to meet the requirements of national economy as a whole; 
and, finally, major portion of the surplus must be 
earmarked for general capital formation^ 
Investigation into the pricing techniques in 
public enterprises revealed that Government exercises 
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rigid control on the prices of public enterprises. It 
ffiust, however, be cited that price controls hampered 
the growth of the iron and steel industry. It produced 
a nu-mber of negative phenomena ranging from deteriora-
tion in the quality of steel products to the fall in 
steel production. The sticky prices and the spiralling 
cost of production tended to reduce the level of output 
on the one hand and discourage production of superior 
category of steel due to unremunerative prices on the 
other. The most serious defect of steel price control 
was the distortion of both retention and selling prices 
relative to the prices of »other commodities» and the 
cost of producing steel in India, The high cost of 
production and the low prices caused low return on 
it~i— 
capitai block per ton of salable steel. Thus, it has 
definite implications on the quality of products rolled 
and operational efficiency of the public steel" mills* 
It is Impossible for the public enterprises to earn an 
adequate return on their investment so long as they are 
the catchers of iinrealistic prices, ** " 
When prices are determined, there must obtain a 
•minimum level of cost' viz-a-viz prices for the 
products of our public enterprises. The findings of 
this enquiry indicate that the prices becaune untenable 
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to our public enterprises because they were not sufficient 
to cover the costs of production. In the case of Iron 
and steel industry, for example, the rate of growth of 
prices was lower than the costs. During the period 
1961-62 and 1969-70 the annual rate of grov;th of prices _ 
for steel products was 8 per cent as compared to 10 
per cent for the cost of producing steel in the coiontry. 
It demonstrates that there does not exist a pricing 
system consistent with the level of costs in our public 
enterprises. 
It is, therefore, imperative to constitute a 
competent body to help the'^ovemment evolve a consistent 
pricing policy for our public enterprises. To avoid the 
conflict bet'./een the maximum 'economic', and 'social' 
returns, it would be worthwhile to apply the principle 
of 'marginal costing' in these enterprises„ 
It can be pointed out without any fear of contra-
diction that prices based on 'cost plus' formula are not 
conducive to reductions in the costs. The cost must be 
reduced to a minimum level for the determination of 
prices by eliminating factors causing escalation in the 
costs, e.g., large idle capacity, deficiencies in 
project planning, constructional delays, inadequate 
production management, heavy inventories, lack of 
proper marketing management, large overheads, surplus 
labour force, low productivity of labour and capital. 
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There are , in fact , maiiifestatiors of managerial 
inefficiency due to organisa t ional def ic ienc ies and lack 
of i n i t i a t i v e on the part of nanagesent* 
The main conclusion of t h i s study i s tha t , to 
ensure success of the public en te rp r i ses , i t i s neces-
sary to run these en te rpr i ses on soiuid p r inc ip les of 
business rcanagerrient. The decision-making process must 
be ra t ional ised so that decisions are taken promptly a t 
a l l levels of management, i . e . , board of d i r ec to r s and 
down to the lowest l eve l of management. The public 
enterpr ises which have become adjuncts to the ministry 
concerned due to o f f i c i a l hold on t h e i r boards must be 
given a board which must be d ivers i f i ed , consis t ing of 
members drawn from diverse f i e l d s , e»g., education, 
research, ijadustry, coiBmerce, banking, etc* These 
org-ani$atio35al reforms are compatible with »operational 
autonomy* of public en te rpr i ses and 'publ ic accounta-
b i l i t y », divorced from p o l i t i c a l considerat ions and 
a rb i t r a r i ne s s , 
ty—I 
o 
The analytical study significantly reveals that, 
in the present set-up, there is conspicuous absence of 
norms to measure the managerial efficiency of our 
public enterprises. »Money profits' must not be taken 
as a true yardstick, except where competitive condit"ions 
prevail* Efficiency must be measured in relation to 
cer ta in object ives , v i z . , econoi^ical uu<^- of c . p i t a l 
resources and other inputs, suvin^^s en ovorl.f ds e^ nd 
inventor ies , hi;ihfcr productivity of lauour and cap i t a l , 
changes i*i un i t cost of production oT a given quality^ 
These c r i t e r i a have not been made use of in our public 
enterpr ises* If implemented properly, these treasures 
would go a long way in enhancing the p r o f i t a b i l i t y 
of our public sector enterpriseso 
I t i s s igni f icant t o note tha t the ^Surplus 
margin* i s fixed too generally and without suff ic ient 
consul ta t ion with the management who alone can say what 
i s feas ib le and what i s unfeasible under a given se t 
of conditions^ iin ' ove ra l l ' surplus target for the 
public sector as a whole is not veiy meaningful from 
the angite of improving 'operat ional ef f ic iency ' and 
providing incentives to tnanageraent» 'Surplus* ta rge ts 
should be, therefore, determined for individual concerns 
in close consultat ion with the management, a f t e r taking 
i n t o consideration the supply and demand condit ions, 
and impact on the private sector v iz -a-v iz the 
na t iona l econonjy as a whole» 
On the basis of the findings of t h i s study, i t 
can be asser ted tha t , surplus being the primary 
objective for socia l welfare programoie, pr ic ing policy 
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rcust be so formu-lated as to help the public snterprises 
strengthen their marketing and technological position, 
provide the conimmity with products and services 
competitive in price and quality, bring about higher 
productivity and assist in *general* capital formation. 
To attain these objectives, Government must pay full 
attention to the concept of 'marginal cost pricing' 
to substitute for the arbitrary methods of fixing 
prices on the basis of 'cost plus' formula. This is 
essential for the fulfilment of the social responsi-
bilities of management and their trusteeship towards 
citizens of the country* 
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